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ABSTRACT 
The central concern of this thesis is with the role 
thought-experiments play in the debate about personal 
identity, especially with the question of what role they 
should play. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is 
a defence of the use of thought~experiments against a number 
of influential and potentially damaging indictments of it. 
Some of the arguments discussed are directed at specific 
experiments or a specific kind of experiment, but all have 
implications which extend to the method in general. The 
thrust of my response to these arguments is that even if some 
objections to thought-experiments are strong enough to make us 
more cautious about how we use them, none of them is strong 
enough to require the general abandonment of the method of 
thought-experiment in the context of the personal identity 
debate. 
The aim of the second part is to find an answer to the 
question of what it is that thought-experiments can do, given 
that there is no prior case ruling them out altogether. The 
strategy is to reach an answer by a close examination of some 
prominent examples of thought-experiments in the literature. 
vi 
In the nature of my topic, there are two issues here. One is 
methodological, about what one can expect from a thought-
experiment; the other is the substantive one as to what 
thought-experiments can really establish about the nature of 
personal identity. 
With regard to the methodological issue, two basic kinds 
of potentially informative thought-experiment emerge. There 
are those which serve to support or undermine a theory by 
revealing the relative importance of the various principles of 
classification which are implicit in our use of the concepts 
of person and personal identity. There are also those which 
function to show that a theory suffers from internal 
inconsistencies or that it has unacceptable consequences. 
In the process of investigating how thought-experiments 
can work, I argue that one view of personal identity receives 
stronger support from them than any of its rivals. This is a 
nonreductionist view which holds that while personal identity 
can be analysed in terms of psychological continuity, it 
cannot be reduced in the standardly accepted sense of that 
term. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION - THESE BIZARRE FICTIONS 
SECTION 1: Thought-experiments and personal identity 
For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it 
the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter 
and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as 
deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be 
the same person with the prince, accountable only 
for the prince's actions: but who would say it was 
the same man? (Locke 1694: II,xxvii,15) 1 
The modern debate about personal identity begins with 
Book II, Chapter xxvii of Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. The use of thought-experiments does not begin 
with the work of Locke2 • Nor is it restricted to the 
discussion of persons and their identity, but the role that 
thought-experiments like the one above have played in that 
discussion is not paralleled anywhere else in philosophy. 
Their presence infuses the entire debate: they are used by 
advocates of all the central competing theories,.and all the 
watersheds in the history of the debate are marked by their 
us~. 
1· 
These points are enough to establish the importance of 
this method of argument to the topic of personal identity, and 
to make an enquiry into its workings a worthwhile 
philosophical enterprise. But there is much more besides this 
which makes the enquiry a pressing one. The past forty years 
have seen the emergence of a number of sharp and far-reaching 
criticisms of the use of thought-experiments, and the clamour 
of this criticism has recently been on the increase. Given 
this growing opposition, together with the influential role in 
which they have been cast, the whole problem will need careful 
attention if the personal identity debate in its current form 
is to retain its central position in contemporary metaphysics. 
In this introductory chapter I will give a brief sketch 
of the debate itself and the place thought-experiments have 
had in it. I will also outline how I will structure my 
investigation of the method and the place it should have in 
the personal identity debate. 
SECTION 2: Early historical examples of the personal identity 
debate 
What is known as the personal identity debate consists, 
as do most such prominent philosophical debates, in not one 
but a whole number of debates. Nevertheless, those 
participat~ng can be divided without much misrepresentation 
into two overall groups. There are those who think that the 
2 
relation of being the same person over a period of time can be 
analysed into more familiar and better-understood relations, 
and those who deny that this is the case. The terms used for 
each group differ in the literature. The most common 
distinction is drawn at present between "reductionists" and 
"nonreductionists" (for example, by Parfit 1984); sometimes 
the divide is expressed as separating "empiricists" from "non-
empiricists" (Madell 1981) and sometimes "materialists" from 
"dualists" (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984). 
These different titles serve to give some idea of who the 
combatants are and perhaps something of what is at stake, but 
none of them fits perfectly. While most dualists do tend to 
see personal identity as unanalysable, there are materialists 
who also see things this way. There are also those, like 
Locke himself, who are neutral in the debate as to whether or 
not mind is matter (Locke 1694: IV,iii,G), but who take up a 
strong position as to the analysability of personal identity. 
While it is common for empiricists to insist that the relation 
can be further analysed in terms of observable relations, 
there are empiricists who believe that it cannot, and non-
empiricists who believe that some analysis is possible. The 
reductionistj nonreductionist distinction is perhaps the most 
accurate of the three standard characterizations, but even so, 
there are nonreductionists who accept the analysability of 
personal identity, as we shall see in Chapter 7. As a result, 
while it may make the exposition more clumsy, I will tend to 
stick to talk of analysability unless the context dictates 
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otherwise, but the relevance of the other distinctions should 
become clear in due course. 
The fundamental opposition outlined above can be well 
illustrated from the early history of the debate, as can the 
role of thought-experiments in the support of both sides. As 
I have said, the first major contribution was that of Locke. 
Locke suggests in his Essay that the notion of "same person" -
the notion crucial to law and morality which underlies the 
institutions of responsibility, commitment, desert, and so on 
- can be analysed into a more fundamental relation: 
as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea 
of any past action with the same consciousness it 
had of it at first, and with the same consciousness 
it has of any present action; so far it is the same 
personal self. (Locke 1694: II,xvii,10) 
His response to those who oppose the analysability of the 
relation takes the form of an attack on the Cartesian notion 
of the self being an immaterial substance, the focus of the 
attack being on substantiality rather_ than immateriality 
(Jolley 1984: 130). In this, he makes use of a thought-
experiment: he holds that were someone to insist th~t his soul 
were that of Socrates - that is, he and Socrates were the same 
immaterial substance - while being unable to remember any of 
Socrates's actions or thoughts, we would deny that he and 
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Socrates were the same person. And we would still do so even 
if it could somehow be proved that there was an immaterial 
substance shared between them (1694: II,27,14). 
The other side of the opposition is represented by 
Leibniz, especially in his New Essays on Human Understanding. 
Leibniz's position has some complexity to it and shares 
certain points with Locke's (Curley 1982, Jolley 1984), but 
one central strand concerns the importance of immaterial 
substances. He challenges Locke with the following thought-
experiment: 
Here is something we could much more fittingly 
suppose: in another region of the universe or at 
some other time there may be a sphere in no way 
sensibly different from this sphere of earth on 
which we live, and inhabited by men each of whom 
differs sensibly in no way from his counterpart 
among us. Thus at one time there will be more than 
a hundred million pairs of similar persons, i.e. 
pairs of persons with the same appearances and 
states of consciousness. God could transfer the 
minds, by themselves or with their bodies, from one 
sphere to the other without their being aware of it; 
but whether they are transferred or left where they 
are, what would your authorities say about their 
persons or 'selves'? Given that the states of 
consciousness and the inner and outer appearances of 
the men on these two spheres cannot yield a 
distinction between them, are they two persons or 
are they one and the same? ... since according to your 
theories consciousness alone distinguishes persons, 
with no need for us to be concerned about the real 
identity or diversity of substance ... what is to 
prevent us from saying that these two persons who 
are at the same time in these two similar but 
inexpressibly distant spheres, are one and the same 
person? Yet that would be a manifest absurdity. 
· (Leibniz 1765: 245) 
5 
Thus, acco~ding to Leibniz real identity is not to be 
expressed in more basic terms, especially not in terms of some 
observable relation. It is a relation sui generis, simple and 
unanalysable; and that point is established by a thought-
experiment. 
SECTION 3: Contemporary examples of the personal identity 
debate 
The debate over the possibility of further analysis of 
the concept of personal identity does not end with the 
exchange between Leibniz and Locke, nor does their method of 
conducting it. The most influential contemporary writer on 
the topic is Parfit, who styles himself a reductionist. 
Personal identity, he holds, can be analysed as a relation of 
psychological continuity in a 1:1 relationship; what is more, 
the world could.be completely described without any reference 
to persons or personal identity (Parfit 1984: 212). This is a 
more sophisticated account than Locke's, while showing a 
strong resemblance to it. His support for it also resembles 
Locke's, with added sophistication. He supports it by 
attacking those who believe that personal identity is an 
irreducible relation, focusing on the fact that they also 
believe that there must always be an answer to any question of 
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identity. Parfit takes the following thought-experiment to 
show that there are not always answers. 
My body is fatally injured as are the brains of my 
two brothers. My brain is divided, and each half is 
successfully transplanted into the body of one of my 
brothers. Each of the resulting people believes he 
is me, seems to remember living my life, has my 
character, and is in every other way psychologically 
continuous with me. And he has a body that is very 
like mine. (Parfit 1984: 254-5) 
In this scenario, all the possible answers to the question as 
to the identity relation between the original and the 
survivors are equally implausible. Both cannot be Parfit on 
pain of absurdity, for then two distinct people would be one 
and the same. To say that neither is Parfit is tantamount to 
saying that Parfit is dead, which would likewise be absurd. 
As he puts it, this would be to call a double success a 
failure. But the only other option is that one of the 
survivors and not the other is Parfit, and such an answer 
would be arbitrary or worse. So nonreductionism must be 
wrong. 
Madell is one modern-day combatant in the Leibniz 
tradition. His insistence on the unanalysable nature of the 
relation has behind it these considerations: 
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the following two thought-experiments are equally 
intelligible: (a) that I might not have existed, but 
someone having exactly the l_ife that I have had 
might have existed instead; (b) I might have had a 
totally different life, even to the extent of being 
born centuries earlier. (Madell 1981: 79) 
So the opposing positions and the characteristic method 
are to be observed at both ends of the modern debate, at the 
beginning and at the latest point. But the method also marks 
high points along the way. It was remarked earlier that the 
debate was not one but many debates, while the exposition so 
far may create a different impression. For within the camps, 
especially the camp favouring analysis, there is much 
dissension, and here again thought-experiments are prominent 
in the armouries of almost all who are engaged. 
The most important difference among those who favour 
analysis occurs between those who hold that identity is to be 
analysed as psychological continuity, and those who opt for 
physical continuity. For Parfit, as we have seen4 , when the 
variables stand for persons, for x to be identical to y, x and 
nobody else must be psychologically continuous with y (Parfit 
1984: 262-3). For Williams, amongst others; x must be 
physically continuous with y. Why should we believe Williams 
rather than Parfit? Because of the following case, Williams 
argues. 
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All the events (Charles) claims to have witnessed 
and all the actions he claims to have done point 
unanimously to .. the life-history of some one person 
in the past - for instance, Guy Fawkes. Not only do 
all Charles' memory claims that can be checked fit 
the pattern of Fawkes' life as known to historians, 
but others that cannot be checked are plausible, 
provide explanations of unexplained facts, and so 
on. (Williams 1956: 7-8) 
Should we follow the suggestions of Locke and Parfit, we would 
agree that Charles was Guy Fawkes, but 
if it is logically possible that Charles should 
undergo the changes described, then it is logically 
possible that some other man should simultaneously 
undergo the same changes; e.g. that both Charles and 
his brother Robert should be found in this 
condition. What should we say in that case? They 
cannot both be Guy Fawkes; if they were, Guy Fawkes 
would be in two places at once, which is absurd ..• We 
might instead say that one of them was identical 
with Guy Fawkes, and that the other was just like 
him; but this would be an entirely vacuous 
manoeuvre, since there would be ex hypothesi no 
principle determining which description was to apply 
to which .•. The only case in which identity and exact 
similarity could be distinguished ... is that of the 
body - 'same body' and 'exactly similar body' really 
do mark a difference. Thus I should claim that the 
omission of the body takes away all content from the 
idea of personal identity. (Williams 1956:8-10) 
Thus on Williams's account the only way to determine who 
really was Guy Fawkes would be to discover which of Charles's 
and Robert's bodies were that of Guy Fawkes, and personal 
identity consists in bodily, not psychological continuity. 
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There are also arguments to support Parfit against 
Williams. One argument in support of his position is Locke's 
thought-experiment quoted at the start of the chapter. Parfit 
also asks us to consider this example: 
I enter the Teletransporter. I have been to Mars 
before, but only by the old method, a space-ship 
journey taking several weeks. This machine will 
send me at the speed of light. I merely have to 
press the green button. Like others, I am nervous. 
Will it work? I remind myself what I have 'been told 
to expect. When I press the button, I shall lose 
consciousness, and then wake up at what seems a 
moment later. In fact I shall have been unconscious 
for about an hour. The scanner here on Earth will 
destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact 
states of all my cells. It will then transmit this 
information by radio. Travelling at the speed of 
light, the message will take three minutes to reach 
the Replicator on Mars. This will then create, out 
of new matter, a brain and body exactly like mine. 
It will be in this body that I will wake up. 
(Parfit 1984: 199) 
Parfit's response to the thought-experiment is to confirm that 
what he has been led to expect is indeed what would happen 
(1984: 285); but since personal identity is retained despite a 
total physical change, physical continuity is not even a 
necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for identity. 
I will not attempt to resolve this or any other dispute 
at this stage, and there are other significant disputes among 
the analysts which deserve a mention. Perhaps the last major 
one in the literature which requires some attention is between 
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adherents of the view that some sort of physical continuity is 
the relation which constitutes our identity. We have seen 
Williams's contention, with its supporting thought-experiment, 
that bodily identity is what constitutes the identity of 
persons. There is an opposing view that this contention is 
too strong. While the emphasis is still on the physical, it 
is argued that it is merely some part of one's body that must 
continue in order for identity to be retained. That appears 
to be the consequence of this thought-experiment of Sidney 
Shoemaker's: 
One day, ... a surgeon discovers that an assistant has 
made a horrible mistake. Two men, a Mr Brown and a 
Mr Robinson, had been operated on for brain tumours, 
and brain extractions had been performed on both of 
them. At the end of the operations, however, the 
assistant inadvertently but Brown's brain in 
Robinson's head, and Robinson's brain in Brown's 
head. One of these men immediately dies, but the 
other, the one with Robinson's body and Brown's 
brain, eventually regains consciousness. Let us 
call the latter "Brownson." Upon regaining 
consciousness Brownson exhibits great shock and 
surprise at the appearance of his body •.. When asked 
his name he automatically replies "Brown." He 
recognizes Brown's wife and family (whom Robinson 
had never met), and is able to describe in detail 
events in Brown's life, always describing them as 
events in his own life ... Over a period of time he is 
observed to display all of the personality traits, 
mannerisms, interests, likes and dis1ikes, and so on 
that had previously characterised Brown, and to act 
and talk in ways completely alien to the old 
Robinson. (Shoemaker 1963: 23-24) 
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Here the transfer of Brown's brain into Robinson's body takes 
with it the identity of Brown, or so it has been claimed5 • 
But it is quite obvious that Brownson's whole body, or even 
most of it, plays no part in that transfer of identity. What 
has happened to Brown seems to be best described as a radical 
amputation, and that marks the whole-body criterion of 
personal identity as misguided. 
That provides a rough sketch of at least the major 
concerns in the personal identity debate. It by no means 
reflects all the sophistications, nor refers to all of the 
philosophers who have concerned themselves with the problems. 
But it does serve to show the kinds of issues which have 
interested philosophers, and makes quite clear that a singular 
sort of method has driven the debate. Thought-experiments are 
by no means to be seen as the preserve of a particular school 
of thought on the topic, as the wide variety of conflicting 
views represented shows; everybody seems quick to produce the 
thought-experiment which proves their point. 
SECTION 4: Adverse reaction to the general method 
The impression that all concerned accept the method of 
thought-experiment is misleading, for their appeal has not 
been universal. The various parties in the debate have long 
accused each other of misinterpreting particular thought-
12 
experiments, or misrepresenting what is at stake, and thus 
abusing the method in their arguments. But there is also a 
much stronger and more far-reaching kind of censure to be 
found in the literature. This ranges from Williams's mild 
warning that "the imagination is too tricky a thing to provide 
a reliable road to the comprehension of what is logically . 
possible" (Williams 1966: 45) to Flew's total rejection of the 
use of thought-experiment {Flew 1988}. Wilkes's book Real 
People is tellingly subtitled, "Personal Identity Without 
Thought-Experiments" (Wilkes 1988). 
Objections to the method range across a wide front; there 
are complaints of semantic, epistemological and metaphysical 
problems besetting any attempt to discover the truth about our 
identity by indulging in imaginative experiments. Nor are 
these criticisms isolated ones; recently they have increased 
greatly in number and have received widespread acceptance6 • 
The crucial role that thought-experiments have been shown to 
play, together with the general presumption by their users of 
their effectiveness, demands that these criticisms receive 
attention. In the following chapters I will look both at 
criticisms of specific thought-experiments and more general 
rejections of the entire method. 
This tide of adverse criticism of the use of thought-
experiments in the personal identity debate demands attention 
if one still wishes to make use of them. Thus Unger is 
obliged to begin his Identity, Consciousness and Value (Unger 
1989) with a chapter outlining and defending the method before 
he gets on to use it to support his view of identity in the 
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eight chapters which follow. But the problems the method 
raises cannot be adequately dealt with as quickly a~ Unger 
proposes. That is a strong reason for my thesis taking the 
form it does - almost the inverse of Unger's - of a detailed 
defence of thought-experiments in the context, followed by an 
examination of some of the consequences for personal identity. 
One point is worth making here, however, even before any 
detail is provided of the case against thought-experiments. 
This is that there is a function for thought-experiments even 
if there is a flaw in the method itself. Even if all the 
arguments against thought-experiments were to succeed, there 
would still be a place for them. Once it is accepted they 
have played, and still play, an influential role in the 
personal identity debate, their place is assured; for they can 
work as internal criticisms of the work of theorists who make 
use of and accept them as a valid method. One is entitled to 
use a theorist's own thought-experiments, as well as 
relevantly similar ones which he does not use, against him. 
The method of thought-experiment would be accepted 
provisionally and used to undermine the conclusions of those 
who are satisfied with the method, much as the premises of the 
non-sceptic might be provisionally accepted in order to 
demonstrate the truth of scepticism. In doing so, one would 
not commit oneself to the independent validity of the method7 • 
So given the widespread use of thought-experiments in the 
literature on personal identity, even in the worst scenario, 
there remains important work for them to do. 
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SECTION 5: A general outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is 
a defence of the use of thought-experiments against a number 
of influential and potentially damaging indictments of it. 
Some of the arguments discussed are directed at specific . 
experiments or a specific kind of experiment, but all have 
implications which extend to the method in general. The 
thrust of my response to these arguments is that even if some 
objections to thought-experiments are strong enough to make us 
more cautious about how we use them, none of them is strong 
enough to require the general abandonment of the method of 
thought-experiment in the context of the personal identity 
debate. 
The second part has a less defensive aim, namely to find 
an answer to the question of what it is that thought-
experiments can do, given that there is no prior case ruling 
them out altogether. The strategy is to reach Sin answer by a 
close examination of some prominent examples of thought-
experiments in the literature, although I will by no means 
always draw the same conclusions from the experiments as their 
proposers do. In the nature of my topic, there are two issues 
here. One is methodological, about what one can expect from a 
thought-experiment; the other is the substantive one as to 
what thought-experiments can really establish about the nature 
of personal identity. 
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This setting-out makes the two parts sound distinct, but 
of course they are not. In defending the general validity of 
thought-experiments against the various attacks in the 
literature, quite a bit will begin to emerge about specific 
results that thought-experiments are and are not able to 
achieve. Likewise, in investigating what it is that thought-
experiments show in particular cases, more critical points 
about their use and abuse will come out and have to be 
discussed. Especially in Part Two, perhaps, the two issues 
will tend to run into each other. This need not reflect any 
confusion, for the issues sometimes are intertwined, and I 
will do my best to signal just how far we have got on each 
issue at various stages. 
Ultimately, the argument of Part Two is that there are 
two kinds of thought-experiment reflecting two things that 
thought-experiments can do: there are those which reveal the 
implicit criteria we use in applying concepts like person and 
same person8 , and there are revisionary thought-experiments 
which set out to show, or end up by showing, that there is 
something wrong with the beliefs or practises which underlie 
our concepts. 
In the process of investigating how thought-experiments 
can work, I will argue that one view of personal identity 
receives stronger support from them than any of its rivals. 
This is a nonreductionist view which holds that while personal 
identity can be analysed in terms of psychological continuity, 
it cannot be reduced in Parfit's sense of that term; the 
relations into which it can be satisfactorily analysed contain 
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irreducible references to persons. This view and its 
attendant distinction between analysability and reducibility 
will be spelt out in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8. 
SECTION 6: A chapter-by-chapter synopsis 
The section headings in each chapter should provide an 
idea of the strategy of the thesis, but let me conclude this 
introduction with a more detailed synopsis, outlining what 
will happen chapter by chapter. Part one, the defence of 
thought-experiments, consists of Chapters 2 to 5. Chapter 2 
takes on an argument presented by Shoemaker and Flew, to the 
effect that the meanings of the terms "person" and "same 
person" are grounded in our actual experience, and that this 
rules against our taking seriously fictional or counterfactual 
scenarios in investigating the concepts represented by those 
terms. 
Chapter 3, as its title suggests, is concerned with an 
attack on thought-experiments from an epistemological angle. 
It is not only epistemology that provides the cutting-edge, 
however, as semantics once again plays a large part. The 
central argument to which I respond is one of Fodor's, which 
suggests that the method of thought-experiment asks us to make 
knowledge claims for which we can have no reliable warrant. I 
reject Fodor's argument, but in doing so acknowledge that one 
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semantic theory which is extremely influential in contemporary 
analytic philosophy - namely, the causal theory of meaning 
associated with Kripke and Putnam - appears to provide Fodor's 
case with strong independent support. I argue that this 
support is ultimately not forthcoming. 
In Chapter 4 I turn attention to an argument of Wiggins 
which focuses on thought-experiments whichtry to draw 
conclusions from the apparent possibility of one person 
splitting into two. Wiggins's argument, which has 
consequences beyond this experiment alone, denies that we need 
to take such cases seriously. Not doing so might make matters 
easier for all, but even so Wiggins's way out turns out to be 
unsatisfactory, as does an attempt by Kitcher to refine 
Wiggins's position. 
Wilkes's recent attacks on thought-experiments involving 
splitting are the subject matter of Chapter 5. While her 
arguments have something in common with those of Wiggins, she 
also brings new considerations to bear. My argument in the 
chapter is that none of these new considerations is any more 
successful than those Wiggins raises. 
Part Two starts its investigation of what thought-
experiments can do with a close look in Chapter 6 at Bernard 
Williams's famous examples in "The Self and the Future". A 
number of responses to Williams's scenarios are canvassed, and 
a conclusion about methodology is reached with some, albeit 
inconclusive, implications for personal identity itself. 
Chapter 7 has as its focus Derek Parfit's argument based 
on his "splitting" thought-experiment. While I have been at 
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pains to defend such thought-experiments in Chapters 4 and 5, 
little or nothing has been said up to this point about what 
the significance is of imaginary cases of splitting. It is 
pointed out that this case represents a different kind of 
thought-experiment from those in the previous chapter, a kind 
which attempts to make us revise some of the beliefs we hold, 
rather than making implicit ones explicit. It also emerges 
that it is not at all clear that the conclusions Parfit 
reaches are the correct ones to draw; in the light of other 
thought-experiments, a very different picture begins to take 
shape. 
In the discussion of Chapter 7, certain thought-
experiments are used which have a focus that is somewhat 
different from either of the main types examined so far. 
Their concern is with personal identity across worlds, rather 
than personal identity over time. While identity across 
worlds involves different considerations from identity across 
time, debate about the former informs debate about the latter 
in important ways. But these new experiments give rise to new 
objections. I pay some attention to the new objections and 
then turn to the question of whether similar problems occur 
with regard to experiments directly concerned with trans-
temporal identity. The discussion focuses on an experiment 
which Parfit calls the "Combined Spectrum", an important one 
which is designed to show that nonreductionist views of 
personal identity are false. It is argued that, partly as a 
result of these new objections, the experiment fails in its 
aim. However, in the course of the argument more points in 
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favour of the nonreductionist view of identity which emerged 
in Chapter 7 come to the fore . 
. ··:·· .. · 
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NOTES 
1. The references to Locke's Essay are to Book, chapter and 
section. Thus "II,xxvii,15" refers to Book II, chapter 
27, section 15. 
2. Indeed, Rescher points out that it starts where Western 
philosophy starts: with the Pre-socratics (Rescher 1991). 
3. Given this remarkable fact, it is fairly surprizing that 
Sorensen in his book Thought Experiments makes only three 
direct references to the personal identity debate and 
thought-experiments found there (Sorensen 1992: 312). 
4. As well as for many others, such as the Shoemaker of 
Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984), and Locke himself. 
5. For example by Williams (1970: 47ff). Shoemaker's 
response to his own example is more complex than, and to 
some extent at odds with, the story which I tell here 
(Shoemaker 1963: 24 and 246-7). Nevertheless, Shoemaker 
does wish to assert a physical criterion of identity. 
His response is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
6. The following list of works expressing opposition gives 
some idea of how widespread the censure of thought-
experiments regarding personal identity has become: 
Baillie 1990, Collins 1982, Johnston 1987, Kitcher 1979, 
Lowe 1990, White 1989, Wiggins 1980, Wilkes 1988. 
7. Elliot {1991: 58-59) is careful to distance himself from 
any claim that the method is a generally useful one, and 
excuses himself on the grounds that he only uses the 
device against those who use it themselves. 
8. Here I underline the terms referring to concepts. I will 
continue with this practise throughout the thesis, in the 
hope that it will help me to avoid any use/mention 
mistakes. Rather than fall into the trap into which 
Leibniz and others fall (Mates 1989), I signal my 
procedure at this stage. 
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PART ONE 
IN DEFENCE OF THOUGHT-
EXPERIMENTS 
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CHAPTER 2: BODY-SWAPPING AND THE MEANING OF "PERSON" 
SECTION 1: Body-swapping in the literature 
The modern discussion of personal identity begins with 
the work of Locke. It is right here at the beginning that the 
use of thought-experiments begins as well. That provides 
reason enough to start the discussion of the case against 
thought-experiments with an argument aimed at the kind of 
experiment which Locke uses. While the argument has this 
specific focus, it will become clear that it has general 
repercussions for the method itself. 
The most prominent thought-experiment of which Locke 
makes use concerns an apparent "body-swap": a scenario in 
which one person seems to exchange bodies with another. Locke 
outlines a case in which the soul of a prince "enters and 
informs" the body of a cobbler (Locke 1694: II,xxvii,15). But 
we need not stick with Locke's example; a more convenient 
starting-point - convenient not least because of the absence 
of talk of souls - occurs in a more up-to-date version of the , 
thought-experiment used by Shoemaker (Shoemaker 1963: 25-28 & 
243-245). This version also lends itself to our purposes 
because it leads into a strong attack on the method by 
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Shoemaker himself. I will outline the experiment, and then 
discuss Shoemaker's response to it. 
Shoemaker, to recall, asks us to consider the following 
situation. Brown and Robinson undergo operations whereby 
their brains are removed from their respective heads. After 
the removal the brains are replaced, but not in their orig~nal 
heads: the body of Brown receives Robinson's brain and vice-
versa. One of the resulting men dies immediately; the other, 
the one with Robinson's body and Brown's brain survives. He 
is dubbed "Brownson". 
This thought-experiment has frequently been used as an 
argument to show that it is psychological continuity rather 
than bodily continuity which is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for personal identity. The relevant intuition is 
that the only plausible response is to say that Brownson is 
identical with Brown. After all, Brownson would have all of 
Brown's memories, personality traits, projects and so on. The 
experiment has been taken as showing at the same time that 
"human" and "person" are distinct kinds, since their 
respective identity conditions are clearly shown to be 
different. It has also been used, as in Chapter 1, to argue 
for a more specific physical criterion of personal identity 
than a straightforward bodily criterion. 
But these are not the conclusions that Shoemaker draws1 • 
Granted, the experiment is not used in the context of the 
issue between bodily and psychological criteria for personal 
identity or the human/person distinction. Even so, Shoemaker 
is wary of drawing the conclusions which have seemed to most 
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commentators to be obvious. He holds that the criteria people 
currently use to judge personal identity are predominantly 
physical ones, and that these are adequate for dealing with 
the situations they encounter. As far as the case of Brownson 
is concerned, since its kind has never been encountered, there 
is no established response to be made: 
The question of what most people would say if the 
imagined events occurred is of course a factual 
question, and not a question for philosophers to 
decide. But something can be said, of a 
philosophical nature, about what would be the case 
if such events were to happen and if nearly everyone 
were to agree that a change of body had taken place. 
First, it clearly cannot be said that in making this 
judgement people would be mistaken; at most it can 
be said that in making it they would show that they 
had adopted new criteria of personal identity and 
that their judgement would not be in accord with our 
present criteria. (1963: 246} 
Furthermore, 
It cannot be said that they would be abandoning ... · · 
bodily identity as a criterion of identity; all that 
can be said is that they would be refusing to regard 
this criterion as decisive in all cases, and would 
be allowing it to be overweighed by other criteria 
in some circumstances. (1963: 246-247) 
Why is Shoemaker so wary of drawing any strong conclusion 
from the thought-experiment? If all we can draw from the 
experiment is that if it were actually to happen and people 
were actually to agree that the resulting person were Brown, 
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then they no longer take the bodily criterion of identity to 
be universal, then the experiment is not n~arly so interesting 
as it at first seemed. He is claiming that what people would 
say about the identity of Brownson is philosophically 
irrelevant, and that the fact that we intuitively accept that 
Brownson is Brown implies nothing about the nature of persons, 
or about our concepts of person and personal identity. But 
all this needs explanation, for it certainly goes against 
traditional thinking on the use and usefulness of such 
speculations. Nor is it just this particular experiment that 
is affected: for if our intuitive reactions to a 
counterfactual situation are philosophically irrelevant, then 
thought-experiments must to a significant degree be dropped 
from philosophical methodology. That is a sweeping claim 
since, apart from their centrality to the personal identity 
debate, they occur to a lesser degree throughout philosophy. 
SECTION 2: Criticism of the response of Shoemaker and Flew 
What need immediate investigation are the considerations 
which underlie Shoemaker's response to body-swapping. He is 
by no means alone in his circumspect treatment of such cases2 • 
One of the most forceful statements of relevant 
considerations, and an influential argument against the use of 
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thought-experiments to reach conclusions about personal 
identity, has recently been published.by Flew. Flew writes: 
•.. we ought never to forget, what almost always in 
the present context has been forgotten, that there 
is a categorical difference between fact and 
fiction. Our notions both of persons and personal 
identity evolved in adaptation to the actual 
situations in which our ancestors found themselves; 
and they will no doubt continue to evolve if and in 
so far as our actual situations become in relevant 
ways drastically different. But considerations of 
how in future we either ideally should or in fact 
would alter these or other concepts, were we in 
truth confronted by this or that unquestionably 
conceivable yet way-out fantastic predicament, are 
simply not relevant to investigations of the present 
meanings either of the word 'person' or of the 
expression 'same person'. (Flew 1988: 123) 
This extract expresses precisely similar thoughts to those 
underlying Shoemaker's discussion, and like Shoemaker, Flew is 
in effect ruling the use of almost any counterfactual thought-
experiment out of court. 
Shoemaker's and Flew's wariness stems from the fact that 
the apparent body-swap described does not actually occur, and 
the belief that only our responses to actual situations can be 
an index of the meaning of our words. By contending that 
consideration of situations which we do not or have not 
encountered is irrelevant to the meaning of the expressions we 
use, Flew argues that no interesting counterfactual thought-
experiment has any place in philosophical methodology3 • But 
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before we curtail our methodology and face the radical 
consequences of such a move, the case for doing so needs 
closer attention. 
Flew's contention is that the meaning of our terms is 
exhausted by the actual situations to which they apply. But 
the argument which he produces - that our concept of person.al 
identity has been formed and has evolved in response to actual 
situations - far from establishes the irrelevance of thought-
experiments. For it is certainly true that however easily we 
may apply the concept of personal identity in practice, we 
would find it much more difficult to say precisely why we 
apply it in any given case. Even though we apply the concept 
easily, this brings no guarantee that we have any clear idea 
of the criteria we employ in its application. on the face of 
things, thought-experiments stand to be able to inform us on 
exactly this issue, for the following reasons. 
There is a common-sense distinction to be drawn between 
the features which are essential to a kind of individual and 
features which instances of that kind have only accidentally. 
By way of illustration, consider a light-bulb. Although all 
light-bulbs are made of glass, this is merely an accidental 
and not an essential feature of light-bulbs. In support of 
this, we can point to the fact that we would not refuse to 
call an object newly come on the market a light-bulb simply 
because it was not made of glass. This is the case even 
though all the light bulbs we have actually come across have 
been glass ones. So the fact that we do not take some (up 
until now) universal feature of light-bulbs to be an essential 
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feature is established by a thought-experiment - that is, by 
consider~ng how we respond to a certain kind of counterfactual 
situation - in this case coming across a new kind of light-
bulb that is not made of glass. Although the situation is in 
certain respects an unfamiliar one, we have no hesitation in 
responding to it. From past practice we know implicitly that 
being made of glass is not a feature relevant to an object's 
being a light-bulb, and thus to the meaning of "light-bulb". 
It is how a thing functions that makes it a light-bulb. 
Flew's insistence that the meaning of a term is exhausted 
by the actual situations to which it applies suggests that our 
response to the proposed counterfactual situation is 
irrelevant. But the result of this is to allow no adequate 
distinction between essential and accidental features. On the 
basis of actual experience alone, we would have to say that 
being made of glass was part of the concept of a light-bulb. 
If counterfactual situations are, as the extract from Flew 
suggests, irrelevant to the investigation of the meaning of a 
term, then we have no clear way of distinguishing universal 
but accidental features from essential ones. Not only is this 
to deny an intuitively important distinction, but in the 
process Flew also underestimates the direction that implicit 
knowledge based on past practice can give to thought-
experiments like that above. 
As another example, one can consider the concept of a 
scientist. The context in which that concept emerged was one 
in which all the instances of the concept were male. We know, 
however, that masculinity forms no part of the concept of a 
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scientist. Of course, nowadays we have many female 
scientists, but the point is that the actual origins of the 
term did not exhaust its meaning - it did not change meaning 
once women took up what had been exclusively male practices. 
Even before then, a thought-experiment could have brought out 
the implicit knowledge that masculinity was not an essenti~l 
feature of the scientist. 
We can now apply the discussion to the concepts which are 
our particular concern. Flew and Shoemaker point out that the 
actual situations in which our concepts person and same person 
arose involved experience of embodied persons only. They hold 
that our concepts are accordingly of physical entities and 
physical continuity. Flew is no doubt right that we don't 
meet disembodied persons; but it does not follow, despite 
Flew's apparent inference to the contrary, that our concepts 
essentially involve embodiment and physical continuity. 
Although the context in which the concepts form may be 
o,ne in which all the persons we meet are humans, and in which 
persons and bodies don't go swapping around, this does not 
dictate that in our concept of person we do not distinguish 
between humans and persons. It does not close off the 
possibility that embodiment is an accidental and not an 
essential aspect· of personhood. Flew's admission that 
something like a disembodied person is "unquestionably 
conceivable" seems to support this point. That is, he seems 
by this admission to allow precisely what is at issue - that a 
disembodied individual could be a person, despite our lack of 
experience of such an individual. 
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Flew does actually step down from the strong position 
suggested by the extract above, and he acknowledges that it 
does not follow from the fact that the only ¢'s experienced 
are ~ that it is incoherent to suppose that there are ¢'s 
which are not ~ (1988: 103), but not as far as regards the 
concepts of interest to us. He thinks that it would be absurd 
to take ¢'s here as people and ~ as the property of being 
embodied and thus suggest that persons could exist without 
bodies. If one were to do so, he claims, one would be unable 
to re-identify a person or even identify a person as such in 
the first place. But this hardly follows: just because we 
usually (or even always) do use physical traits in identifying 
and re-identifying people, that does not imply that people are 
necessarily embodied. Flew sets out the following challenge: 
To characterize something as incorporeal is to make 
an assertion which is at one and the same time both 
extremely comprehensive and wholly negative. Those 
proposing to do this surely owe it both to 
themselves and to others: not only to indicate what 
positive characteristics might significantly be 
attributed to their putative incorporeal entities, 
but also to specify how such entities could, if only 
in principle, be identified and reidentified. 
{Flew 1988: 103) 
The implied suggestion is that this cannot be done. But it is 
by no means clear that Flew is correct in his contention that 
we would be unable to identify a disembodied person as such or 
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reidentify them or ascribe positive properties to them. 
Gillett outlines the following story which strongly suggests 
otherwise. 
Consider a family called Brown who live in what is 
supposed to be a perfectly normal semi-detached 
horne. Imagine that things of an unusual nature start 
happening. Lights go on and off and things are moved 
in the house. Other things are 'tidied away' or 
interfered with in unaccountable ways. Each member 
of the family is suspected but absolved of any 
blame. One day the father, Mr Brown, conjectures 
that the house may be haunted by a poltergeist. 
After he discusses this with the family, to the 
amusement of some members and the wonderment of 
others, one of the children begins to receive 
premonitions of what is going to happen. She says 
that a person, an invisible person, P, has 'talked' 
to her. She then qualifies this and says that the 
person had not really 'talked' to her but rather 
'let her know' like 'thoughts popping into her 
head'. One night she announces that Pis going to 
'come out of the closet' as it were. She says that P 
wants to belong to the family and be accepted and 
that she feels very lonely. Sarah suggests that the 
others can 'tune in' by adopting the right attitude 
to P. That evening, at supper, P moves an ashtray 
across the coffee table, closes the curtain and 
lights the gas to boil the kettle. The family are 
amazed. Gradually they learn, over the next weeks, 
to recognize certain 'thoughts' as being messages 
from P. P becomes a family friend an lets them know 
that her name is Polly. P establishes her familial 
position when Mrs Brown feels a sudden premonition 
of danger to Sarah, who is playing in the back 
garden. She runs out and finds Sarah asphyxiating in 
a plastic bag. From this point on the family become 
absolutely convinced that Polly is real. 
(Gillett 1986: 377-378) 
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Polly in this story is certainly disembodied and yet she 
manifests the ability to perceive, to communicate and t9 act 
as well as distinct character traits. How she manages to do 
all this is mysterious, but the story is by no means 
unintelligible. And given that she manifests these abilities 
and traits, a denial that she is a person is extremely 
implausible. Flew's challenge thus seems to receive a 
straightforward answer. 4 
SECTION 3: An alternative model to Flew's 
The whole objection to Flew's position can be made in a 
slightly different way by setting out a more plausible model 
for the content of a concept like "person". Flew has 
suggested that thought-experiments involving fictional 
situations are irrelevant to the investigation of the meaning 
of "person" and "same person" on the grounds of there being a 
rigid connection between the meaning of these terms and the 
actual situations in which we encounter persons. Implicit in 
his criticism is the view that such actual situations exhaust 
the meaning of "person" and "same person". In this section I 
wish to respond to this by outlining an alternative model for 
the meaning of the relevant terms. I will argue that the 
model is at least as plausible as Flew's, and yet supports a 
distinction between essential and accidental features and thus 
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undermines the rigid link between meaning and actual 
situations which Flew sees as so important. I will also argue 
that not only does this alternative model allow thought-
experiments to be relevant, but that the ease with which we 
respond to thought-experiments and other fictional situations 
provides a form of evidence for the truth of the model. 
The alternative model to Flew's stems from David Lewis's 
account of the meaning of mental terms (Lewis 1972). All of 
the most influential accounts of the concept of a person 
stress the centrality of certain mental concepts. For 
example, Locke defined a person as a "thinking intelligent 
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places" (Locke 1694: 39). Daniel Dennett's widely 
acknowledged "conditions of personhood" include that to count 
as a person an individual must at least be rational, self-
conscious and be the subject of intentional attitudes (Dennett . 
1976: 269-270) 5• These examples serve to illustrate the 
I 
general acceptance of a crucial iink between mental concepts -
especially those of "intentional attitudes" like belief, 
desire and intention - and the concept of a person. It is 
here that Lewis's account of mental terms becomes relevant: 
there appears to be a strong connection between the meaning of 
"person" and the meanings of our mental terms, and Lewis 
offers us an account of those. What is important for our 
purposes is that that account is consistent with the 
distinction between essential and accidental properties 
discussed above. 
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Lewis suggests that our mental terms are "theoretical 
terms". That is, they are terms which get their meaning from 
the theory in which they occur. In this case the theory is 
our folk-psychology, the theory made up of commonsense 
principles according to which we explain and predict the 
behaviour of those around us. A term will be implicitly 
defi?ed by the role it plays in the principles of this theory. 
Take, for example, the term "desire". Following Lewis's 
model, the term is defined by the role it plays in folk-
psychology. The role it plays there is a causal or functional 
one. The relevant principles which serve to outline its role 
in our system for explaining behaviour are epitomised by the 
practical syllogism: if X desires that p and believes that 
doing A will lead to p, then X tends to do A. Desire is the 
state which typically causes one to act to get something, and 
which is typically caused by some or other lack, or by a 
perceived need. In the same way the meaning of our other 
mental terms can be spelt out by reference to the causal role 
they play in other parts of this explanatory system. 
Using this brief exposition of the alternative model to 
Flew's, it can be made clear how Flew's objection to thought-
experiments can be undermined. The mental terms which are of 
interest to us are defined by the roles they play in folk 
psychology. Thus belief, desire and other mental states are 
defined according to the functional roles they play. Since 
the principles of folk psychology define desire (to use the 
same example) as a functional state of this kind, what emerges 
is that other features of actual desires - features not linked 
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in any fundamental way to the typical causal role of those 
desires - are not essential to those states being desires. 
So, for instance, although our actual desires are associated 
with our organic brains this need not have been the case. 
Having an organic brain is not essential for having a state 
with the causal role typical of desire. Even if all 
individuals which actually have desires also have such brains, 
this is beside the point - being associated with that kind of 
brain is an accidental feature of our desires. 
This all has relevance for Flew 1 because the definitions 
of mental terms implicit in folk-psychology will set 
boundaries for the type of situation in which the terms will 
apply, types of situation which may be found instantiated in 
otherwise bizarre circumstances which nobody has actually 
experienced. As long as our mental concepts like that of 
desire are applied according to implicit principles like those 
indicated above which underlie our explanations of behaviour, 
then we will be able to distinguish between essential and non-
essential conditions for the application of those concepts. 
This means also that we will be able to apply the relevant 
terms in at least some counterfactual situations. As long as 
the essential conditions for the concept's application are 
satisfied, then we will be able to use the concept, no matter 
how grossly the situation considered differs in other ways 
from situations we have actually experienced. Just as the 
principles of science can be applied in counterfactual 
situations, so can the principles which (on the model under 
consideration) go to define our mental concepts. And as a 
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result the distinction between fact and fiction is not nearly 
so categorical as Flew suggests. 
I have maintained that Lewis's model is a plausible one, 
and as such it is enough to undermine the arguments of Flew 
and anyone else who believes that our concepts must fail in 
strange counterfactual situations. Wittgenstein has been 
taken to hold a position similar to that of Flew in passages 
such as this one6 : 
If you imagine certain facts otherwise, describe 
them otherwise, than the way they are, then you can 
no longer imagine the application of certain 
concepts, because the rules for their application 
have no analogue in the new circumstances. 
(Wittgenstein 1967: §350) 
As this claim stands it is far too sweeping, just as Flew's 
claims are. The application of our concepts will only be 
unimaginable if the facts which are changed are such that the 
essential conditions for that concept will no longer be 
satisfied. But Wi~tgenstein can also be read as making this 
narrower claim, and the existence of this plausible 
alternative to Flew's model suffices to show Flew's opposition 
to thought-experiments to be unreasonable. 
Although that is sufficient to make the case, there is 
more to be gained from this discussion. For the very fact 
that our concepts do seem to apply in certain strange 
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circumstances but not others provides evidence of a sort for 
.. the view that our mental concepts work according to implicit 
principles along the lines suggested above. 
Perhaps the most striking example to consider is that 
provided by cartoons and the characters that appear in them. 
In cartoons we discover characters like Bugs Bunny who, 
although he is a rabbit, has sophisticated beliefs and desires 
far beyond any we might encounter in actual rabbits. Indeed, 
we would only find humans having mental states as complex as 
the desire to discover the weak points of one's enemy (in this 
case, Elmer Fudd) and exploit them to the full. We cannot 
reasonably assert that Bugs Bunny is a human, yet our concept 
of desire fits neatly in Bugs's cartoon world. In other 
words, this implies that you do not have to be human to have 
extremely sophisticated desires, even though it is only humans 
who we actually experience as having such states. Nor does 
this only apply to animals like Bugs Bunny. In Walt Disney's 
films we meet cellos and teapots to whom nobody has any 
trouble ascribing beliefs and desires. This all suggests that 
there are implicit principles according to which these 
concepts are applied, and which rule being human or being 
organic as non-essential conditions for their application. 
A more detailed example may serve to make the point more 
clearly. Consider the case of someone who suffers a brain 
trauma and as a consequence loses motivation. Once the 
problem is diagnosed, the person undergoes micro-surgery in 
which the affected parts of their brain are replaced by 
electronic components designed to perform the tasks once 
38 
performed by the damaged brain cells. Organic brain cells 
have now been replaced by f_unctionally equivalent non-organic 
parts. After the operation, the person's behaviour patterns 
return to what they were before the brain trauma. Intuitively 
it is appropriate to describe.the person as having recovered 
the capacity for desire. That is, we would ascribe desires to 
this person even though those desires are not organically 
realised as our desires happen to be. 
It is not the case, then, that our concepts must fail in 
counterfactual contexts. 11 Way-out fantastic predicaments" are 
only irrelevant to the meanings of our words if they preclude 
the essential conditions for the application of the relevant 
concepts. Were we to come across creatures who were totally 
self-contained and self-supporting, needing nothing from their 
environment, our concept of desire would have no purchase 
where they are concerned. Our reaction to this situation 
confirms that the essential conditions for applying the 
concept of desire are·not satisfied in the case of creatures 
that never act to get anything, and provides further 
confirmation for the model proposed. 
Just as counterfactual contexts can be relevant to mental 
terms like "desire" and "belief", so they can be to terms like 
"person" which these mental terms go to define. Thus just 
because persons have not changed bodies in our actual 
experience, it does not follow that imagining cases in which 
they do will result in examples where our existing conceptual 
apparatus - and in particular our concept of same p~rson - has 
no application. And as a result, Flew has not presented us 
39 
with a case which should lead us to reject the use of thought-
experiments as a tool in the personal identity debate. 
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NOTES 
1. It should be noted that Shoemaker has revised his views 
since the early work cited, and in Shoemaker (1970) and 
Shoemaker and Swinburne {1984) he draws conclusions very 
much like those mentioned. 
2. Quine also voices a similar objection. He contends that 
to seek what is 'logically required' for sameness of 
person under unprecedented circumstances is to 
suggest that words have some logical force beyond 
what our past needs have invested them with. 
(Quine 1972: 490) 
This amounts to much the same objection to those of Flew 
and Shoemaker, and I will just deal with the (fuller) 
position of Flew explicitly. 
3. No thought experiment has a place, that is, apart from 
his own special use of a thought experiment in Flew 
( 1951) . 
4. To argue in this way is, of course, to use a thought-
experiment; but they can presumably be regarded as 
innocent until proven guilty. 
5. As Dennett points out {1976: 269) these conditions are 
common themes in all accounts of personhood. 
6. Parfit takes Wittgenstein as holding this sort of view 
{Parfit 1984: 200). 
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CHAPTER 3: KNOWING WHAT WE WOULD SAY 
SECTION 1: Fodor's argument that we cannot know what we would 
say 
One influential line of argument against the use of 
thought-experiments concerns an important epistemological 
question. Broadly, the.argument runs something like this. 
The point of outlining some counterfactual scenario is to 
ascertain what we would say in the situation described. 
Knowing this will give us insight into the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for applying a concept; or into whether 
F is an essential feature of G's rather than an empirically 
adequate criterion for claiming something to be a G. Thus we 
are called on to imagine a situation in which some x seems to 
beaG, but is not an F (for example), and are asked what we 
would say - would we say x was a G or not? 
So the point of thought-experiments is to discover the 
present meaning of our words by finding out what we would say 
in some crucially different situation. The problem, Fodor 
argues, is that we cannot know what we would say in situations 
which are crucially unlike our actual ones. 
This general line of argument occurs in an early paper of 
Fodor's (Fodor 1964), and it comes up again in Wilkes's recent 
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book, Real People (Wilkes 1988). For the purposes of this 
chapter, I will concentrate on Fodor's argument, looking at 
Wilkes's slightly different case in Chapter 5. 
The brief exposition above misrepresents Fodor's position 
slightly. For rather than making the strong epistemological 
claim that knowledge of what we would say in unprecedented 
circumstances is impossible, he argues that it would be 
irresponsible to rely on our intuitions in this matter. Let 
me spell the argument out in more detail. 
Fodor's first point is to stress that the thought-
experiments under discussion involve counterfactual 
situations. on top of this they are counterfactual situations 
such that we have no way of testing observationally whether 
what a speaker claims he would say is what he really would 
say. The situations are of interest precisely because they 
are abnormal: certain features which usually obtain do not 
obtain in them, or certain features obtain in them which do 
not obtain in actual experience. The point of this is to get 
to the features of some word or concept which are determined 
by meaning alone; features which are essential to a concept, 
and which are not, though universal, merely accidental 
/' 
accompaniments to insta~ces of that concept. ) 
As a result, the strategy is to reach a position where we 
/ can rely on a speaker's mastery of his language: on his 
intuitions as to whether or not a given concept still applies. 
It is here that the problem arises. For the methodology 
requires that we rely on a speaker's present linguistic 
intuitions, and yet there is much more than this operating 
43 
here. We are being asked to say what we would believe were 
certain usually reliable features of our experience to cease 
to be the case. For example, one is asked to contemplate a 
scenario in which people apparently swap bodies, or divide 
into two. But in supposing these things one is supposing that 
certain laws of nature, or at least certain true empirical . 
generalizations, no longer hold. Thus we are being asked to 
say what beliefs and what theories we would adopt should our 
current beliefs or theories prove to be false. 
Fodor contends that in most interesting cases this is 
just asking too much. For how can we possibly know what 
theories would come to be accepted should our present ones be 
rejected? For instance, how do we know what people would come 
to believe were all the water on earth to turn red? How many 
of our current beliefs would we give up? How would other 
theories actually be affected? We certainly have no general 
principles according to which such a judgement can be made; 
knowing what we would come to believe is not just a matter of 
working out what claims are implied by the claim that water is 
red, building those into our scheme and rejecting beliefs 
incompatible with these. We just have no vaguely reliable way 
of predicting how beliefs and theories would evolve should 
something like this happen. More to our point, it would be 
just as, or even more, difficult to predict how our belief-
system would change should people suddenly start swapping 
bodies or dividing into two on a large scale. How things 
would pan out is something we just don't know. 
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There is still a further point to Fodor's criticism. He 
writes: 
it is unreasonable to attempt to predict what 
theories would be accepted if our current theories 
were abandoned and, a fortiori, it is unreasonable 
to attempt to make such predictions on the basis of 
an appeal to our current linguistic intuitions. 
(Fodor 1964: 207) 
The point stressed here is that the intuitions the thought-
, 
experiment strategy requires us to rely on are linguistic 
ones; intuitions about the meanings of terms which form part 
of our mastery of language. It is as speakers, and as 
speakers alone - not as armchair psychologists or sociologists 
- that we would have to make the prediction as to our beliefs 
in the situation outlined. But the kinds of beliefs we are 
being asked to make judgements about - that is beliefs about 
the world in general - go far beyond judgements which have 
only to do with language; and so, as speakers alone, we are 
simply not competent to make the required decisions. 
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SECTION 2: Why Fodor's argument misses its mark 
Fodor may well be correct that it wouid be irresponsible 
of us to place any great weight on our current ideas about how 
our beliefs in general would change should some reliable 
feature of our experience cease to hold. Furthermore, to ask 
what one would say in such a situation does seem to rely on 
ideas of that sort. But even if he is right about all of 
this, his argument is wide of the mark and certainly does not 
show that we should give up the thought-experiment strategy. 
The reason for this is, as I will argue, that his argument 
turns on a crucial misdescription of the strategy of thought-
experimentation. He may be correct that some philosophers 
have used the strategy he describes and attacks, but if so, 
this shows only that they are guilty of misusing the method, 
and not that the method itself is faulty. 
Fodor's argument requires that speakers be asked to say 
how they would respond if they were in the situation 
described. It is because we don't know how they would respond 
that he· takes the strategy to fail. But we would not have to 
know what we would say in the situation in order to carry out 
the task of separating the essential from the non-essential 
conditions for the application of a concept. It is our 
response, given our present belief-system which matters: we 
are being asked, "does the concept as it stands allow such-
and-such?". Perhaps the point can be made clearer in the 
following terms. Fodor is claiming that what the thought-
experimenter asks is, "What would our language-game be if 
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such-and-such were the case?". But the correct, and 
unproblematic, question to ask is, "What would we say in our 
language-game if such-and-such were the case?" 
Take the case of persons swapping bodies. In normal 
circumstances people do not swap bodies; perhaps such a thing 
is empirically impossible. That, of course, does not stand in 
the way of the strategy outlined above: considering a 
hypothetical body-swap is just the sort of thing to test 
whether sameness of body is a logically characteristic feature 
of personal identity or merely an empirically adequate one 
according to our existing conceptual structures. So our 
thought-experimenter sets up a scenario in which human body A 
takes on the psychological characteristics which we used to 
associate with human B, and he asks, "is the A-body person A 
orB?". Our intuitions, as did Locke's 300 years ago, suggest 
that the A-body person is now B; we conclude that sameness of 
body is not a necessary condition for applying the concept 
same person. 
Now we do not know how our belief-system would change 
should this sort of thing start happenning, and we cannot 
predict on the basis of our linguistic intuitions how people 
would be treated should an operation to bring this situation 
about become feasible. Perhaps we would all agree to carry on 
treating the A-body person as A. Who knows? But that seems 
beside the point. In reaching the response that persons A and 
B would have swapped bodies we do not, nor do we need to, 
involve ourselves in claims about how our beliefs would change 
were we faced by the phenomenon. All we commit ourselves to 
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is the belief that nothing in our intuitive understanding of 
what is crucial to personal identity is inconsistent with 
persons swapping bodies. In Fodor's terms, our intuitions 
about the meaning of "same person" lead us to say that the A-
body person is B, and it seems on the face of things as if our 
present mastery of the term is all that has been relied upon1 • 
SECTION 3: Independent support for Fodor from the causal 
theory of reference 
Nevertheless, there is an important issue here which 
still needs to be discussed. One of the central thrusts of 
Fodor's argument is that thought-experiments are not capable 
of revealing semantic facts. In our case the claim would be 
that they reveal nothing about the semantics of "person" or 
"same person". Now, while Fodor is wrong about why thought-
experiments might fail in this task, there is some independent 
reason to believe that his conclusion is correct after all. 
The independent reason comes from the work of Kripke and 
(especially) Putnam on the semantics of general terms, "kind" 
terms, of which "person" is one {Putnam 1975, Kripke 1980). A 
brief look at their view on such terms will begin to show why 
Fodor's claim has some plausibility. 
The Kripke-Putnam view arises as a response to another 
influential view on the meaning of general terms. This is the 
theory due to Frege, Searle and others2 that the sense of a 
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general term, like the sense of a proper name, is given by one 
or more descriptions which we associate with that term. These 
descriptions will serve to pick out one and only one kind of 
individual, and in this way sense will determine reference. 
crucial to this theory is that in order to use a general term 
meaningfully - in order, that is, actually to refer to a 
particular kind of individual - one must know some such 
identifying descriptionjs. 
Against this, Kripke and Putnam have contended that one 
can perform the task of referring to kinds of thing perfectly 
well without this sort of knowledge. Indeed, one could still 
talk about (say) dahlias, even though the beliefs one had 
about dahlias - or certainly any beliefs one associated with 
the term which might individuate one particular kind of plant 
- were totally false. My ignorance of what makes dahlias 
dahlias does not prevent me from talking about them 
succesfully. What this sort of example shows is that one does 
not need knowledge of the facts which individuate a kind in 
order to refer to its members. 
.J 
It also shows that the 
descriptions which we do associate with a kind are no more 
than contingent marks, and are not logically binding as the 
description theory suggests. 
What the success of one's reference depends upon is the 
existence of a causal link between my use of the term "dahlia" 
and actual dahlias. At some stage in the past, the word came 
to be used to pick out this particular kind of plant, and the 
usage became general. As long as a causal chain can (in 
principle) be traced between my usage and such a "baptism", 
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and as long as there is a scientific theory which groups a set 
of individuals around that original exemplar, then I succeed 
in referring to dahlias when I use the term. 
It is important to note that this account of the meaning 
of general terms was designed for natural-kind terms like 
"gold", "tiger", or my example of "dahlia". But if we take 
its central notions a bit further, then there may well be 
important consequences for the kind of thought-experiments 
that concern us. If we assume for the moment that this 
general picture works for "person" as it does for "dahlia" or 
"gold", some consequences immediately become apparent. The 
meaning of "person" and the associated meaning of "same 
person" would not depend in any fundamental way upon the 
descriptions we might associate with the terms. In other 
words, what these terms really mean is not determined by the 
beliefs we have about the kinds of individuals (or relations) 
to which they purport to refer, or by the rule-of-thumb 
criteria we commonly use for applying the terms. 
At this stage we can return to the matter at hand: to 
thought-experiments and the question of whether they inform us 
on semantic issues relevant to "person" and "same person". It 
would be of use to have an example to structure the 
discussion. For this we can use Locke's proposed case of an 
apparent body-swap. 
should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the 
consciousness of the prince's past life enter and 
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inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by 
his own soul, everyone sees he would be the same 
person with the prince, accountable only for the 
prince's actions: but who would say it was the same 
man? (Locke: II,xxvii,15) 
Locke is in effect asking us what we would say about the 
situation which results, and taking it to be the case that 
everyone would agree that the prince - that person - has 
swapped bodies. He takes it to follow that personal identity 
does not co-incide with human or bodily identity. 
Using this as our illustration, we could say that Fodor's 
argument concludes that the thought-experiment tells us 
nothing about the meaning of the crucial terms: it does not 
show that bodily identity is not a logically characteristic 
feature of the term "same person••. Fodor's reasons for this 
conclusion would be those outlined before: that the strategy 
of thought-experiment is to rely solely on a speaker's mastery 
of language, that is, on his linguistic intuitions; but that 
to answer the question as to "what we would say" in a 
counterfactual situation requires more than this - especially, 
it requires knowing how the rest of our beliefs will change 
should certain reliable features of experience cease to hold. 
I disagreed with Fodor's argument on the grounds that he 
conflates what we would say given our conceptual scheme with 
what our future conceptual scheme would be should the world 
suddenly become as we have imagined it to be. But reasons 
other than his for reaching his conclusion now begin to 
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emerge. Consider what the thought-experiment does. In asking 
what we would say about the identity of the person in the 
cobbler's body, it requires us to weigh certain of our 
implicit principles against each other: namely, the principle 
that "consciousness of past life" is crucial to personal 
identity and the principle that being the same human (i.e. 
bodily continuity) is crucial to identity. In the normal 
unreflective course of our lives, we are not called upon to 
weigh these two principles against each other because the 
memory of a particular life and bodily continuity coincide in 
the case of all the individuals we know. What the 
counterfactual situation represented in the thought-experiment 
does is to show that they need not coincide, and that when 
they are in conflict we are more strongly committed to the one 
than to the other. Faced with the hypothet~cal situation, it 
becomes clear that we are more easily prepared to give up the 
principle that bodily identity is crucial than we are its 
rival. 
Have we then learned any semantic facts from the 
experiment? Not according to the causal theory of reference 
which I outlined above. For what we have learned concerns 
which of two of our implicit principles concerning what is 
crucial to personal identity we take to be more fundamental. 
This needs to be stressed: we learn something about the 
principles implicit in our applying a concept and their 
relative weighting in our conceptual system. As we have seen, 
the causal theory of reference removes any beliefs or 
principles in our head from a position of semantic importance; 
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what we believe to be essential to persons and their identity 
does not play any crucial role in the meaning of those terms 
and is no more than a rule-of-thumb. It is only if one 
accepts a version of the description theory of reference that 
one could take the thought-experiment to show something about 
the meaning of the terms concerned3 , but that theory is 
mistaken. And because of this, Fodor may appear to be right 
that we do not learn semantic facts from these experiments. 
SECTION 4: Why this support does not help 
I am sympathetic to much of what Kripke and Putnam have 
to say about the meaning of natural-kind terms. I want to 
explain why I think those claims do not show the invalidity of 
thought-experiments in our context. I noted above that the 
causal theory as outlined is set up specifically for natural-
kind terms, and the question must now be faced as to whether 
this causal model works in the case of "person" as it does for 
natural-kind terms like those mentioned above. The question 
is important because there are reasons for believing that it 
does not. 
One reason comes from Putnam himself. In Meaning and the 
Moral Sciences (Putnam 1978) Putnam despairs of his model 
working even for the kind term "human being", and the reasons 
he gives are directly relevant to this discussion. One 
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feature of the account outlined above is that the reference of 
a kind term depends on the existence of a scientific theory 
the laws of which serve to group objects around an ostended 
exemplar or paradigm. According to Putnam, however, we cannot 
realistically expect to get a scientific theory of human 
beings, at least not for a very long time (Putnam 1978: 62)~ 
He reasons that having an explanatory theory of human beings 
would require all our current social institutions to have 
changed so much as to be unrecognizable: 
would it be possible to love someone, if we could 
actually carry out calculations, of the form: 'If I 
say X, the probability is 15 per cent she will react 
in manner Y'? Would it be possible to have 
friendships or hostilities? Would it even be 
possible to think of oneself as a person? 
(Putnam 1978: 63) 
Putnam's despair here is rather puzzling, but even so it 
raises problems for our enterprise. The puzzlement stems from 
the fact that the considerations he outlines do not really 
seem to be problems ·in the way of achieving a theory of human 
being as a natural kind. Humans are animals just like any 
others, and there are perfectly adequate biological theories 
available: theories which will provide accurate enough 
inclusion conditions for the class of human beings. The kinds 
of considerations he raises seem rather to affect the 
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availability of a suitable scientific theory for the kind 
person. 
Here we need to acknowledge that persons do not form a 
natural kind. As the discussion of Chapter 2 section 3 
brought out, it is what a thing does and how it is treated 
that makes it a person, rather than any matter of internal 
structure which typically makes biological kinds the kinds 
that they are. Locke was indeed on to something when he 
suggested that "person" is a forensic term (Locke 1694: 
II,xxvii,26) and Putnam is thus right to despair of applying 
his model as is to such individuals and the term which picks 
them out. Should we follow his model and look for a theory 
which groups individuals around a paradigm person, we would 
end up with the wrong group: that of humans rather than 
per·sons. 
This point brings us close to the heart of the problem 
with appealing to the causal theory to back up Fodor's case 
against thought-experiments, and it will bear closer 
attention. Human beings are the clearest examples we have of 
persons. In the hypothetical baptism of a kind of individual 
with the title "person", then, the original individual around 
which some theory is to collect a set of similar individuals 
would most probably be a human being. And yet "person" does 
not mean the same thing as "human being" and it is at least 
highly contentious to hold that the extensions of the two 
terms co-incide. This requires that some modification be made 
to the account of how kind terms like "person" get their 
reference. 
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What needs to be added is an explanation of what it is 
about the human being picked out in the baptism situation 
which determines that it is as a person rather than as a human 
being that the individual in question is being picked out. 
The only plausible explanation here is that it is the 
attitudes of the baptizer which determine what exemplar is 
selected. The baptizer has in mind the fact that a certain 
individual instantiates certain .properties and in virtue of 
these he dubs the individual a person. 
This sort of modification to the causal theory is not 
only required by terms like "person"; it is even required when 
it comes to natural kinds. For instance, it needs to be 
explained what determines that an individual is picked out as 
a dahlia rather than as an example of one of the other kinds 
. 
to which it belongs: flower, plant, etc. In the case of the 
dahlia, it will be various surface properties of the plant 
which the baptizer has in mind that determine which underlying 
nature is relevant to the extensipn of the term applied. 
These will determine which scientific theory grouping other 
individuals around that one is relevant (Devitt & Sterelny 
1987: 72-75). In both the case of the dahlia and that of a 
person a change has to be made to the purely causal theory 
outlined. 
In Devitt and sterelny's terms, a "descriptive-causal" 
theory must replace the causal one. Certain descriptions 
which we associate with the term under discussion will play a 
crucial role in determining its reference. This is not a 
return to the pure description theory, however. Most 
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importantly, reference still depends on the term's being 
causally grounded in some exemplar, and thus one is not 
required to have knowledge of the crucial descriptions in 
order to use the term successfully. One may be wrong about 
what it is that something must be able to do to be a person 
and yet one would still be able to talk about persons. 
It is crucial to notice the undermining effect this move 
from a causal theory to a descriptive-causal theory stands to 
have on the mooted support for Fodor's conclusion. What the 
supporting argument used the causal theory to do was to make 
the implicit principles we might use in applying the concept 
of a person irrelevant to the meaning of "person". The 
argument just presented shows that this cannot be done: if we 
are to distinguish as we do between humans and persons, then 
speakers' implicit beliefs play a crucial role in the meaning 
of "person". I argued above that what thought-experiments 
like Locke's do is bring us to a realization that there is 
conflict between certain of our implicit principles regarding 
the application of the concepts of a person, and to show us 
which are the fundamental ones; as a result they are at least 
potential ways to reaching semantic facts. 
Although that serves to make the case against an appeal 
to the causal theory to support Fodor's conclusion, much 
remains to be said about the reference of "person". I've 
argued that a "pure" causal theory - one which makes no appeal 
to associated descriptions or the attitudes of the speaker -
is insufficient to explain the semantics of this term. But 
that does not mean that it is on the wrong track altogether. 
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In the next chapter I will discuss, and to an extent endorse, 
an attempt to show how the theory can be modified to provi~e 
the required explanation. As will become clear, there are 
points of significance to our discussion still to emerge. 
The conclusion that we should then draw from this 
discussion is that the causal theory cannot plausibly be used 
as was suggested to bring support to Fodor's case against 
thought-experiments. Even if the use of thought-experiments 
does in the end constitute a problematic methodology in the 
context of questions about personal identity, they cannot be 
easily ruled out as irrelevant to the semantics of the case. 
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NOTES 
1. Fodor is not alone in making this mistake. Wilkes, for 
example gives the following description of the method of 
thought-experiment . 
... we imagine a 'possible world' in which (an 
imaginary) state of affairs actually occurs - a 
world like our own in all relevant respects except 
for the existence in that world of the imagined 
phenomenon ... Then we try to draw out the 
implications - 'what we would say if' that imagined 
set-up were to obtain; that is, if we inhabited that 
possible world. 
(Wilkes 1988:2 -my italics) 
2. One might wish to include Russell in this list, despite 
his disagreements with Frege. He certainly also suggests 
that terms manage to refer via descriptions which we 
associate with them. 
3. This claim that causal theorists cannot use thought-
experiments to reveal the meaning of terms may seem 
surprising in the light of some of Kripke's work. For in 
Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1980), Kripke concludes on 
the basis of his intuitions regarding the concept "pain" 
that what the term "pain" refers to is not a physical 
state, but a phenomenal quality. Whether or not this 
squares with his causal account of reference, it serves 
to strengthen my claim that causal theorists in the end 
offer no support to Fodor's conclusion that thought-
experiments reveal no semantic facts. 
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CHAPTER 4: SHOULD WE TOLERATE PEOPLE WHO SPLIT? 
SECTION 1: The strategy of the chapter 
The idea that it is possible for persons to divide has 
long been of interest to philosophers concerned with personal 
identity. Thought-experiments outlining some scenario in 
which one person splits into two have been claimed to hold 
dramatic consequences for the concept of "same person". Thus, 
for instance, Parfit has used them to argue that personal 
identity turns out not to be the deeply important notion we 
intuitively take it to be (Parfit 1984: sections 89-90), and 
Wiggins has suggested that these experiments (were we to 
accept them as valid) would threaten the very coherence of the 
notion (Wiggins 1976, 1980). 
Others have been less impressed by these "fission" 
thought-experiments1 • But the onus remains on those oppos7d 
to show what is wrong with the conclusions drawn from, or with 
the description and strategy of, the speculative experiments. 
I believe that this is a more difficult task than is often 
realized. In this chapter and the next one I wish to look at 
three important attempts to undermine thought experiments 
involving the division of persons, attempts which also have 
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consequences for thought-experiments in general. I will argue 
that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of 
splitting, whatever they may be. 
In Section 2 of this chapter two examples of the kind of 
thought-experiment in question are set out. In Section 3 an 
argument against such experiments from Wiggins is set out and 
criticized. The argument examined in Section 4 is an attempt 
by Kitcher to solve the problems encountered by Wiggins's 
argument. In the final section, I will return to some of the 
points made in chapter 3 and tie up some loose ends. 
SECTION 2: Fission thought-experiments and what they have been 
claimed to show 
Before looking at the various attacks on fission thought-
experiments, it would be useful to have a brief account of the 
sort of experiment that is at stake. Experiments that appear 
in the literature do not usually describe one human splitting 
spontaneously, like an amoeba, into two. More representative 
is Wiggins's scenario (Wiggins 1967: 52-55) in which one 
individual's brain is divided and the two halves placed in 
distinct bodies. Perhaps the most influential example is that 
put forward by Parfit, a case I outlined briefly in Chapter 1. 
To recall, Parfit assumes that he is one of a set of identical 
triplets, and that each of his brain hemispheres is capable of 
61 
the functions of the other; he then outlines the following 
scenario: 
My body is fatally injured as are the brains of my 
two brothers. My brain is divided, and each half is 
successfully transplanted into the body of one of my 
brothers. Each of the resulting people believes he 
is me, seems to remember living my life, has my 
character, and is in every other way psychologically 
continuous with me. And he has a body that is very 
like mine. (Parfit 1984: 254-255) 
What do these scenarios show? I will attempt to answer 
this question in Chapter 7. My present aim, rather, is to 
argue (against various attacks) for the validity of fission 
thought-experiments. It would be useful, however, to have 
some notion of what the experiments are claimed by their 
proponents to spow. 
Wiggins points out that fission cases stand to undermine 
standardly accepted criteria for personal identity, and thus 
the concept itself. In the cases outlined 1 criteria based on 
physical or psychological continuity seem unable to ground a 
decision as to which of the resulting people is identical with 
the original. Parfit also draws attention to the 
impossibility of a grounded decision as to identity (1984: 
253-265). It would 1 he argues, be strongly counter-intuitive 
to say that the original person was dead; that is, that nobody 
is identical to the original. On the other hand, the logic of 
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identity prevents both candidates from being the original. 
But to say that one of the candidates retains the identity of 
the original while the other is merely similar is to make an 
arbitrary decision. What all this leads up to, argues Parfit, 
is that questions of identity can have indeterminate answers, 
and any theory which implies that they cannot must be wrong. 
So nonreductionist views of personal identity which will have 
this implication are shown to be misguided, and personal 
identity is exposed as not being the deeply important notion 
it has been taken to be. 
SECTION 3: Wiggins's rejection of splitting persons 
The first argument against fission that I wish to examine 
is due to David Wiggins. Wiggins's strategy is to argue that 
"person" is a natural kind term, or at least has an important 
natural kind element: that the concept of a person is a 
concept "akin to a natural kind concept" (1980: 172). 
Although we came across some reason to doubt this in Chapter 
3, for the sake of the present argument we can temporarily set 
these doubts aside; and we will meet some important 
modifications to the theory discussed there which will make 
this suspension of doubt worth the while. 
The advantages of person being treated as a natural kind 
like frog or human being are great, the most important one 
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being that we would not need to be concerned by troublesome 
cases of fission and the like2 • To put it briefly, ·this is 
because the extension of the kind would be something fairly 
close to the extension of human being and the natural laws 
governing humans do not allow fission. 
The strategy has its base in Putnam's account of natural 
kinds and natural kind terms. To recall: the reference of a 
natural kind term is established by the ostension of paradigms 
or exemplars of the kind in question, and the extension of the 
term is the set of objects grouped together with the exemplars 
by the most comprehensive scientific theory available. 
Whatever theory fits this description, it will consist in part 
of a set of natural laws, laws which determine what counts as 
a member of the natural kind. This is a crucial point in 
Wiggins's argument: 
Unless there are such laws, the putative kind name 
has no extension, nor even the sense it is required 
to have. If there are such laws, on the other hand, 
then their holding is nothing less than constitutive 
of the existence of (individuals of that kind). It 
follows that, if person is a natural kind, then when 
we consider the problem of the identity of persons 
through change, the whole logic of the situation 
must exempt us from taking into account any but the 
class of situations which conform to the actual laws 
of the actual world. For these serve ... to define 
the class of persons. (Wiggins 1976: 158) 
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According to Wiggins, then, our natural-kind concepts have 
their basis in what is actually the case. The exemplars 
serving to fix the reference of "person" would be actual human 
beings and, as pointed out above, the laws governing humans 
in the actual world preclude any sort of splitting, for in our 
world humans cannot divide. It would thus be impossible fo! 
an instance of the concept person to do so, since on this view 
what is possible for such an instance is limited by the 
natural laws which apply to items of the kind in question. 
There is, of course, another important issue lurking 
here. For certain influential thought experiments involving 
fission are set up as cases which are in accordance with the 
laws of nature. One example is Parfit's case set out in 
Section 1. Parfit insists that the division of his brain and 
the subsequent implanting of the two halves into the.brainless 
bodies of his identical siblings is "merely technically 
impossible". By this he means that it is empirically possible -
that is, it satisfies the laws of nature. It's only that 
technology is not yet advanced enough for the experiment to be 
performed; there is nothing "deeply" impossible about 
separating brain hemispheres, one hemisphere performing the 
tasks of the other as well, or dividing one stream of 
consciousness into two (Parfit 1984: 245-246). But if Parfit 
is right about all this, then it seems that we ·aon't yet have 
a reason for ignoring speculations involving fission. 
Although Wiggins does not address this point in any 
detail, he would presumably see things otherwise. Although no 
law of nature is overtly violated in Parfit's description of 
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his division, there are certain laws with which the phenomenon 
describeq may not be consistent, and to which Wiggins draws 
attention. For among the laws which determine the extension 
of a natural kind, f, must be those which "define the 
characteristic development and typical history of individual 
fs" (Wiggins 1976: 158). The problem with fission is that .it 
represents a vast departure from the typical history of a 
person; a departure so vast that we are justified in viewing 
it as irrelevant to questions about the kind person. 
SECTION 4: A response to Wiggins's rejection of splitting 
In this way, treating "person" as a natural kind term 
avoids any threat from science-fiction thought-experiments. 
If Wiggins is correct, the envisaged experiments would be 
impossible in a far more damaging sense than the "mere 
technical" sense contemplated by Parfit. But a response·along 
these lines is unhelpful when it comes to Parfit's case. This 
is because it is by no means clear that the thought-experiment 
is not consistent with the actual normal development of 
persons. In Parfit's defence it can be held that should our 
technology advance individuals of otherwise normal personal 
development could be split. Fifty years ago an argument 
relevantly similar to Wiggins's could have been produced in 
support of the claim that persons cannot have (non-human) 
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animal hearts: receiving one would represent a vast diversion 
from the typical history of a person. But today baboon hearts 
have been transplanted into normal humans. 
Nothing in Wiggins's account amounts to an argument 
against this; nothing suggests that normal humans could not be 
split, or that Parfit's transplant is crucially unlike the. 
baboon-heart transplant. To respond that humans don't 
actually split is simply irrelevant, and to argue that split 
individuals would cease to be persons would be absurd. Of 
course, Parfit could be wrong in his claim that the reasons 
why splitting is not yet actual are merely technological ones: 
but that does not help this argument of Wiggins's - for 
establishing that requires a different kind of argument 
altogether. 
What Wiggins needs is an empirical argument, for the 
issue of whether humans can split is an empirical one, just as 
was the issue about humans and animal hearts. There are 
empirical considerations which might offer Wiggins's anti-
splitting stance some support. For instance, the fact that 
different psychological functions are located in different 
lobes of the brain would seem to be a problem for Parfit's 
premise that each of his lobes (in the thought-experiment 
world) are capable of the functions of the other. But more 
would be needed even than this, because Parfit's pointing to 
actual stroke-sufferers who have regained the functions they 
lost through the loss of the use of one brain hemisphere seems 
to establish the possibility he requir~s, even though we will 
never meet an individual like the one he describes. Parfit 
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does acknowledge that "it seems likely that it would never be 
possible to divide the lower brain, in a way that did not 
impair its functioning" (Parfit 1984: 255). But even if this 
is true, we still need an argument from Wiggins as to why this 
impossibility would be crucial in preventing a split. Would, 
for example, leaving Derek's brothers' lower brains intact and 
transplanting one of Derek's upper hemispheres on to each make 
a crucial difference? All this needs supporting evidence if 
Wiggins's case is to be at all convincing. 
Even apart from these considerations, Wiggins realises 
that things are not quite so easy as his argument presented 
above might make them appear. Wiggins acknowledges along with 
philosophical tradition and my arguments of Chapter 3 that, 
despite the advantages of treating it as such, "person" is not 
just a natural kind term like "human being". Following 
Putnam's account of the way the reference of a natural kind 
term is fixed, pointing out exemplars of the kind person would 
result in the extension of "person" being the same as that of 
"human being", and as Wiggins realises (1976: 160), the two 
terms are not interchangeable. Any account of persons must 
bring into consideration their character as agents with 
beliefs, intentions, and so on; something which is not 
essential in an account of humans. In other words, following 
Putnam's account as it stands, the wrong class of individuals 
would be isolated. 
Wiggins suggests that this problem can be avoided by 
adding a "functional specification", setting out the peculiar 
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characteristics of personhood to a natural kind requirement. 
Thus 
x is a person if x is an animal falling under the 
extension of some natural kind whose members 
perceive, feel, remember, imagine, desire, make 
projects, move themselves at will and carry out 
projects... (1976: 161, cf 1980: 171} 
This move increases the extension of person so as to include 
not just humans, but those creatures "who come near enough to 
us" (1976: 161}. The ultimate outcome is that 
every person would belong to some natural kind that 
determined a sound Leibnizian principle of identity 
through change for some one kind of person (human-
person, dolphin-person, parrot-person or whatever) . 
There would be no one real essence of person as 
such; but every person could still have the real 
essence of a certain kind of animal. Indirectly, 
this would be the real essence in virtue of which he 
was a person. (Wiggins 1980: 172} 
Since Wiggins sees a natural-kind element as part of the 
definition of "person", he feels justified in setting fission 
thought-experiments aside. It is worth stressing that 
Wiggins's argument is aimed specifically at fission thought-
experiments, and not at thought-experiments in general3 • Even 
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if his arguments were successful, then, it would only be 
fission cases that would be affected, and not the method 
itself. Nevertheless, I wish to defend the ·use of fission 
cases, and the limited scope of Wiggins's argument has some 
importance for this end. since Wiggins's argument concerns 
only fission cases, it is still legitimate for us to use 
thought-experiments not precluded by his argument. We would 
at least not be guilty of begging the question against him. 
The crucial point in Wiggins's case against fission is 
his insistence that the concept of a person has a natural-kind 
component - that "every person would belong to some natural 
kind" (Wiggins 1980: 172}. This is crucial since it is the 
laws governing the relevant natural kinds (humans, dolphins, 
etc) that rule out fission. It is against the claim that 
persons have an essential natural-kind element that (non-
fission) thought-experiments provide us with a powerful 
argument. 
We do not need to look far for the relevant imaginary 
cases. In Chapter 3 section 3 I suggested that cartoon 
characters provide evidence against Flew's model for the 
meaning of terms like "person", and they do damage to 
Wiggins's argument as well. Cartoon situations often present 
persons who are members of natural kinds amongst whom we never 
actually find persons, and to whom Wiggins's anti-splitting 
laws might not apply. For instance, should the cartoon 
character be an amoeba, then precisely what it can do is 
split. When the characters are artefacts of one kind or 
another, the point against Wiggins is even clearer: we have 
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examples which nobody hesitates to view as persons which are 
not members of any natural kind. 
Putnam puts forward similar considerations using a 
science-fiction example: 
robots can be inspiring or pathetic - they can 
overawe us with their superhuman powers (and with 
their greater than human virtue as well, at least in 
the writings of some authors) , or they can amuse us 
with their stupidities and naivete. Robots have 
been "known" to fall in love, go mad (power- or 
otherwise), annoy with oversolicitousness. At least 
in the literature of science fiction, then, it is 
possible for a robot to be "conscious"; that means 
(since "consciousness", ·like "material object" and 
"universal", is a philosopher's stand in for more 
substantial words) to have feelings, thoughts, 
attitudes and character traits. 
(Putnam 1964: 386) 4 
Robots clearly do not form a natural kind, but we have no 
problem with ascribing to them all the important features of 
personhood. Without some strong argument to the contrary, 
then, we have no reason to take seriously the natural-kind 
clause in Wiggins's definition of a person. And once the 
natural-kind clause is given up, Wiggins's argument against 
fission collapses. 
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SECTION 5: A refinement of Wiggins's rejection, and a response 
A solution has been suggested which app~ars to serve 
Wiggins's purpose of justifying the ignoring of problematic 
thought experiments like fission, yet without casting person 
as a natural kind. Kitc~er has proposed (Kitcher 1979) 
dropping the attempt to make person a natural kind, but at the 
same time looking elsewhere for laws which will determine 
personhood and personal identity in the way in which Wiggins 
envisaged natural laws working. Kitcher contends that even 
though no laws of natural science bring together the class of 
persons, there is a body of true empirical generalizations 
which does. 
These are the generalizations of commonsense or folk 
psychology, which have already cropped up in chapter 2: laws 
(or, for the fussy, "laws") such as: "An individual who wants 
p and believes that doing A will bring about p, will tend to 
do A", and "An individual who fears q will tend to avoid 
situations in which that individual believes q to be likely to 
occur". Intentional predicates like those in these examples 
will be central to the theory which serves to define persons, 
but there will also be other laws such as "An individual who 
has a painful experience with objects of a certain kind will 
tend to eschew objects of that kind" (Kitcher 1979: 545). 
These are the generalizations which we use to explain the 
behaviour of others, and as suggested before are like natural 
laws in being universal, projectible, counterfactual-
supporting, and so on. They do differ in being liberally 
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sprinkled with qualifying phrases like "tends to", and in 
having a large number of ceteris paribus clauses, but they are 
not being claimed to be the laws of a mature scientific 
theory, and this vagueness does not prevent them from 
performing their task of explaining behaviour. 
There is thus no prima facie reason why folk psychology 
cannot perform the extension-fixing task assigned to the 
theories of natural science. Although the kind thus defined 
would not be a natural kind, it would nevertheless be a "law-
governed" kind (Kitcher 1979: 544}. On this model, a person 
would be a member of the class of individuals of whom folk 
psychology is true - individuals whose behaviour can be 
explained and predicted by the laws of folk psychology. This 
move also lets in certain individuals not allowed by Wiggins 
but which, despite his qualms, probably should be there. It 
is just chauvinism simply to rule out complex computers as 
possible persons, and perhaps corporations should be included 
as well (French 1983}; on this model, these could be persons. 
Treating person as a law-governed kind like this is in 
the spirit of Wiggins's defence: note the occurrence of the 
central terms of folk psychology in his functional 
specification. It also seems to solve the problems he faced 
in the following ways. Like the natural kinds strategy, it 
provides a justification for our eschewing scenarios involving 
the fission of persons, and so on. This strategy aims to 
retain the basis of the relevant concepts in the actual. 
Thus, 
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unless actual persons divide or merge, we may ignore 
questions about whether clones would be persons, and 
if so, how many persons. (Kitcher 1979:546} 
Kitcher does not explain the detail of this argument, but 
presumably it is analogous to Wiggins's - that such 
occurrences are not in accordance with the laws of folk 
psychology describing the normal development of an individual, 
and thus remain irrelevant to the inclusion and identity 
conditions of the kind "person". 
This defence of Wiggins's strategy by appeal to law-
governed rather than natural kinds may seem to solve the 
question of the legitimacy of "fission" thought-experiments. 
But there is good reason to believe that it is not at all 
adequate for performing this task in the way envisaged. In 
the remainder of this section it will be argued that folk 
psychology does not really preclude the envisaged scenarios as 
required. 5 
Does folk psychology really have laws that make fission 
and body-swapping impossible? Is it not rather our cognitive 
dependence on the laws of physics that leads us to doubt these 
possibilities? For folk psychology, as its detractors point 
out, has been around more-or-less unchanged for centuries, co-
habiting happily wi~h worldviews peppered with disembodied 
persons and the like. Whether you are an angel or a human, or 
whether you are a splitter or a non-splitter, if you believe 
that doing A will lead to p, and you want p, you will tend to 
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do A. Certainly we may worry about how a spirit could do 
certain kinds of A consistently with the principle of th~ 
conservation of energy; but that takes us way beyond the 
strictures of folk psychology. The appeal of Wiggins's 
natural-kind strategy was that it assigned persons a physical 
essence, and it was precisely that which militated against 
fission; by moving from the physical to the psychological as 
Kitcher does, this crucial element of the strategy is lost. 
Perhaps this misses the central point raised earlier in 
connection with Wiggins's reasoning against troublesome 
thought-experiments. On both the law-governed and natural 
kind models, it will be laws governing the typical history and 
characteristic development of members of the kind person which 
make fission and so on impossible and thus irrelevant. But 
does folk psychology have such laws? And if it does, do they 
really rule out fission and body-swapping? It was argued in 
the previous section that Wiggins's appeal to typical human 
development was unhelpful in response to thought-experiments 
like that outlined by Parfit; here I will argue that when it 
comes to typical development according to folk psychology, the 
case against thought-experiments is even worse. 
Laws governing typical development which might form part 
of our folk psychology would presumably concern the way a 
person's mental outlook matures, the different kinds of ideas 
and attitudes individuals tend to have at different ages, and 
so on. It's not at all clear, however, that these laws 
militate against fission: it seems rather to be the case that 
they could still apply despite the division of one person into 
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two, or despite a change of body. Even though it's true that 
the actual_typical development of humans does not involve 
splitting into two, it is not this aspect of development that 
folk psychology describes. 
An important point which has emerged in discussion of 
folk psychology in the literature is that it is a "topic-
neutral" theory (Smart 1959; Putnam 1980; Lewis 1980): it sets 
out the roles mental states play without specifying the first-
order properties of those states. As a result, it is 
consistent with both physicalist and dualist views about the 
nature of those states. This compatibility with dualism is of 
import in our discussion, because it allows for the 
possibility of a separation between persons and their bodies; 
it allows that persons can be distinct from their bodies, and 
thus at least prepares the ground for disembodied and dividing 
persons. In the light of this, it emerges that the use of the 
laws of folk psychology to fix the extension of the term 
"person" is the wrong sort of strategy to follow in attempting 
to avoid the thought-experiments in question. Folk psychology 
is just not the right theory to appeal to in trying to show 
the envisaged scenarios to be irrelevant and ignorable. 
In these ways the law-governed kind strategy turns out to 
be no improvement at all on Wiggins's natural kind strategy as 
an· argument against fission thought-experiments. Wiggins's 
strategy shows flaws in its attempt to set out what makes 
persons members of that kind, while the former strategy is 
also unable to perform the task of ruling out popular thought-
experiments for more important reasons, as just discussed. As 
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a result, these attempts to show fission and other thought-
experiments to be irrelevant to the debate on persons fail. 
While they fail in this regard, the law-governed model 
makes significant progress as an account of how the semantics 
of "person" works, and links up neatly with the arguments of 
Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 I set out how the causal theory 
seemed at first glance to support Fodor's conclusion about the 
semantic irrelevance of thought-experiments: the latter reveal 
things about our beliefs or implicit principles, and the 
causal theory casts our beliefs as semantically irrelevant. I 
argued against this that our beliefs are not irrelevant to the 
semantics of "person", and here we have further support for 
that claim. 
The law-governed model brings to the fore that the theory 
which does the work of fixing the extension of the kind around 
a paradigm person is a folk theory, the theory of folk-
psychology. As a folk theory, it is one which everybody 
knows. This marks the case of "person" as crucially unlike 
the natural-kind terms for which the causal theory of 
reference was designed; the theories which fix the extensions 
of those terms are the theories of mature science, which are 
by no means available to everyone. It was precisely because 
the extension-fixing role for natural-kind terms is played by 
such theories that our beliefs appeared irrelevant and Fodor's 
conclusion seemed to get support; but once the asymmetry 
between the natural-kind case and our case is realized, this 
. support vanishes. The outcome is that the method of thought-
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experiment has not been shifted from its central place in the 
personal identity debate. 
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NOTES 
1. Apart from the arguments I discuss in this and the 
following chapter, this view is also expressed by Baillie 
{1990), and a version of it is put forward by Johnston 
(1987). 
2. Nagel also proposes treating person as a natural kind 
(Nagel 1986: 39-40). He sees this as a way of ruling out 
the dilemma about indeterminacy which is a consequence of 
fission thought-experiments. My argument in Chapter 7 
addresses the indeterminacy problem, but without Nagel's 
manoeuvre. 
3. Wiggins does take exception to some other thought-
experiments besides fission ones. He writes, "those who 
use the method of possible worlds to determine answers to 
questions of necessity and identity or necessity and 
origin are using a mistaken method" (Wiggins 1980: 213). 
But the reasons he gives there are not the same as those 
under consideration in this chapter. I pay some 
attention to these new arguments of Wiggins in Chapter 8. 
4. Putnam is admittedly hesitant about drawing the 
conclusion that we must say robots are conscious on the 
grounds of this sort of experiment. But in the end he 
admits that it is no more than chauvinism which can 
prevent us from making that assertion (1964: 407). 
5. An interesting point can be raised here. This concerns 
the possibility of the radical falsehood of folk 
psychology. Eliminative materialism - a fairly popular 
theory in contemporary philosophy of mind - claims 
precisely this: the claims of folk psychology are false; 
terms like "belief" and "desire" fail to refer to 
anything in the world (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983). I 
do not wish to get embroiled in this debate here, but it 
is worth noting that if the eliminative materialists are 
right, then if we follow Kitcher's line, there is no such 
thing as a person. For the purposes of this thesis I 
will assume that the claims of folk psychology do not 
fail of reference. There are, in fact, solid grounds for 
this assumption. on this, see Horgan and Woodward 
(1985). 
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·CHAPTER 5: WILKES AND PEOPLE WHO SPLIT 
SECTION 1: Wilkes's rejection and an initial reply 
In the first chapter of her book Real People Wilkes puts 
forward a strong case against the use of thought-experiments 
in our context. Her argument has a number of links with that 
of Wiggins, but also brings new considerations to bear on the 
matter. 
One similarity is that the very thought-experiments which 
bothered Wiggins - those involving the fission or splitting of 
persons - are the ones which bear the brunt of Wilkes's 
attack. She argues (Wilkes 1988: 37) that while some 
philosophical thought-experiments merely need important and 
drastic changes to be made to them, "fission" ones must be 
rejected out of hand. The case she offers against all 
thought-experiments is dependent on the case against fission 
ones, and for the purposes of this discussion I will confine 
my attention to this central part of her argument. I wish to 
argue that none of the considerations she brings to bear 
should lead us to give up the use of this thought-experiment. 
In Section 1 I will outline Wilkes's case against fission and 
point out why, on the face of things, it is unsuccessful. In 
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Section 2 I will look in detail at how Wilkes hopes to avoid 
these prima facie problems, and.I will explain why her 
attempts at reconciliation do not work. 
Wilkes's argument runs as follows. Any thought-
experiment, be it in science or philosophy, presupposes that 
all the relevant background conditions for the phenomenon in 
question are included and specified. Wilkes calls this 
"establishing the phenomenon". Thought-experiments are 
counterfactual in that they require us to suspend belief in 
some way: we are asked to imagine what would happen, or what 
we would say, if something which is not actually the case were 
to happen. But the background against which this change is to 
be supposed must be provided if the enterprise is to have any 
point and hope of success. In the context of personal 
identity, we are out to discover "the heart of our current, 
present notions of what it is to be a person" (1988: 12}, and 
if we are to do this we need to know enough about the 
situation we are being asked to consider. 
In the case of one person splitting, amoeba-like, into 
two, Wilkes argues that we are just unable to fill in the 
background in any adequate way. There are two broad ways in 
which the phenomenon of fission fails to be established, and 
they can be summed up as the difficulties of imagining, or 
describing, how the split occurs and of imagining that the 
split occurs. Wilkes argues, as did Wiggins, that the natural 
laws governing human beings preclude fission: it is 
theoretically impossible that a human divide into two. That 
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is the problem of describing how a person splits: against the 
background theory of human beings it is just not possible. 
Besides this problem there are other grave difficulties 
in store; for, Wilkes contends, in order to imagine that a 
person divides or to respond to the question of what one would 
say if a person were to divide, one needs to know all sorts of 
things about, for instance, the predictability of splitting 
and the social background against which it would occur. These 
are details, however, which the proposers of the experiment do 
not and cannot provide. 
Does all this show that we should eschew thought-
experiments involving fission, and that we can safely ignore 
any conclusions which they seem to yield? Wilkes thinks so, 
but has the point really been made? Consider first the 
argument from the premise that it is theoretically impossible 
for humans to divide. It was suggested in Chapter 4 that 
there is reason for doubting that our current scientific 
theory constituted by laws governing human capacities, 
features and normal development, precludes a human being from 
splitting into two. And even so, the conclusion of the 
argument is that it is impossible that persons divide, or at 
least that we can ign6re thought-experiments in which they are 
described as doing so. It would be absurd to deny that most, 
if not all, of the persons we actually meet are humans, or 
that the paradigm of a person in anyone's view would be a 
human, but that does not prevent there being a distinction 
between person and human, as is acknowledged by Wiggins, and 
which stops Wilkes's inference from going through. 
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The suspicion that this is the case becomes more pressing 
in the light of part of Wilkes's own argument. For she allows 
that there may be individuals in other galaxies who are 
persons, but not humans, and can split (1988: 36). Surely if 
this is a possibility, then arguments from the human condition 
in the context are irredeemably weakened? All they would show 
is that some persons cannot split - true, those non-splitting 
ones are the ones that we persons happen to be - but this 
consideration will not be of any help on our way to answering 
deep questions about the nature of personal identity. 
Wilkes is always insistent on stressing that the only 
important impossibilities in thought-experiments are those 
relevant to the aims of the experiment. Thus it is that 
Einstein's famous experiment which set out to answer what 
someone travelling beside the front of a beam of light would 
see is not ruled inadmissible by the imp?ssibility of a human 
travelling at the speed of light: this impossibility is 
irrelevant to the aim of the experiment. The aim of fission 
scenarios are, in her own words, to reveal "the heart of our 
current, present notions of what it is to be a person". If 
our current, present notions allow splitting persons - albeit 
alien ones - then it is not at all clear that such things are 
irrelevant impossibilities. The impossibility (if it is one) 
of human fission would rather seem to be the impossibility 
which is irrelevant to the outcome of experiments in which the 
aim is to find out about persons as such. 
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SECTION 2: Why tolerating splitting does not forsake 
philosophy for fairy story 
This is not how Wilkes sees things. What her response 
would be can be seen from the points she makes after allowing 
the possibility of non-human divisible persons. She holds 
that to take notice of such purported individuals is to cross 
the divide between philosophy and fairy story: to indulge in 
an enterprise which cannot yield the results initially 
required. 
There are two points which can be gleaned from Wilkes's 
discussion in support of this claim that to take an interest 
in dividing non-human persons is to forsake philosophy. The 
first involves the charge that the kind of possibility at 
stake here is an uninteresting one (1988: 18); the second 
concerns the precise aim of the thought-experiment enterprise 
(1988: 37). 
With regard to the kind of possibility operating in the 
case of dividing alien persons, Wilkes allows it to be clear 
that the situation is logically possible, but she denies that 
bare logical possibility is of any interest. For it is also 
logically possible, i.e. consonant with the laws of logic, 
that water is not H20, and that iron bars float on water', and 
so on, but this bears no relation to what might or could 
happen. On the contrary, says Wilkes, we know that water 
cannot be anything but H20 in the sense that we cannot believe 
in the actual existence of something which is water but not 
H20, or something which is an iron bar, but floats on water. 
"There is, we can say, no possible world in which these states 
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of affairs obtain'' (1988: 18). It is thus only in the context 
of fiction, wnere we willingly suspend belief in order to be 
entertained, that situations such as these, and of persons 
splitting, have any place. The aim of the philosophical 
thought-experiments is to "establish" the required phenomenon 
so as to draw conclusions about the nature of persons, and .in 
so far as that aim is concerned, the situation is impossible. 
The second point, which is related to the first, is this: 
the question originally posed by the thought experimenter 
concerns "what we would say if we divided or fused" (1988: 
37). What is to be said if aliens divide is their 
philosophical problem and not ours - not, at least, until we 
actually come across them. 
I wish to argue that neither of these points pushes the 
thought-experiment in question over any important divide 
between fact and fiction. consider the first argument in 
which division of persons is compared with the floating of an 
iron bar or water's not being H20. By analogy, just as it is 
impossible for iron to float on water, or for water not to be 
H20, so persons cannot d~vide. There may be no logical 
inconsistency here, but we know that none of these could 
happen. To all intents and purposes, they are impossible. 
But this analogy does not work. The reason that iron 
will not float on water is that it has a specific gravity at 
20°C of 7.87, and this precludes a bar of it from floating on 
water. Specific gravity is a function of the inner structure 
which is essential to something's being iron. Likewise, water 
cannot but be H20 because that is precisely the structure of 
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the molecules which provides the essence of water. The other 
examples of impossibilities which Wilkes provides (1988: 18) 
also depend on essential inner structures. The problem is 
that the essence of person, whatever it is, is not a matter of 
inner structure, unlike that of iron, water, and the like. 
And certainly, Wilkes has no argument to the contrary. A 
point which emerged in the discussion of Flew's arguments as 
well as in the accounts of Wiggins and Kitcher is that 
"person" is a term inextricably linked to folk psychology, and 
it is from this context, at least in part, that it derives its 
meaning: persons are the things which have beliefs and 
desires, self-consciousness, and so on. If any laws apply to 
them and serve to constitute a kind, they are laws about the 
relation between beliefs and behaviour, the relations between 
the different kinds of pain one may feel, and such things. 
These laws are not in any essential way about the inner 
constitution of anything. Folk psychology works in complete 
ignorance and independence of the inner workings of the 
individuals to which it applies. 
Wilkes herself seems to acknowledge this point when she 
appeals to Dennett's six criteria as the "conditions of 
personhood" (1988: Ch 1 sec 6; Dennett 1976) and when she 
acknowledges that "it is improbable that 'person' is in any 
legitimate sense a term that can usefully be construed as a 
'natural kind' ... ; whereas 'human being' seems to be just 
that" (1988: 15). But given that the kind we are concerned 
with is crucially unlike the kinds Wilkes appeals to in 
demonstrating interesting kinds of possibility, her argument 
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gives us no reason to believe that the division of persons is 
to be ranked alongside the happenings in Alice in Wonderland 
as regards its informative status. 
There would be a problem if the scenario or world 
outlined in a thought-experiment somehow conflicted, either 
explicitly or implicitly, with what we know to be essential. 
features of the kind in question. If such was the case, then 
in Wilkes's terms the phenomenon would not have been 
established. But this is precisely what is not clear in the 
case of persons dividing, and which is clearly so in Wilkes's 
other examples. If the fiction being considered seemed to us 
to be incoherent, we would then have some evidence that it was 
not constructed in conformity with our ordinary concepts, but 
once again this is not to be observed in the case of fission. 
Even if the details of the division are left vague, there does 
not seem to be anything in folk psychology and the more 
familiar features of persons qua persons which suggests a 
conflict with division, as was argued in chapter 4, §3. 
Indeed, this seems to be precisely the reason why we 
understand fission thought-experiments so readily, and 
intuitively feel their importance regarding questions of 
identity. 
The second point Wilkes makes in favour of fission being 
only fiction does not provide much help to her overall case. 
This was the point that what is at stake in the thought-
experiment is what we would say if we were to divide. It does 
not help because this is not what is at stake. or, at best, 
this is a misleading description of what is at stake. The 
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question is rather what we would say if persons were to 
divide. Now this is precisely of interest because we are 
persons, but to insist that we must confine our reflections to 
the possibility of us humans dividing is to change, if not to 
beg, the question. We ask the question to investigate the 
conceptual consequences of persons dividing. It is enough to 
set up the investigation that some of our fellow persons can 
divide, and this Wilkes acknowledges, just as she acknowledges 
that the concepts of human and person are different ones. 
That some persons do not divide because they are also humans 
is neither here nor there; as long as persons can divide -
that is, as long as an individual can be a person and divide -
then the resulting conceptual issues affect us persons too, 
even if we human persons don't go about splitting. 
SECTION 3: Imagining that people split 
It still remains to examine the other general thrust of 
Wilkes's case - that which concerns and questions the "that", 
as opposed to the "how" of personal fission. Wilkes argues 
that certain details crucially relevant to the aims of the 
experiment are inevitably left out of the description of the 
supposedly possible world. She claims that where the case of 
division is concerned we need to know such things as 
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how often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes 
predictable and sometimes not, like dying? Can it 
be prevented? Just as obviously, the background 
society, against which we set the phenomenon is now 
mysterious. Does it have such institutions as 
marriage? How could that work? or universities? 
It would be difficult, to say the least, if 
universities doubled in size every few days, or 
weeks, or years. Are pregnant women debarred from 
splitting? The entire background here is 
incomprehensible. (Wilkes 1988: 11) 
Presumably the idea behind the claim that we need to know 
these things is that we require such information in order to 
be in a position to provide a sensible and informed answer to 
the question of what we would say if one person divided into 
two. That seems to be why the questions are "crucially 
relevant to the aims of the experiment". We would just not 
know what to say unless this background was filled in. Since 
thought-experimenters are not about to do the filling in, they 
cannot really expect an answer at all. 
The questions Wilkes asks in the quoted passage are 
certainly interesting ones, which do raise fascinating puzzles 
with regard to splitting persons. But she consigns them far 
too much weight in the context in which she raises them. For 
consider, is it really crucial to know whether splitting is 
inducible or predictable in order to respond to the question 
"who is this person?" after a split? Likewise, would one have 
to know how marriage operates in the speculated person's 
society? It would only be necessary to know these things if 
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knowing what one would say to splitting requires knowing how 
one_would live with the phenomenon. In outlining the method 
of thought-experiment Wilkes makes it clear that she requires 
this: 
Such a question typically postulates an imaginary 
state of affairs, something that does not in fact 
happen in the real world. Put another way, in the 
modern jargon, we imagine a "possible world" in 
which the state of affairs actually occurs .•. Then we 
try to draw out the implications - "what we would 
say if" that imagined set-up were to obtain; that 
is, if we inhabited that possible world. 
(Wilkes 1988: 2; my italics) 
But in equating knowing what we would say to splitting with 
knowing how splitters think Wilkes seems to be guilty of the 
very mistake I attributed to Fodor. That is, she confuses the 
question of what (given our conceptual scheme) we would say to 
splitting with the question of what the conceptual system of a 
society of splitters would be like. As we saw in Chapter 3, 
an answer to the former question does not require an answer to 
the latter. 
Wilkes's questions all concern how a society in which 
splitting occurred would cope with that peculiarity. This 
suggests that she is guilty of the same mistake as Fodor, but 
we can also use the discussion of Chapter 2 section 3 to show 
why her questions are misguided or irrelevant to the task of 
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investigating persons and their identity. It was suggested 
there that the concept of a person and that of personal 
identity get their content from their place in the system of 
folk psychology. Now, given the familiar principles of folk-
psychology, it is not at all incomprehensible how marriage 
(for example) would work in a society of splitters. Perhaps 
the splitters would have a new kind of extended family - a 
family would not only grow by producing children, but by 
producing adults as well. Perhaps the splitters would fight 
for the undivided spouse. These and other possibilities are 
all perfectly compatible with our system for explaining 
behaviour. 
In a similar way, questions about the frequency or 
predictability of splitting can be seen as irrelevant. 
Perhaps fission takes place once every six years but does not 
happen to pregnant women and reliable symptoms signal its 
imminence. Perhaps it happens far more often in a more 
haphazard way. Either way, there is no conflict with the 
system in which the terms "person" and "same person" have 
their place, and thus Wilkes's argument misses its mark. It 
would only be in a very peculiar thought-experiment that we 
would need to know that x's splitting was predictable in order 
to know whether x is or is not y. Whether our intuitive 
responses to a thought-experiment situation are dependable, 
whether they are really what we would say, and how we know 
that, are all questions which may affect the acceptability of 
a thought-experiment - but these are all matters independent 
of the knowledge that Wilkes specifies. 
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The points made in the previous paragraph can be 
reinforced by looking at. another issue concerning the 
background society which Wilkes raises. In regard to how 
universities would work in the splitting society, she comments 
that things wou],.d be "difficult, to say the least". But 
that's just it - these are difficulties for the society in 
question, difficulties which are the consequences of 
(metaphysical and) other more fundamental features of the 
society. It is a practical difficulty with perhaps important 
moral implications how marriage would work in a society of 
splitters, but these are problems subsequent to problems of 
identity. It may well be difficult and even impossible to 
live as we do in such a society. (This, I have argued 
elsewhere (Beck 1989], would be the case for a society of 
Parfit's persons.) But that doesn't mean that persons cannot 
divide or that we can ignore arguments concerned with the 
consequences of division. 
Wilkes's arguments against fission fail to establish the 
irrelevance of such thought-experiments to the debate on 
persons and their identity. Experiments outlining some 
scenario in which one person divides are intuitively perfectly 
intelligible, as well as being deeply puzzling, and as a 
result there is an onus on Wilkes to show why we would be 
justified in ignoring them. The arguments above demonstrate 
that she has not succeeded in this. As a result, her 
arguments get us no further than those of Wiggins and Kitcher, 
and fission remains a problem. 
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NOTES 
1. This example, like the other ones Wilkes uses, is drawn 
from Seddon (1972). 
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PART TWO 
WHAT THOUGHT~EXPERIMENTS CAN SHOW 
ABOUT US 
r 
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CHAPTER 6: THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS, THE SELF AND THE FUTURE 
These bizarre fictions have their uses in abstract 
studies, as aids to a better grasp of the nature of 
our ideas. {Leibniz 1765: 314) 
SECTION 1: Williams's two presentations of the experiment 
One of the most influential thought-experiments in the 
literature is the one which occurs in Williams's celebrated 
paper, "The Self and the Future". As with other 
thought-experiments, there is disagreement as to precisely 
what this particular case shows, but most commentators have 
found its consequences to be extremely significant for the 
debate on personal identity. 
In this chapter I will set out Williams's thought-
experiment and then discuss some of the conclusions which have 
been drawn from it. My hope is that something important will 
emerge from this central example about what thought-
experiments can do and can be expected to do. This aim has 
two parts to it, one methodological and one substantive: my 
interest is in both what the experiment shows about the method 
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of thought-experiment and what it shows about personal 
identity itself. 
The thought-experiment is set out as two distinct 
scenarios, but its force turns on its being revealed to be one 
and the same scenario differently described. The first 
description is a fairly straight-forward account of a 
thought-experiment of the kind used in arguments for a 
criterion of identity in terms of psychological continuity. 
A machine has been created which is able to extract and 
record all of the information stored in one's brain which is 
relevant to and determines one's mental life. Two individuals 
A and B are subjected to this process, and the information 
from A's brain is then fed into B's brain and vice-versa. 
After the process, the person in B's body seems to remember 
having A's experiences, has A's beliefs, desires, projects, 
emotional attachments, and so on. Likewise, the person in A's 
body has the psychological features previously associated with 
B. The obvious intuitive response to this scenario is that a 
body-swap has occurred: the person in the A-body is now B, 
while A occupies the B-body. This intuitive response strongly 
supports.the view that our concept of personal identity turns 
on psychological continuity, and that physical continuity is 
not necessary for identity. 
Williams re-inforces this conclusion. by considering the 
likely responses of the individuals involved. As Williams 
sets the case up, A and B are told about the process that is 
to be carried out on them and are told that one of the 
emerging persons will be tortured and the other rewarded. 
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They must each make a choice beforehand as to which is to 
receive which treatment, presuming that this will be done on 
purely self-interested grounds. The support for the 
psychological criterion comes from the judgements the two 
persons would make as to how wise their earlier choices were 
once the operation is complete and the torture and reward . 
handed out. For instance, had A chosen that the A-body person 
be tortured and the B-body person rewarded, the B-body person 
would seem to remember making this choice and, if this is 
indeed what happens, he would be satisfied that "his" choice 
was the wise one (Williams 1970: 48-49). 
Further re-inforcement comes from considering other 
choices: 
Suppose that A chooses that the A-body-person should 
get the money, and the B-body-person get the pain, 
and B chooses 9onversely •.• The experimenter 
announces, before the experiment, that the A-body-
person will in fact get the money, and the B-body-
person will get the pain. So A at this stage gets 
what he wants (the announced outcome matches his 
expressed preference). After the experiment, the 
distribution is carried out as announced. Both the 
A-body-person and the B-body- person will have to 
agree that what is happening is in accordance with 
the preference that A originally expressed. The B-
body-person will naturally express this 
acknowledgement (since he has A's memories) by 
saying that this is the distribution he chose; he 
will recall, among other things, the experimenter 
announcing this outcome, his approving it as what he 
chose, and so forth. However, he (the B-body-
person) certainly does not like what is now 
happening to him •.. The A-body-person will on the 
other hand recall choosing an outcome other than 
this one, ·but will reckon it good luck that the 
experimenter did not do what he recalls 
choosing. (Williams 1970: 49-50) 
97 
Once again, the psychological criterion is supported. The 
choices A and B made were those which one would expect from 
adherents of the physical criterion and, as Williams comments, 
"in this case the original choices of both A and B were 
unwise" {1970: 50). 
The second description is set out in a different manner. 
We are asked to consider a series of cases, each a development 
on the previous one, and challenged to state at which step 
some crucially relevant change - a difference which could 
amount to a change of identity - occurs. The first case is 
one in which A is operat,ed upon in such a way that he loses 
all of his memories. Williams suggests that this change will 
not be sufficient to support a judgement that A has lost his 
identity. The most important consideration here, according to 
Williams, is that if A were told that after the operation his 
body will be tortured, A would still have reason to fear that 
torture despite the intervening memory-loss. These are the 
six steps which develop on this one: 
{i) A is subjected to an operation which produces total 
amnesia, 
{ii) amnesia is produced in A, and other interferences 
lead to certain changes in his character, 
{iii)changes in his character are produced, and at the 
same time certain illusory memory beliefs are 
produced in him; these are of a quite fictitious 
kind and do not fit the life of any actual person, 
{iv) the same as {iii), except that both the character 
traits and memories are designed to be appropriate 
to another actual person, B, 
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(v) the same as in (iv) except that the result is 
produced by putting the information into A from the 
brain of. B, by a method which leaves B the same as 
he was before, 
(vi) the same happens to A as in (v) but B is not left 
the same, since a similar operation is conducted in 
the reverse direction. (Williams 1970: 55-56) 
At stage (i) we have no difficulty in agreeing that A survives 
the loss of memory; that is, the person who emerges from the 
operation is identical with A. Williams suggests that there 
is no relevant difference between stage (i) and stage (ii) 
which would justify a judgement that the person emerging in 
(ii) is not A. Furthermore, this holds for all the following 
stages as well. The·crux comes at the final stage. Since no 
line can be drawn between any of the stages, we are obliged to 
say that the person who emerges here is A; but the problem is 
that the scenario set out in (vi) is precisely that described 
in the first experiment. In stage (vi), just as in the first 
experiment, the psychological features' of A are transposed 
into B's body and vice-versa - only there our intuitions told 
us that the emerging person was B. 
The result is that one and the same thought-experiment 
merely described in different terms evokes directly 
conflicting intuitive responses. The one response appears to 
support a psychological criterion of identity, the other a 
physical criterion, yet these two criteria are mutually 
exclusive. 
According to Williams's exposition, then, we are faced 
with a conundrum. But precisely what the effects of this 
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conundrum are is a question which needs careful investigation; 
certainly there have been many divergent responses expressed 
in the literature. One reaction has been to argue that the 
conundrum is only apparent, and that in fact there is some 
fault with one or the other, or both, of Williams's scenarios. 
In this way the puzzle would be defused, and need establish 
nothing radically new about identity or thought-experiments. 
Williams's final response, although tentative, is along these 
lines; he suggests that one should "take the risk" of 
accepting that identity goes with bodies (1970: 63). 
Another response has been that Williams's 
thought-experiments both succeed, but that the consequent 
position we should adopt on personal identity is not 
Williams's tentative affirmation of a bodily criterion but a 
currently unpopular nonreductionist view. 
Perhaps the most important reactionr for our concerns is a 
rather different one which sees the consequences of the 
conundrum as being primarily methodological, the argument 
being that the stalemate which the thought-experiments bring 
us to shows that the method of thought-experiment is fatally 
flawed as a way to reaching answers about our identity. In 
this chapter I will take a look at all three arguments and 
formulate my own response to the problem, both as regards 
methodology and personal identity itself. 
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SECTION 2: Noonan's argument that both thought-experiments are 
flawed 
Can we just dismiss Williams's conundrum? Noonan argues 
(Noonan 1989: Ch 10) that we can ignore any apparent 
consequences, methodological or other, of "The Self and the 
Future", because both the thought-experiments presented there 
suffer from drastic internal problems. From the way they are 
described we can infer that they do not support the 
conclusions suggested, and certainly do not lead to the 
conundrum that Williams sees. This argument is not one 
against thought-experiments in general; it is intended 
specifically against those outlined above. 
Noonan argues against both of Williams's experiments: 
that the first does not support a psychological criterion of 
identity, nor the second a physical one. I do not wish to 
enter this debate at this stage, although my final response to 
Williams will show that I am sympathetic with one aspect of 
Noonan's argument. I will argue, more immediately, that 
Noonan's arguments against both legs are flawed, and will then 
go on to look at possible consequences of the success of the 
experiments. 
As regards the apparent body-swap outlined earlier, 
Noonan finds that it fails to support a psychological 
criterion because of the way in which Williams plays down the 
crucial role of certain of the participants' (A's and B's) 
psychological attitudes. 
The problem becomes clear, according to Noonan, when one 
looks at the various stages Williams follows in support of his 
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conclusion. Williams considers A's and B's reflections on the 
wisdom of their earlier choices made according to (i) a 
psychological criterion (Williams 1970: 48-49), (ii) a 
physical criterion (49-50), and (iii) different criteria (50) 
- where A chooses according to a psychological, and B a 
physical, criterion. In each case, as outlined above, 
Williams finds that the individuals' reflections would support 
psychological continuity as the criterion. 
Noonan argues that what Williams must do in order to 
conclude thus is to ignore, or at least drastically play down, 
his own assumptions. For how the individuals rate earlier 
choices will depend crucially on their beliefs as to identity 
criteria. Take case (ii) for instance. If A and B choose as 
they do because tney accept a physical criterion (i.e. A that 
the B-body be tortured, B choosing that fate for the A-body) 
and the B-body person is subsequently tortured, it is not at 
all clear that this person (B-body) will acknowledge that his 
original choice, the one,he seems to remember making, was 
mistaken. Rather, suggests Noonan, he will dismiss this 
apparent memory as illusory - for both A and B believe in the 
physical criterion - and will complain that the torture was 
not meted out as he, that is B, chose. Williams, in 
suggesting what he does, ignores the force that the 
fundamental beliefs which shape the participants' choices will 
have when they come to reflect on those choices. Since he 
does this consistently throughout the discussion of the first 
experiment, there is no support to be gleaned there for the 
psychological criterion. 
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It is because of this supposed misrepresentation of how 
those involved would react that Noonan takes Williams's first 
description of the thought-experiment to fail. However, it is 
not at all clear that it is Williams and not Noonan who is 
guilty of misrepresentation. Williams's suggestions as to how 
A and B will react after the experiment are based on the 
intuition that individuals will take themselves to be the 
persons they feel like, and whose lives they remember. This 
seems to me to be fairly uncontroversial, even when it comes 
to an individual who believes strongly in the physical 
criterion of identity. For it certainly does not follow from 
the fact that A overtly adopts the physical criterion that if 
A were to look in the mirror and see B's body, he would say, 
"Oh look, I'm not the person I think I am!" Indeed, it is 
most implausible that A would react in this way, yet that is 
precisely what Noonan is suggesting. As a result, Noonan's 
case against the first experiment is anything but convincing. 
Noonan also argues that the second experiment fails to 
establish its conclusion. This is because he claims that a 
line can be drawn between two of the steps Williams outlines, 
namely between (iv) and (v). At this point, according to 
Noonan, one who holds that psychological continuity is 
necessary for identity can insist that the person who emerges 
in (v) need not be identical to that in (iv) without 
contradicting intuitively correct claims about survival 
through amnesia, and so on. 
The difference is that in (v) the apparent memories of 
the A-body person have been brought about by a "very special 
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causal process which ensures that the brain of A has been 
wiped clean of all the information it contained and that the 
A-body person is psychologically continuous with B" (Noonan 
1989: 225}, while in (iv) all that occurs is that illusory 
memories modelled on B's are induced in A. The difference is 
not just, as Williams claims, that in (v) the model for the 
A-body's apparent memories is also their cause. The crux of 
Noonan's point is that the process whereby A's psychology is 
altered is in no relevant way different from removing A's 
brain and replacing it, as in a thought-experiment like 
Parfit's "My Division" (Parfit 1984: 254-255), with one 
hemisphere of B's brain; in that case there seems to be a 
clear difference between what occurs and inducing illusory 
memories. 
Williams objects to drawing the line between (iv) and (v) 
on the grounds that the A-body person emerging in (v) must be 
A, since the existence of an undisputed B prevents his being 
B. Noonan suggests that this is tendentious because the 
B-body persons's identity with B can be disputed by pointing 
out that what happens to B is better described as fission than 
as the production of a copy without claim to identity. The 
only claim that the B-body has over the A-body to B's identity 
is the continued occupation of B's body, in particular, 
continued possession of B's brain; but to use this alone is to 
beg the question. 
Noonan's argument is a strong one against Williams's 
description of the second thought-experiment. Nevertheless, 
it is not enough to show that we do not face a conundrum. 
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This is because the example can be altered so _as to avoid 
Noonan's criticism, and yet still present what i$ at heart the 
same argument. The way to change the case and achieve this is 
to increase the· number of steps in the description. Instead 
of the six cases which Williams outlines, one can require 
consideration of a spectrum of cases like that described by 
Parfit (1984: 231-233} in which each stage represents a change 
of a very small degree over the stage preceding it, the 
changes occurring a few cells at a time. Thus we would be 
faced by a spectrum consisting of an indefinitely large number 
of cases. In each case A will be operated upon to produce 
some psychological change, the amount of change will increase 
gradually as we move along the spectrum, but the difference 
between two adjacent cases would be almost imperceptible. In 
this way, the final case in the spectrum can be that described 
in Williams's stage (vi}, but nowhere along the spectrum does 
it make sense to draw a line between two stages. After all, 
how could a change so small represent a change in something so 
momentous as identity? The resulting thought-experim~nt 
presents the same sort of case which Williams intended with 
his second thought-experiment, but which is proof against 
Noonan's attack. 
The sorts of consideration which Noonan presents do not 
show any fatally damaging internal inconsistencies in the 
thought-experiments under discussion. Given that Williams's 
case still stands to be informative, the question remains as 
to what it does show, and especially whether it has any 
methodological significance. 
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SECTION 3: Does the conundrum support the unanalysability of 
identity? 
One influential line of argument is that which takes the 
thought-experiments to succeed, but to succeed in showing 
something other than the tentative conclusions Williams draws 
from them. Indeed, the strategy is taken as showing that the 
most popular contemporary views on personal identity are quite 
mistaken. The argument occurs in discussions by Swinburne 
(1984) and Madell (1981), and runs along the following lines. 
Madell and Swinburne deny that personal identity can be 
analysed into some more familiar or better under~tood relation 
like physical or psychological continuity, and they argue that 
this view gains strong support from Williams's conundrum. 
Personal identity to Madell and Swinburne is a basic or simple 
relation which resists any breaking down into something more 
fundamental. To be the same person is to be the same person, 
and there is no more to be said. One is not the same person 
as one was because of the holding of some relation other than 
identity. One immediate implication of this view is that it 
would be possible for A and B to be distinct persons even 
though there is no difference between them whatsoever - no 
difference, that is, other than their being (unanalysably) 
non-identical. In Madell's terms, "I might not have existed, 
but someone having exactly the life that I have had might have 
existed instead'' (Madell 1981: 79) 1 • On the other hand, you 
could have had a life totally different to the one you have 
led, and yet still be you. 
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These entailed possibilities are important for Madel! and 
Swinburne's arguments in the context of "The Self and The 
Future" because they show the acceptance by those who adopt a 
nonreductionist view like theirs of the possibility of "bare 
identity" - of identities or non-identities which do not hold 
in virtue of anything. Madel! and Swinburne suggest that it 
is precisely an unwillingness to accept the possibility of 
bare identity which leads Williams and others who believe 
personal identity to be analysable into trouble with the 
examples at hand. If one throws out this prejudice, and 
accepts that physical and psychological continuity may be no 
more than evidence for identity, the threat posed by the two 
examples is removed2 • 
Admittedly the criteria we usually use to make identity 
judgements let us down in Williams's cases by yielding 
conflicting results, but that is just one of the 
epistemological problems we must be prepared to face; our 
criteria let us down elsewhere as well. This failure of 
normal criteria does not mean that there is any metaphysical 
problem about identity at stake in "The Self and the Future". 
In the unlikely event that the operation should occur, then 
one of the emerging people would be A and one would be B; we 
may just not know which is which. 
Madell places even greater stress than Swinburne on these 
particular examples: 
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anyone who follows the two stories that Williams 
tells in 'The Self and the Future' must also reject 
the view that one or other story is incoherent. The 
outstanding fact about these stories is that both of 
them are so compelling. We are led to understand 
just how it is possible for there to be these two 
different possibilities (i.e. distinct individuals 
in different worlds), and for there to be no 
observable difference between them. Far from this 
being 'utterly mysterious', as Williams claims, it 
is precisely the conclusion that our whole argument 
demands. (Madell 1981: 99) 
It might make Madell's claim clearer to put it in terms closer 
to the examples under discussion than does this quoted 
passage. What the first version shows is how it is possible 
for an individual to retain her identity despite a total 
physical change. The second version shows that identity can 
be retained despite a total psychological change. That the 
two are the same situation differently described is neither 
here nor there - together they show how identity can be 
unaffected by a total psychological change and a total 
physical change. But this is incompatible with the view that 
identity can be analysed in terms of some sort of observable 
continuity, and is in line with Madell's prediction that any 
attempt at such analysis will fail. As a result, a "simple" 
view of identity is shown to be correct. Personal identity is 
a simple, unanalysable relation, something over and above 
mental and physical continuities. 
Before one rushes to accept the conclusions Madell and 
Swinburne draw from "The Self and the Future", some points 
must be borne in mind. In the first place, one needs to be 
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careful about accusing one who accepts that personal identity 
is further analysable of confusing evidence for identity with 
the relation itself. For it is a perfectly rational 
methodological tenet which says that one does not postulate 
entities and relations apart from or underlying those which 
one can observe until there is overwhelming reason to do sq. 
Unless there is some enormous theoretical advantage to be 
gained, it is best to stick with the evidence. So there need 
be no simple confusion going on here. 
Related to this is a problem which arises with regard to 
Madell's point about the way in which both of Williams's 
stories are compelling. He certainly seems to be correct that 
they are compelling, and since they compel us in different 
directions this is something which must be explained if one is 
to deny that the simple view is the only acceptable conclusion 
to be drawn3 • But if he is right about the simple view of 
identity being the correct one, then his own point also 
becomes puzzling. It is puzzling because on that condition, 
neither argument should be compelling; least of all to one 
like Madell who believes strongly in the simple view. For if 
the simple view is true, then in neither of Williams's 
examples are we provided with evidence necessary or sufficient 
for a judgement about ideneity; indeed there is no such thing. 
On their view we could have no grounds for deciding either way 
about the identity of the persons who emerge from the 
operations, and so any compulsion either of the experiments 
carries appears to be totally incomprehensible. 
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While this is a problem for Madell's case, I believe 
there is a way of avoiding it. The challenge is not 
completely fair because nonreductionists like Madell and 
Swinburne allow that factors like psychological or physical 
continuity count as evidence for identity. It is just that 
those factors will not always be decisive; they may be present 
even in the absence of identity, and absent in its presence. 
They may mislead us in certain cases, as they mislead Williams 
into believing he faces a genuine conundrum about identity, 
but under normal circumstances they are good enough for.us to 
get on with. 
Neither of the two points raised in response to Madell 
and Swinburne succeed in undermining their case. As a result, 
their interpretation of the consequences of Williams's 
conundrum stands, at least conditionally. The condition is 
this: that Williams's two scenarios should be as intuitively 
compelling as Madell suggests they are. If they are indeed 
both successful and contain no internal flaws, then they do 
provide a strong case for the existence of bare possibility 
with regard to identity. In Sections 5 and 6, the question 
of whether this condition is satisfied will be raised. 
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SECTION 4: Does the conundrum show thought-experiment to be a 
misguided method? 
The potentially most devastating interpretation of the 
two cases and their consequences is still to be considered. 
This would take Williams's conundrum to show that the entire 
method of using thought-experiments to support theories of 
personal identity is mistaken. If Williams's arguments go 
through, then what emerges is that we can have directly 
conflicting intuitions regarding the application of a concept 
in a given situation. Such a conflict might be taken as 
indicating that our commonsense conception of what it is to be 
the same person over time is incoherent. Alternatively, one 
might respond by rejecting appeals to intuitions about 
counterfactual situations, in this context at least. In that 
case the conflict which has become apparent is taken to show 
that our intuitions are unreliable as support for a theory of 
personal identity. 
Whatever option is taken, the consequences are the same: 
we would have to stop using thought-experiments to support or 
reject alternative theories in this area. This is the 
position of White (White 1989). Noonan suggests that this is 
also the conclusion which Johnston draws from "The Self and 
the Future" (Johnston 1987), but I will point out later that 
Johnston's response is far less radical. White's response is 
an extreme one, with repercussions extending far beyond the 
area of philosophy concerned with personal identity. That may 
not be a reason for rejecting a response like White's to 
Williams's conundrum, but there are such reasons to be found. 
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A first important point is that the rejection of 
thought-experiments is only a consequence of Williams's 
conundrum if a very strong assumption is made: that what 
thought- experiments attempt to do is to elicit from us 
philosophically correct intuitions. For it is only if the 
intuitive response to each experiment is meant to be the 
correct response that the conflicting responses produce a 
contradiction. It is true that this assumption is made in 
much of the discussion in the literature which makes use of 
thought-experiments. When (for example) Locke presents us 
with the case of the prince and the cobbler, he believes that 
the intuition which "everyone sees" (that the prince swaps 
bodies) is the correct one. It is thus that he takes the 
experiment to show that sameness of body is not a necessary 
condition for identity. But I do not believe that the 
assumption is crucial to thought-experiments' providing a 
useful and important method of argument. 
There is then a methodological moral that I wish to draw 
from "The Self and the Future": that we must cease to view 
thought-experiments as revealing the correct intuition about 
personal identity and its necessary and sufficient conditions. 
It still remains to be shown how they can serve any useful 
purpose once this view is abandoned. 
Let us take another look at the first experiment (or a 
purged version thereof) and note closely what goes on there, 
especially the cognitive responses it invokes in us. Another 
thought-experiment, used in a different context, may be a 
helpful guide here. The experiment is one of Putnam's and 
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concerns, among other things, the meaning of "cat". Putnam 
sets out the fol~owing scenario: 
Suppose ... that there never have been cats, i.e. 
non-fake cats. Suppose evolution has produced many 
things that come close to the cat but that it never 
actually produced the cat, and that the cat as we 
know it is and always was an artifact. Every 
movement of a cat, every twitch of a muscle, every 
meow, every flicker of an eyelid is thought out by a 
man in a control center on Mars and is then executed 
by the eat's body as the result of signals that 
emanate not from the eat's "brain" but from a highly 
minituarized radio receiver located, let us say, in 
the eat's pineal gland. (Putnam 1963: 53-4) 
He then asks whether, should this be discovered to be the 
case, there are or ever were any cats. Does one respond that 
there never were any cats since being an animal is essential 
to being a cat, or does one respond that there are cats - and 
thus that cats do not have to be animals. His response is 
that there are and were cats, despite it now being the case 
that cats are not animals. However, while Putnam is clear 
about his own answer which is what seems to be the general 
response, he suggests that things are not quite as clear cut 
as this makes them seem (1963: 54). Unger brings out more 
clearly the complexity of our cognitive response in his 
discussion of the example: 
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Notice that we do not make just one response to the 
question asked. Even while our dominant response is 
to believe that the correct answer is "Yes," we make 
a dominated response, of believing oppositely, that 
the correct answer is "No." Or, at the very least, 
we have a felt tendency to believe in that negative 
direction. (Unger 1982: 119) 
Here Unger seems to be correct. We respond that these 
familiar objects are cats, and yet we also want to say that 
cats are animals; in that way, we experience the "felt 
tendency" against our dominant response of which Unger speaks. 
In the same way we have a felt tendency to deny our dominant 
response to talk of "demon possession" by the witch-doctor of 
old. our dominant response is to say that "demon possession" 
occurs when a demon enters a human body, but since that never 
happens there is no such thing as demon possession. Our 
tendency to deny this (i.e. our "dominated response") shows in 
our wish to say something like, "demon possession is just 
epilepsy", which implies that there is such a thing. 
In the first of Williams's thought-experiments something 
very similar can be observed. Our dominant response to the 
question, "who emerges in the A-body after the operation?" is 
"B." But, as in the case of Putnam's experiment and the case 
of demon possession, we have a dominated response to the 
question which is "A." In the case of the supposed body-swap 
the first response is far stronger, that is, our attitude is 
less equivocal than towards Putnam's experiment, but it is no 
less misleading to talk as if we have one single (and 
supposedly correct) intuitive response. 
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Unger explains responses to Putnam's case in terms of 
certain of our beliefs and their relative strengths: our 
"existence belief" that there are cats is stronger than our 
"property belief" that cats are animals. In the demon case, 
we might say that our property belief is stronger than our 
existence belief. A similar sort of explanation may be 
appropriate in the personal identity case, this time in terms 
of the relative strength of our belief that psychological 
continuity is crucial to our identity over the belief that 
bodily continuity is. However, talk of this sort of belief is 
a bit uncomfortable in the context of commonsense responses, 
for it is far from obvious that people other than philosophers 
have such beliefs. 
·Perhaps the best way of avoiding this worry is to 
describe the position of the kind of thought-experiment at 
stake as follows. In mastering a language, we adopt certain 
classificatory habits - we become disposed to classify certain 
individuals as "cats", "persons", "the same person as ... ", 
and so on. These habits rest on implicit criteria according 
to which the classification is done; what the 
thought-experiments do is to make these implicit criteria 
explicit. They serve to bring out the principles at work, 
even if these principles cannot properly be viewed as 
fully-fledged beliefs. In some cases, like Williams's, 
implicit criteria which are usually co-satisfied can be made 
to come apart, with the possible result that we discover to 
which underlying principles we are more strongly attached. 
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To describe the results of thought-experiments as the 
discovery of the relative strength of commitment to underlying 
principles which they reveal serves to avoid unfounded faith 
in the existence of "the correct intuition". But it does not 
mean that thought-experiments have all their promise removed 
and become pointless. After all, these principles are 
constitutive of our conceptual system and we can still devise 
and use experiments which will decide which of two crucial and 
conflicting criteria or principles is the more fundamental, in 
virtue of being the one we are least prepared to give up or 
deny. Williams's example, then, can be used to show that the 
relation of psychological continuity is more fundamental in 
our conceptual system than its counterpart concerning bodily 
continuity. Of course, Williams's other experiment still then 
poses a problem, even if the problem is now slightly changed. 
Even if we no longer assume that the thought-experiment 
will lead us directly to metaphysical truth - that is, to one 
clear, coherent and correct intuition, or to some implicit 
principle which is a strict and universal rule, "The Self and 
The Future" still poses a problem. For if, as suggested, the 
first thought-experiment reveals that our adherence to 
psychological features is more fundamental than to bodily 
ones, the second experiment contradicts this by apparently 
reversing the direction of dominance. As I remarked earlier, 
the fact that both experiments seem so compelling needs to be 
explained. 
This problem is important, not only for Williams's 
thought-experiments, but for thought-experiments in general. 
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Should we find that thought-experiments reveal some minor 
conflict or tension in the implicit principles which underlie_ 
our concepts, this would not necessarily be of any fatal 
consequence to the method. But the existence of a case which 
shows a generally felt, direct inversion of intuitions like 
that under discussion would be a serious threat to the 
usefulness and reliability of the method, since it raises the 
suspicion that should any given thought-experiment be 
differently described we might feel an intuition totally 
opposed to the one we currently feel. In the next few 
sections I will be concerned to avert this threat to the 
method in general by averting the threat Williams's examples 
pose to the coherence of the concept of personal identity in 
particular. 
SECTION 5: What Williams's experiments do show 
A degree of relativity has already been introduced by 
giving up the search for the correct intuition, and at the 
same time it should be acknowledged that our responses to a 
thought-experiment may be affected by the way and the context 
in which an imagined situation is described or presented. For 
instance, Parfit's description of the outcome of his thought-
experiment involving the teletransporter4 makes it much easier 
for us to agree that we would survive the experience: he 
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describes it as "I" who enters the teletransporter, and "I" 
who wakes up on Mars in the body made of new matter (Parfit 
1984: 199) 5 • And should Putnam's experiment be presented in 
the context of a zoology seminar, we may well react 
differently to Putnam. But these differences in reaction will 
usually not be radical ones: they may affect what we are 
disposed to say, yet it is extremely unlikely that they will 
reverse responses generally. 
Williams's two experiments seem to be a special case. 
Even so, they do not justify the radical response outlined at 
the start of this section - that they be taken to undermine 
the method itself. They do not do so as long as some feature, 
or features, of their presentation can be isolated, the 
presence of which explains the response evoked, and as long as 
isolation and explanation produces a change of response. 
These claims are not very different from those made by Mark 
Johnston, where he does not reject thought-experiment as a 
method but suggests that our intuitive reactions to them are 
"defeasible judgements" (Johnston 1987: 64 and 80-83) 6 • 
In the case of the two experiments in question, such 
features can be seen in the second experiment. Perhaps the 
primary reason for singling out the second one as requiring 
explanation is that it doesn't take the straightforward form 
of the first. It is not as if we are simply presented with 
two scenarios, to the first of which we respond "A emerges in 
the B-body" and to the other, "A emerges in the A-body". In 
that way although the two thought-experiments do at some stage 
involve descriptions of one and the same situation, they are 
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nevertheless very different thought-experiments. It is not as 
if the seconq experiment is simply the first differently 
described. Ever since Locke's example we have found scenarios 
of apparent body-swaps compelling, and once the second 
thought-experiment is closely scrutinized, it becomes clear 
that we have no counter-example to that here. 
How we are led to deny that A emerges in the B-body can 
be seen from the way in which the second case is presented. 
In the first place, Williams describes things as if they 
merely happen within the life of one person - amnesia is 
produced in A, illusory memories are induced in A - implying 
that it is still A who emerges after the change; but this is 
precisely what we are asked to judge, and our responses, I 
suggest, are being prejudiced by the description given. 
A second misleading point is the way that the huge jump 
between steps (ii) and (iii) is disguised in the description. 
In step (ii) we are told that amnesia and "certain character 
changes" are produced in A. In step (iii) there are "changes 
in his character" and "certain illusory memories are induced". 
This does not sound like a very important development, 
certainly not enough to herald a change of identity - but it 
only comes across like that because the whole story is not 
being made clear. In step (iv) we learn that the 
psychological changes wrought are such that the character 
traits and memories shown and experienced match up to those of 
some other actual person, but that what goes on is essentially 
"the same as (iii)" (my italics). This means that the 
character and memory changes occurring in (iii) are 
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sufficiently different from A's to be those of a totally 
different, even if non-actual, person. But then what happens 
in (iii) is nothing like the few minor changes that Williams's 
description suggests, but a massive - a total - invasion of 
A's psychology. Now, we may have no objection to the idea of 
a person surviving memory loss and some character change, b.ut 
a total and ·irreversible change like this is another matter 
altogether. Were the extent of the change in (iii) made clear 
in the description, then it is much less likely that anyone 
would find the move from (ii) to (iii) intuitively acceptable. 
These two points are enough to show why the general 
response to the second experiment has been as envisaged by 
Williams, and are sufficient to show that that response would 
not be straightforwardly elicited by a clearer description of 
the changes that are supposedly occurring over the various 
stages, or at least to show that that should remain a 
dominated response. But the modification I suggested in 
Section 2 as a way of getting around Noonan's criticism of the 
experiment - that is, by introducing a spectrum of cases in 
which each case represents only a very slight change from the 
previous one - avoids this sort of objection. The objections 
just expressed are only to the way in which Williams describes 
the problem; a similar problem can be described in less 
misleading terms. 
Even though the second thought-experiment can be set up 
in a way which avoids the problem of too large a change 
between its stages, I wish to argue that there remain reasons 
for not taking it and its apparent consequences too seriously. 
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The original problem is set out as a series of cases, each one 
representing an apparently trivial development on the previous 
step. This step-by-step development· along with the claim that 
to draw a line between any two adjacent steps would be 
irrational is a familiar pattern of argument. The amendment 
proposed in Section 2 not only·avoids some objections, but 
offers a useful insight when it comes to the way the 
thought-experiment shapes our responses by drawing attention 
to this familiar pattern operating here. For once it is 
recognised that we are dealing with something of the same form 
as a Sorites problem, we should no longer be surprised that we 
are led into the invidious position that step (vi) represents, 
nor should we see the reformulated problem as presenting any 
fatal threat. 
With the standard "paradox of the heap", one is led by.a 
series of small steps to a strongly counter-intuitive 
judgement. But one does not just accept this judgement, nor 
does one accept that this shows a hopeless incoherence in 
one's belief-system. Likewise with Williams's example, one 
should realise that the conclusion we are led to is strongly 
counter-intuitive in that it conflicts with some of our 
fundamental principles; that is what the first experiment 
shows, and what we have realized ever since Locke. But then, 
as with the case of the concept of a heap, we can accept that 
the most the second experiment shows is that there is some 
vagueness in our concept of personal identity. That is hardly 
a startling admission and has nothing like the consequences of 
the devastating incoherence with which we seemed to be 
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threatened7 • I will return to the question of the possible 
indeterminacy of identity in some detail in Chapter 8. 
In discussing some of the dangers involved in the use of 
thought-experiments, Unger issues the following warning which 
is of import here: 
Even in favourable, revealing contexts, not all 
examples will elicit responses indicative of 
philosophically interesting attitudes in the area at 
which the case may be aimed. Dominant responses to 
these potentially dangerous examples may indicate, 
instead, certain rather general psychological 
tendencies that we have. Although sometimes useful 
to us in other ways, for purposes of philosophical 
inquiry these tendencies will be distorting. 
(Unger 1990: 12) 
In the case of the revised version of Williams's second 
thought-experiment, and indeed of the original version, it is, 
I suggest, precisely one of these tendencies that is to be 
detected. Faced by the use of a Sorites-like development of 
the argument by small stages, we tend to ignore the larger 
picture. If we did not have this tendency we would never 
react in the sympathetic way we do to Williams's second 
experiment, but would see it for the body-swap that it is. 
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SECT~ON 6: Williams's own response and why it is unconvincing 
This account of how the description of the second 
experiment misleads us solves the problem posed by his 
conundrum. However, there is another argument which must be 
dealt with before we can move on to other thought-experiments. 
This argument is the final response which Williams makes to 
his own experiments. As I have done, he argues that one side 
of the experiment misleads by the way in which it is 
described; but unlike my case, he holds th~t it is the first 
description which is at fault. This is Williams's argument: 
. The apparently decisive arguments of the first 
presentation, which suggested that A should identify 
himself with the B-body-person, turned on the 
extreme neatness of the situation in satisfying, if 
any could, the description of 'changing bodies'. 
But this neatness is basically artificial; it is the 
product of the will of the experimenter to produce a 
situation which would naturally elicit, with minimum 
hesitation, that description. By the sorts of 
methods he employed, he could easily have left off 
earlier or gone on further. He could have stopped 
at (the point equivalent to} situation (v}, leaving 
B as he was; or he could have gone on and produced 
two persons each with A-like character and 
memories ..• If he had done either of those, we should 
have been in yet greater difficulty about what to 
say; he just chose to make it as easy as possible 
for us to find something to say ... The experimenter 
has ... produced the one situation out of a range of 
equally possible situations which we should be most 
disposed to call a change of bodies. As against 
this, the principle that one's fears can extend to 
future pain whatever psychological changes precede 
it seems positively straightforward. Perhaps, 
indeed, it is not; but we need to be shown what is 
wrong with it. Until we are shown what is wrong 
with it, we should perhaps decide that if we were 
the person A then, if we were to decide selfishly, 
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we should pass the pain to the B-body 
person. (Williams 1970: 62-3, my parenthesis) 
Does this leave us back in the position suggested by 
Noonan, able to ignore "The Self and the. Future" because both 
descriptions are flawed? I don't think that it does, because 
Williams's case here is not convincing. It is not the 
tentativeness of his proposal which fails to convince, but 
rather the fact that the considerations he raises are weak 
ones, especially in the light of the strong case presented 
against the second experiment in Section 5. 
In the first place, we can show what is wrong with the 
principle that one's fears can extend to future pain despite 
radical intervening psychological changes. The principle is 
only plausible if the situation is described in a question-
begging way (i.e. that A will be tortured) , and the 
description of the degree of psychological change is fudged, 
as the discussion of Section 5 makes clear. 
In the second place, it is by no means clear that the 
will of the experimenter to produce an easy response is as 
guilty as Williams suggests. Certainly, the experimenter 
could have stopped his description at (v), leaving two people 
with the character and memory of B, or he could have gone on 
to make two people like A as well. These situations raise 
interesting issues, but I will argue that they do not stop one 
from reacting to the original experiment as one originally 
did. In Chapter 7 we will pay close attention to thought-
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. experiments that raise exactly these issues, and what will 
emerge there is that t~ose experiments have no consequences 
which conflict with the view that personal identity can be 
analysed in terms of psychological continuity. Williams 
admits that his final answer is a risky one (1970: 63), but I 
believe he plumps for the wrong option. 
SECTION 7: Conclusion 
In terms of the personal identity debate, the. thought-
experiments described in "The Self and the Future" do not 
provide sufficient grounds for embracing the view that 
personal identity is unanalysable. Nor do they, on a more 
careful reading, support a bodily criterion of personal 
identity. Both of these positions are let.down by the faults 
of the second experiment. Nevertheless, we are not justified 
(as Noonan has suggested we are) in ignoring the experiments 
\ 
I 
altogether. This means that the thought-experiments 
ultimately suggest support for the view that if personal 
identity is to be analysed, it is to be analysed in terms of 
psychological continuity. 
As far as our methodological interests are concerned, I 
conclude that one aspect of the popular response to Williams's 
thought-experiments has been correct in that they do have 
something to teach us. It is not that the method of 
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thought-experiment must be rejected. Nevertheless, the lesson 
is that we must temper our expectations of thought-experiments 
like those presented; they can indeed be informative, but they 
inform by revealing which principles underlying the 
application of a concept are most important to us given our 
conceptual scheme, not by some direct route to metaphysical 
reality. 
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NOTES 
1. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Madell uses a thought-
experiment along these lines as an argument for his view 
on personal identity. 
2. In the following two chapters, independent reasons will 
be given for accepting this principle. However, such 
acceptance does not commit one to the views of Madell and 
Swinburne on analysability. As will be argued, there is 
good reason to question those views. 
3. In what follows this discussion, a few possible 
explanations will be put forward, and there are others 
besides - like that suggested by Nozick's "closest 
continuer" theory (Nozick 1981) . 
4. Cited on p10 above. 
5. Another fairly clear example of this sort of description 
influencing response can be seen in Chisholm's 
description and response to a case not unlike Williams's 
second experiment (Chisholm 1969: 104-5). 
6. There is experimental evidence supporting my view that 
our intuitive responses are defeasible judgements, which 
is particularly relevant to Williams's experiments and 
the terms in which they are described. Kahneman and 
Tversky set out case studies which show how people react 
in contradictory ways to choices they are offered under 
conditions of uncertainty, the subjects' reactions 
depending on whether the consequences of the choices are 
described in terms of gains or losses (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984). 
7. Even the so-called paradoxes which beset vague concepts 
may well not be insurmountable problems. Mark Sainsbury 
reviews a number of possible responses in his Paradoxes 
(Sainsbury 1989). 
127 
CHAPTER 7 PARFIT'S DIVISION 
SECTION 1: Parfit's argument 
A second thought-experiment which has been extremely 
influential and which has received fairly wide attention is 
one that carne up in Chapters 4 and 5. This is the experiment 
in which one person apparently splits into two. As was 
mentioned, there is more than one version of this case, but I 
will concentrate on a single treatment: that of Parfit in his 
Reasons and Persons, which is the most graphic and extended 
version in the literature (Parfit 1984: 253-265). The 
thought-experiment has been claimed to have extremely 
important consequences for the debate about personal identity. 
As was the case with Williams's "The Self and the Future", our 
interest will be both in what these consequences are, and in 
gleaning what implications we can for the method of thought-
experiment in general. 
Before looking at the consequences of the thought-
experiment, it would be useful to rehearse Parfit's account of 
the experiment. Parfit assumes that he is one of a set of 
identical triplets, and that each of his brain hemispheres is 
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capable of the functions of the other. He then outlines the 
following scenario: 
My Division. My body is fatally injured as are the 
brains of my two brothers. My brain is divided, and 
each half is successfully transplanted into the body 
of one of my brothers. Each of the resulting people 
believes he is me, seems to remember living my life, 
has my character, and is in every other way 
psychologically continuous with me. And he has a 
body that is very like mine. (Parfit 1984: 254) 
Parfit points out that there are only four possible 
answers to the question, "What happens to me?" in the light of 
this scenario: 
(i) Nobody who survives is identical with me, that is, 
in effect, I have died. 
( ii) I am one of the surviving people. 
(iii) I am the other survivor. 
(iv) I .am both surviving people. 
The trouble is that all of these answers are problematic. It 
would be strongly counter-intuitive to say that the original 
person was dead; that is, that nobody is identical to the 
original. As Parfit puts it, this would amount to calling a 
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double success a failure {1984: 256). The logic of identity 
prevents both candidates from being the original. But to sa~ 
that one of the candidates retains the identity of the 
original while the other is merely exactly similar is to make 
an arbitrary, ungrounded decision. However, those are all the 
available options. 
What all this provides, argues Parfit, is the basis for a 
strong case in favour of what he calls a reductionist view of 
personal identity. The case centres around Parfit's 
contention that the reductionist view can accommodate the 
consequences of the imagined situation, while the opposinq 
nonreductionist views can not. It will benefit the discussion 
which follows to look in some detail at why he sees "My 
Division" supporting reductionism. 
Reductionism, according to Parfit, holds not only 
that the fact of a person's identity over time just 
consists in the holding of certain more particular 
facts 
but also 
that these facts can be described without either 
presupposing the identity of this person, or 
explicitly claiming that the experiences in this 
person's life are had by this person, or even 
explicitly claiming that this person exists. These 
facts can be described in an impersonal way. 
(Parfit 1984: 210) 
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Reductionists differ among themselves as to what the 
particular facts in ques.tion are - whether physical or 
psychological or both, but those differences are not the 
concern of Parfit's "My Division" argument. He takes his 
argument to support the family of views which agree that (i) 
personal identity can be analysed into relations of physica~ 
and/or psychological continuity, and that (ii) these relations 
can be completely described without making any reference to 
persons or personal identity. 
It is worth stressing the second part of what Parfit says 
here, as he himself does, for that is what makes the position 
described truly reductionist. Following on from claim (ii), 
according to Parfit a reductionist also makes the third claim 
that 
· we could give a complete description of reality 
without claiming that persons exist (1984: 212). 
This is a feature of Parfit's reductionism which will receive 
special attention in this chapter. 
A nonreductionist, in Parfit's terms, is someone opposed . 
to the broad view just described, someone who denies either 
both claims (i) and (ii) or who at least denies claim (ii) 
(Parfit 1984: 210). For the nonreductionist, personal 
identity is a relation which does not just consist in the 
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holding of physical or psychological facts. Or, at the least, 
a nonreductionist will hold that these facts somehow 
presuppose identity, and thus cannot be "impersonally 
described". The nonreductionist claims that it is possible 
for there to be a person who has a life (and body) exactly 
like yours yet who is not you, and conversely that you could 
have had a life (and body) completely different to those you 
do have. Nonreductionists suggest that these possibilities 
have our intuitive support, yet are incompatible with any 
attempt to reduce personal identity to physical or 
psychological continuity. 
Nonreductionists also appeal to other intuitions in 
support of their position. For instance, support is claimed 
to come from our first-person perspective in the following way 
(Madell 1981:13-14). our own identity seems to be crucially 
unlike the identity over time of other kinds of things. 
Whether or not we call a stamp collection the same collection 
despite the additions, subtractions and re-arrangements that 
I I J I 
occur over a per1od of t1me 1s very much a matter of 
convention. The same goes for our decision to call the old 
oak the same entity as the sapling and as the acorn. This is 
what Butler was pointing to when he described our practices as 
involving a "loose and popular" rather than the "strict and 
philosophical" sense of identity (Butler 1736: 101). But what 
goes for the oak does not seem to go for our own identity. It 
seems impossible seriously to view your own conscious life or 
a portion of it as a succession of discrete moments of 
consciousness which are only by convention those of one person 
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(viz. you). In this way, your identity is not just a matter 
of physical or psychological continuity, and any attempt to. 
reduce it to that would appear to stem from some confusion. I 
make reference to these intuitions simply to make Parfit's 
target more readily understandable. In what follows, I will 
confine my attention to his definition, and the associated 
principles which he explicitly outlines and uses. 
Parfit's argument for reductionism based on "My Division" 
takes the form of an attack on two principles which he 
associates with nonreductionism. He calls these the 
principles (i) that identity must be determinate and (ii) that 
identity is what matters in survival. These principles and 
nonreductionism "stand or fall together," he says (1984: 216), 
and argues that they fall. Since reductionism is compatible 
with the falsity of both pri~ciples, he concludes that the 
fall of nonreductionism is at the same time support for his 
reductionist view of personal identity. 
The argument concerning the principle that identity must 
be determinate runs as follows. What emerged from "My 
Division" is that none of the possible answers to the 
question, "What happens to me?" is better than any of the 
others. The question is, says Parfit, an open one. What this 
means is that questions of identity can have indeterminate 
answers - the scenario of "My Division" is precisely a context 
in which that is the case - and any theory which implies that 
they cannot must be wrong. That forms the crux of Parfit's 
case: he holds that the nonreductionist is bound to insist 
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that identity must be determinate, whereas reductionism is 
compatible with indeterminacy. 
The reductionist sees personal identity as involving 
nothing more than our brains, bodies and sequences of 
psychological or physical events. As an example, for Parfit 
person x at time t is identical with person y at time t-1 if, 
and only if, x (and nobody else) is psychologically continuous 
with y. Psychological connections and continuity are matters 
of degree, as are the physical connections to which other 
reductionists appeal, and thus the reductionist is prepared 
for indeterminacy. Questions of identity to which there are 
no clear answers or to which one answer is as good as another 
conflicting one are to be expected. On the other hand, to the 
nonreductionist these matters of degree are not what identity 
is all about - it is something over and above physical or 
psychological continuity. As a result, Parfit suggests, 
nonreductionism has no room for indeterminacy where identity 
is concerned. And because nonreductionism implies determinacy 
while reductionism does not, "My Division" is claimed to show 
the latter to be true and the former false. 
As mentioned, there is another aspect to Parfit's 
argument on top of this one about the determinacy of identity, 
one which concerns the principle that identity is what matters 
in survival. Parfit explains the principle as follows. 
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Consider an ordinary case where ... there are two 
possible outcomes. In one of th~ outcomes, I am 
about to die. In the other outcome I shall live for 
another forty years. If these forty years would be 
worth living, the second outcome would be better for 
me. And the difference between these outcomes would 
be judged to be important on most theories about 
rationality, and most moral theories. It would have 
rational and moral significance whether I am about 
to die, or shall live for another forty years. What 
is judged to be important here is whether, during 
these forty years, there will be someone living who 
will be me. On one view, this is always what is 
important. I call this the view that personal 
identity is what matters. {1984: 215) 
Parfit argues that what emerges from "My Division" is that the 
relation of identity cannot be what really matters in such a 
case, or indeed any other. The relationship between the 
original person and each of the survivors contains all that we 
would wish for in normal survival - it is {at least just 
about} as good as ordinary survival. But since the logic of 
identity prevents us from calling the relationship between 
these individuals "identity", it cannot be the case that 
identity is what matters most in survival. 
Why this is of relevance to Parfit's case for 
reductionism is that, following his reasoning1 , 
nonreductionism implies that identity is what matters above 
all else in survival. Parfit assumes rather than spells out 
why this should be the case, but presumably his reasoning goes 
back to the sort of claims that were suggested above as 
providing intuitive support for nonreductionism and which 
Madell and Swinburne felt were backed up by Williams's two 
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cases in the preceding chapter. The suggestion was that it is 
intuitively plausible that you could survive without either 
physical or psychological continuity. If so, then it seems 
that neither of these can be what ultimately matter: what 
matters is identity. Now, Parfit's point is that while this 
principle is part of the nonreductionist position, it clear~y 
forms no part of reductionism. What matters to a reductionist 
like Parfit is psychological continuity; in the example above 
what he regards as important is that there will be someone who 
has his memories, beliefs, projects and so on. Since the 
principle that identity is what matters has been shown false 
by "My Division", Parfit concludes that nonreductionism is 
also false and that reductionism has been vindicated. 
I will structure my discussion of Parfit's thought-
experiment and the arguments that accompany it around a number 
of methodological points about thought-experiments. However, 
it may help to summarize here what I will argue, in the course 
of the discussion, about "My Division" and the debate between 
reductionist and nonreductionist views of personal identity. 
I will argue that "My Division" does not show that identity 
can be indeterminate; or rather, that it does so only if one 
assumes that identities must be grounded (in a sense to be 
explained). But we have good independent reasons for 
rejecting the view that identities must be grounded. As far 
as the second thrust of Parfit's argument is concerned, I will 
argue that even if "My Division" were successful in 
establishing that identity is not what matters, this would not 
support reductionism since the nonreductionist need not be 
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committed to the principle that identity is what matters. But 
more importantly I will argue that "My D_ivision" does not 
succeed as a case against this principle. Finally I will 
argue that "My Division", in conjunction with another of 
Parfit's thought-experiments, brings to light certain internal 
conflicts within his reductionism. My conclusion will be that 
after the discussion of "My Division" we have more reason to 
believe in nonreductionism than in Parfit's reductionism. 
SECTION 2: The structure of revisionary thought-experiments 
In the previous chapter, we looked at one example of what 
thought-experiments can do. This was that they can serve to 
make explicit the implicit criteria we have for applying 
important concepts like "person" and "same person"; put more 
helpfully, if less carefully, they can reveal (perhaps 
previously unformulated) beliefs we have about persons and 
their identity. But something more than this is being claimed 
for the "fission" thought-experiments just outlined. They are 
being used for revisionary purposes: for showing that there is 
something wrong about our beliefs or the underlying principles 
we make use of in applying the concepts, and that these 
principles should be replaced by others. Parfit makes the 
following claim for "My Division": "Considering this case may· 
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help us to decide both what we believe about ourselves, and 
what in fact we are" (Parfit 1984: 255 - my italics). 
If there is an interesting distinction between what we 
believe ourselves to be and what in fact we are, then there is 
something immediately implausible about the use of thought-
experiments towards this end, and which merits some 
discussion. For how can a thought-experiment reveal "what in 
fact we are" (as opposed to what we believe we are)? If this 
is what is required of a thought-experiment, is there not a 
real danger of attempting to infer p from Op? We cannot hope 
to discover actual contingent facts by considering merely 
possible .worlds. 
Should the proponents of revisionary thought-experiments 
such as the current fission one be attempting anything as rash 
as the route just described, they would be wrong. I am not 
convinced that there is not an element of that strategy in 
certain of Parfit's thought-experiments - in the next chapter 
I will discuss this at some length - but I do not think he is 
guilty of that mistake in this case. For although other 
possible worlds cannot inform us on matters of contingent fact 
about our own world, they are in a position to inform us on 
matters of possibility and necessity. For instance, the 
description of a possible world can show us that something 
presumed to be a necessary truth is nothing of the sort. And 
this is at least part of what Parfit attempts with "My 
Division"; he wants to show, among other things, that personal 
identity is not necessarily determinate. 
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To be informative, revisionary thought-experiments will 
have to work in this negative way; that is, by showing certain 
beliefs or principles to be false and thereby, perhaps, 
providing support for a conflicting view. In sorensen's 
terms, they work as "alethic refuters", that is by showing 
some claim of possibility or necessity to be false (Sorensen 
1992: 135) 2 • To explain how they might perform this refuting 
task, I will drop the "possible-worlds" talk and return to 
more familiar terminology. There seem to be two basic ways in 
which a thought-experiment could refute a theory or principle. 
The first way is to reveal some inconsistency in the theory 
itself, the second way - which is more common in the 
literature - is to reveal that the theory, belief, or whatever 
has consequences which conflict with another deeply entrenched 
theory or belief. Both ways thus take the form of a reductio 
ad absurdum. 
As suggested above, "My Division" is best read as 
operating in this way, more particularly, in the second way 
mentioned. Our belief that personal identity is of necessity 
determinate is shown to conflict with other entrenched 
principles - for instance that identity is a 1:1 relation. To 
reject this latter principle (which is usually kn~wn as the 
necessity of identity) is to pay too high a cost in terms of 
the damage it would do to our logical system. In a similar 
way the belief that identity is what matters in survival is 
shown to conflict with the belief that the relationship 
between the original person and each of the survivors contains 
all that matters. As a result the principle of the 
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determinacy of identity and the principle that identity is 
what matters are to be rejected, and we have good reason to 
believe the reductionist view of persons and their identity. 
SECTION 3: Determinate identity or grounded identity? 
So far, the discussion suggests that "My Division"· serves 
to give us interesting insights into what thought-experiments 
can do, in particular showing them in a revisionary role. But 
while it is true that we have gained insight into the workings 
of the method, this particular instance serves also as a guide 
to some important problems, for it is not as straightforward 
as it may seem. 
Let me begin the investigation of what there is still to 
be learned from "My Division" by taking a critical look at the 
first conclusion Parfit draws from the experiment, namely that 
it shows that personal identity can be indeterminate. One 
reason for doubting that this conclusion is justified by the 
argument is that in order to reach it, appeal gets made to a 
principle which is itself-questionable. 
This point bears on the part of Parfit's argument in 
which answers (ii) and (iii) to the question "What happens to 
me?" are rejected. We are told that to answer that Derek 
Parfit survives as one of the off-shoots rather than the other 
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is not a viable option. The reasons provided as to why this 
is the case take the form of rhetorical questions: 
... each half of my brain is exactly similar, and so, 
to start with, is each resulting person. Given these 
facts, how can I survive as only one of the two 
people? What can make me one of them rather than the 
other? (Parfit 1984: 256) 
The principle giving substance to these questions is 
presumably that there can be no such thing as "bare identity", 
that there must be some discoverable property in virtue of 
which any claim of identity or non-identity is true, or which 
justifies a choice between the two options. As it is 
sometimes put, identity must be grounded, and without some 
grounding any decision that I am one or the other of the 
resulting people would be arbitrary. 
This principle that identity must be grounded has some 
plausibility when expressed as it is in Parfit's questions, 
but when further justification is required it is not at all 
easy to come by. A symptom of this is the very way that. 
Parfit makes his point: rhetorical questions take the place of 
any substantive argument. 
That there is a problem in finding some backing for this 
principle can be seen elsewhere among those who are wedded to 
it. An important instance is Forbes, who relies heavily upon 
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the principle in The Metaphysics of Modality, but admits that 
he can see no clear way to jus~ifying it (Forbes 1985: 127-
128). This lack of positive support does not by itself 
I·' 
undermine the principle, but things start to look worse for it 
when we see that there are writers who strongly deny that the 
grounding principle is true at all, such as Madell (1981), 
Garrett (1986) and Mackie (1987). 3 All three assert that 
there are reasons for accepting that individuals can be 
identical or non-identical even though there are no 
empirically observable facts in which this identity or non-
identity consists; one strong reason~will emerge in Section 4 
below4. 
So far no argument has been put forward to the effect 
that the principle is false. That is, unless one shifts the 
focus and counts "My Division" as establishing the falsity of 
the principle that identity must be grounded rather than the 
falsity of the principle that identity must be determinate. 
This is a crucial point; for given that the status of the 
grounding principle is at least dubious, there is just.as much 
reason for taking "My Division" to be a reductio of that 
principle as of the determinacy of identity5 • Certainly 
nothing in the experiment itself suggests that only the truth 
of the determinacy principle is at stake. We are required to 
weigh one entrenched belief against another, and either can 
give. 
This is a problem which scenarios like Parfit's, insofar 
as they are thought-experiments, will share with other 
falsifying experiments: it is not always going to be clear 
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precisely what is shown to be false. This has been a standard 
criticism of falsificationist methodologies in the philosophy 
of science, but the problem becomes especially acute when the 
case involves one belief being bounced off other entrenched 
beliefs, beliefs which like those in "My Division" are 
metaphysical principles which are not obviously true nor 
necessarily clearly understood. Matters are easier when one 
is working within an established theory, merely seeking 
further support for the principles of that theory, but there 
is no such stable background here. 
The problem need not be insurmountable, however. It may 
well be that other thought-experiments can be produced which 
also bring pressure to bear on the determinacy of identity 
principle without making appeal to the impossibility of bare 
identity. In this way, it could become evident that too high 
a price is being paid in clinging to the determinacy principle 
- that too many other principles have to be given up in order 
to keep that one intact. Should this be the case, it would be 
sound methodology to reject the determinacy principle and any 
other principle in a similar position. This sort of compound 
use of thought-experiments is an effective technique, and does 
occur in the literature. Examples of it, but ones which I 
will not go into here, are Mackie's argument mentioned above 
{Mackie 1987) and Parfit's own use of his "My Physics Exam" to 
support a conclusion drawn from his "Branch-Line Case" {Parfit 
1984: 287 and 246-247) 6 • I will, however, demonstrate the 
technique with arguments that I offer in the following section 
and section 6. 
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SECTION 4: An independent_argument for ungrounded identity 
While this methodological point about the compound use of 
thought-experiments is of general significance, it should be 
mentioned that, even on its terms, things appear to be 
detrimental to Parfit rather than in his favour. For there is 
a thought-experiment of Salmon's, on which he bases his well-
known "four-worlds" paradox, which raises a serious difficulty 
for the claim that bare identity is impossible (or that 
identity must be grounded), and without making any appeal to 
the determinacy of identity (Salmon 1982: Appendix 1, sec 28). 
Figure 1 
W* w 
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X 
"' 
y 
f--- I 
X # y 
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u v 
Assume, for ease of exposition; and since nothing crucial 
to th.e argument depends on it, that you were originally made 
up of four basic parts. Thus there is an individual, x, in 
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the actual world, w*, made up of parts a,b,c and d. Assume 
that there is another world, w, in which an individual y, who 
is not identical to x, exists, made up of parts a,b,c and e. 
This is not controversial: someone else could have existed who 
was originally made up of matter very similar, but not 
identical, to your own make-up. It is also hardly 
controversial to assume as well that you might have been made 
up of slightly different matter. That means that we can say 
that there is a world, u, in which x exists but is made up of 
parts a,b,d and e. 
However, according to the uncontroversial assumption just 
invoked, there is also a world, v, in which y exists made up 
of a,b,d and e. Now, as a result of the transitivity and 
necessity of identity, y in v is not identical to x in u, 
since y in v is identical to y in w, while x in u is identical 
to x in w*, and x in W* is not identical to y in w. What all 
this means is that x in u and y in v are distinct individuals 
even though there is nothing in which this non-identity can be 
grounded. 
So there we have independent support for the claim that 
identities need not be grounded, to which even one who denies 
that identity need be determinate must agree. As a result we 
have good reason to see Parfit's thought-experiment as a 
reductio of the demand for grounding rather than of the 
determinacy of identity thesis. It was the grounding 
principle that proved to be crucial to Parfit's attempt to 
refute nonreductionism by undermining its apparent implication 
that identity must be determinate. Once it is seen that his 
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thought-experiment assumes the truth of a contentious 
principle, Parfit's case for reductionism becomes less 
convincing than it was before. But with this independent 
argument against the grounding principle, "My Division" can 
serve as a further consideration against the grounding 
principle itself rather than a case against the determinacy. of 
identity, and Parfit's case against nonreductionism appears to 
be anything but conclusive. 
The argument against Parfit can be summed up in the 
following way, which may enhance its intuitive appeal. 
Parfit's thought-experiment really leaves us with two options: 
we can say that he is one of the survivors of the fission 
process (which' we would like to say), or we can say that he is 
neither survivor (which we would also like to say, in order to 
preserve the grounding principle) . Parfit in effect opts for 
the latter. But the argument drawn from Salmon undermines the 
grounding principle, so now there is less resistance to saying 
that Parfit is one survivor. Since that was one of the things 
we did want to say, that is what we should say. 
SECTION 5: Why the argument that identity is not what matters 
does not support reductionism 
In this section, in the course of raising another 
methodological problem facing Parfit's thought-experiment, I 
will argue that the second thrust of his case for reductionism 
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appears to be in trouble. My contention is that even if "My 
Division" w~re successful in showing that identity is not what 
matters, this does not imply that nonreductionism is false 
since accepting nonreductionism does not imply acceptance that 
identity is what matters. on top of this,_ I will argue that 
"My Division" is unsuccessful in its attempt to show (as a 
case against nonreductionism) that identity is not what 
matters. 
Parfit suggests that "the main conclusion to be drawn 
(from 'My Division') is that personal identity is not what 
matters" (1984: 255). He presents this as being itself an 
argument for reductionism because he holds that only 
reductionism is compatible with the truth of this consequence 
of the thought~experiment. 
"The claim that identity is not what matters," says 
Parfit, is "part of the Reductionist view" (1984: 264). 
Nonreductionism is incompatible with the consequence that 
identity is not what matters because it holds that persons are 
entities over and above any physical or psychological 
continuities, and Parfit suggests that implies that it is 
identity rather than anything else which matters in survival. 
This is then Parfit's case in brief. "My Division" 
presents a case in which I do not survive, but in which what 
matters does survive: the relation between Parfit and each of 
the resulting people contains all that we would want in normal 
survival. So identity cannot be what matters. Since 
nonreductionists say it is what matters, they must be wrong. 
As a result, reductionism is vindicated. 
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These are the points to which Parfit makes reference when 
he writes that his experiment can show us "what in fact we 
are". It is through these points that the thought-experiment 
can show us that we are reducible to our bodies and/or our 
psychological states; as he puts it, that we can be accurately 
and adequately described "impersonally", that is, without a~y 
mention of our being persons (1984: 210). 
I have suggested that fulfilling the aim of showing 
actual facts about us, despite its surface implausibility, 
need not be beyond the reach of thought-experiments. They 
can, at least in principle, reveal facts about us by showing 
what we are not. Thus Parfit could succeed in establishing 
that we are persons as envisaged by a reductionist by 
establishing that nonreductionism is wrong about us. 
Although the strategy is acceptable in principle, I wish 
to make it clear that it is by no means easy for the strategy 
to succeed in practice. One problem we have already 
encountered is that the thought-experiment can backfire, and 
thus that the argument accompanying it needs somehow to make 
it plain that its target theory or principle is the only 
theory which can plausibly be shown false by the experiment. 
However, there is another problem related to this one; 
for the argument also needs to ensure that the thought-
experiment actually does show its target theory to be false. 
This is not just the previous point that something else might 
equally be held to have been disproved, but that whatever 
phenomenon is described must really conflict with the theory 
at stake. 
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The point can be illustrated with "My Division". 
Parfit's ultimate end is to support reductionism by destroying 
its rival; it is to this end that he argues that identity is 
not what matters. But the argument which "My Division" 
presents for identity not being what matters is not 
incompatible with nonreductionism. 7 Recall that 
nonreductionism is the view that personal identity cannot be 
reduced (without circularity) to the holding of particular 
physical or psychological facts; now, nothing in Parfit's 
argument around "My Division" prevents someone holding this 
and holding that identity is not what matters. 
The crucial premise in Parfit's argument is that the 
relationship between the original person and each of the 
surviving people contains all that we want in normal survival. 
He suggests that we ought to regard the prospect of division 
as like ordinary survival in respect of what we want. These 
are claims about which attitude of the original towards the 
survivors is the rational one. They imply that it would be 
irrational to insist that identity is what a person about to 
split should care most about, since the relation between the 
original person and one of the survivors cannot plausibly be 
described as identity yet contains all that we want in 
survival. But, as suggested above, a nonreductionist can 
agree with all of this: nothing in her nonreductionism compels 
her to believe that she should not be concerned about a future 
individual simply because that individual will not be 
identical with her. What the argument shows is that to base 
self-interested concern about the future solely on 
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considerations of identity is misguided, and that 
considerations of the psychological connections between 
original and survivor are extremely important. But the thesis 
that persons cannot be reduced to their bodies and 
psychological states does not imply that we should let our 
concern for identity outweigh such considerations. 
In this way, then, "My Division" misses its mark. This 
may be a problem that is peculiar to that thought-experiment, 
but it certainly reveals one more way in which metaphysical 
speculations like it can go wrong in an attempt to show our 
actual nature. 
There is a second reason why Parfit's argument about what 
matters does not provide a conclusive case against 
nonreductionism. The reason is that from the point of view of 
a nonreductionist, the argument appears to beg the question. 
As I have outlined, the thrust of the argument is that after 
Parfit has divided we can no longer talk of a relation of 
identity between Parfit and the surviving persons, and yet the 
relation which does exist between Parfit and each of the 
survivors contains all that matters in ordinary survival. As 
a result, Parfit concludes that identity cannot be what 
matters (and thus that nonreductionism is wrong). But the 
nonreductionist seems entitled to balk at Parfit's assertion 
that identity-talk does not apply after the division takes 
place. It is a direct implication of nonreductionism that 
there can be cases in which one person is identical to another 
even though there is nothing (else) in which this.identity 
consists, and likewise that there can be cases of non-identity 
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even though there is no observable difference to ground this 
lack of identity. This means that it is part of the 
nonreductionist's thesis that it is possible to have· a case in 
which we cannot decide questions of identity on empirical 
grounds. As far as the nonreductionist is concerned, then, 
what Parfit has produced in "My Division 11 is precisely such. a 
case - a case in which we are unable to decide on the evidence 
available which survivor is identical with Parfit. So far we 
have no case against nonreductionism. It is only if we go 
further and insist that neither survivor is Parfit that it 
follows that identity is not what matters, but to do so would 
be to beg the question against the nonreductionist - we would 
in effect be assuming that personal identity is reducible to 
certain observable relations. Certainly "My Division" gives 
us no special reason to believe that neither survivor is 
Parfit over and above our difficulty in deciding the issue. 
As a result, it appears that the nonreductionist has no reason 
to take the case for identity not being what matters 
seriously. 
SECTION 6: Another relevant example of· the compound -use of 
thought-experiments 
In discussing "My Division" and its implications for 
personal identity as well as methodology, it has emerged that 
there are a number of reasons why the thought-experiment is 
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not in a position to do all that Parfit claims for it. 
However, there is even more of relevance to our enquiry to be 
gleaned from this thought-experiment. I pointed out in 
Section 2 that thought-experiments stand to perform a 
revisionary function by making clearer the consequences of a 
theory: by showing that the theory conflicts with too many 
other important theories, or that it has some internal 
,,/ 
inconsistency, they can provide us with good reason for 
rejecting that theory. 
"My Division" can serve to highlight what appears to be a 
significant tension of the kind envisaged in Section 2 within 
Parfit's own reductionist theory. At the same time, this will 
provide us with another example of how thought-experiments can 
function together to support a conclusion. The tension 
emerges when we consider "My Division" together with another 
of Parfit's thought-experiments, one which is in fact a 
variation of "My Division". I will argue that these two 
thought-experiments in combination reveal a conflict between 
two of Parfit's claims about what reductionism basically 
invoives. 
Parfit has claimed that a reductionist holds 
1) that the fact of a person's identity over time just 
consists in the holding of certain more particular facts. 
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More specifically, for Parfit8 , personal identity consists in 
the holding of unique relations of psychological continuity -
that is, x=y if and only if x is psychologically continuous 
with y and nobody else is {Parfit 1984: 263). To be a 
nonreductionist one will also hold that: 
3) we could give a complete description of reality 
without mentioning persons or their identity. 
Such a description would not leave anything out, even though 
it does not mention persons, Parfit explains, because the 
claim "that a particular brain and body, and a particular 
series of interrelated physical and mental events" implies the 
claim "that a particular person exists" {1984: 212). 
My contention is that another look at "My Division" 
reveals a conflict between these two claims which Parfit sees 
at the heart of reductionism. 
In §91 of Reasons and Persons, Parfit outlines the 
following variation of "My Division": 
I have two fatally brain-damaged brothers, Jack and 
Bill. A surgeon first removes and divides my brain. 
The halves are then taken to different wings of the 
hospital, where they will be transplanted into the 
bodies of my two brothers ... Suppose that one half of 
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my brain is successfully transplanted into Jack's 
body. Before the other half can be transplanted, it 
is dropped onto a concrete floor. 
(Parfit 1984: 269} 
Parfit wishes to use this experiment to embarrass the holder 
of a physical criterion of identity, but let us put that 
aside. By itself this thought-experiment does not damage 
Parfit's theory, but tensions within that theory start to show 
when we consider this thought-experiment alongside the 
original version. If we call the scenario of "My Division" 
world "w", and this new variant "v", we get this picture: 
Figure 2 
Jack Bill Jack 
r l 
WoddW WorldV 
Given Parfit's claim (1) and his subsequent filling-in of the 
details9 , in w neither Jack nor Bill has a claim to identity 
with Derek. This must be the case if personal identity 
consists in 1:1 psychological continuity, since neither Jack 
nor Bill has the required unique relation with Derek. 
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However, since there is only one survivor in v, Jack in that 
world can and should be described as being identical with 
Derek. What this implie.s is that using the label "Jack" in 
both w and v is misleading, for Jack-in-v cannot be identical 
to Jack-in-w. This non-identity follows, once again, from the 
transitivity and necessity of identity. Since Derek-in-w = 
Derek-in-v, and Derek-in-v = Jack-in-v, Derek-in-w = Jack-in-
v. But Derek-in-w ~ Jack-in-w, so Jack-in-w ~ Jack-in-v. 
Now, while the two Jacks are not identical, they have the 
same brain, the same body, and also share the series of 
interrelated mental and physical events. But this means 
precisely that the existence of a particular brain, body, etc 
does not imply the existence of a particular person: for one 
and the same brain, body, etc is associated with distinct 
persons in worlds w and v. In other words, assuming the 
theory implicit in Parfit's claim (1), his purely impersonal 
description of worlds w and v would leave something out, in 
defiance of claim (3) - and what the description would leave 
out are precisely facts about the identity of persons .. 
In this way, "My Division" can indeed be revealing in our 
enquiry. It serves as a good example of how a thought-
experiment can reveal consequences of a theory which are 
otherwise not at all obvious, and yet are damaging for that 
theory. While this argument reveals tensions wit~in Parfit's 
reductionism, it may not do enough damage to show 
nonreductionism to be true. There may be another reading of 
Parfit's claim (1) which does not lead to a conflict with 
claim (3). But even so, the argument does succeed in lending 
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more plausibility to the view that personal identity resists 
any reduction. 
SECTION 7: Conclusion 
There have been two major strands of argument in this 
chapter, and it may be useful to conclude by separating them 
out clearly so as to minimise the confusing effect this might 
have. The basic discussion was methodological, and here it 
emerged that "My Division" serves as a good example of the 
form a thought-experiment which stands to make us revise our 
views will take. Thought-experiments are an ideal way of 
making the consequences of a theory clear - of revealing the 
costs of accepting that theory in terms of its conflicts with 
other theories or internal inconsistencies. 
However it also emerged that there are difficulties into 
which even as impressive and important a thought-experiment as 
"My Division" falls. The most significant of these is that 
the general problem of knowing precisely what is refuted by an 
experiment is particularly acute in the case of revisionary 
thought-experiments dealing with abstract metaphysical issues · 
such as those at stake in the personal identity debate. 
In the discussion of "My Division", what also came to 
light is that a thought-experiment might often function most 
effectively when used in combination with other thought-
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experiments. Not only can this help solve the problem just 
mentioned, but (as I argue is the case with "My Division") 
this complex use of thought-experiments can also bring out 
consequences of a theory which would otherwise go unnoticed, 
In discussing how these methodological points affect "My 
Division", some positive points regarding personal identity 
itself began to emerge. The most important is that once the 
method of revisionary thought-experiments is made plain, it 
appears that "My Division" does not offer the support Parfit 
envisages for his reductionism. Indeed, as a case against 
nonreductionism, "My Division" appears to be question-begging. 
On top of this, Parfit's imaginary situation when used 
together with the "four worlds" argument of Section 4, begins 
to make a case for some version of nonreductionism. This case 
is strengthened when "My Division" is considered alongside the 
alternative version of the same situation which Parfit makes 
use of elsewhere. In this way, "My Division" threatens to do 
anything but the task which Parfit sets for it. In the 
following chapter, it will emerge that there is further 
support to be found for the nonreductionist position. 
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NOTES 
1. I stress that it is according to Parfit that 
nonreductionism implies that identity is what matters, 
because I will argue that nonreductionism has no such 
implication in section 5 below. 
2. Although, as the discussion of Chapter 6 makes plain, 
they do not work only as alethic refuters as Sorensen 
seems to suggest (1992: 132-166). 
3. Not only do these points suggest that we should be 
careful about a hasty acceptance of the principle that 
identity must be grounded, but such acceptance seems to 
beg the question against the nonreductionist. It is part 
of the nonreductionist view that I may just be one person 
rather than another even though there is no other fact in 
virtue of which this is the-case. I will raise this 
point in more detail in Section.5. 
4. one argument for ungrounded identity which has already 
been mentioned is Madell's thought-experiment set out in 
Chapter One. 
5. Even though, as I later argue, the principle that 
identity must be grounded is false, "My Division" would 
not necessarily show the principle to be false as I 
suggest here - that is, the thought-experiment would not 
provide a reductio of the principle. It would only work 
as a reductio of the grounding principle if the principle 
that identity must be determinate were true. But later 
(Chapter 8 section 7) I will argue that Parfit is correct 
that identity need not be determinate. Nevertheless, his 
argument for this conclusion based on "My Division" still 
falters since it presupposes the truth of the grounding 
principle. 
6. I discuss this case of Parfit's support of the one 
thought-experiment by the other in a slightly different 
context in Beck (1992b). 
7. The argument to follow is due to Garrett (Garrett 1991: 
365) . 
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8. Although these are the "more particular facts" which 
Parfit favours, as I have pointed out other reductionists 
might point to facts other than these. 
9. The argument to follow is unaffected if one favours a 
physical criterion rather than Parfit's psychological 
version in one's reductionism. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE TELESCOPE AND THE SPECTRUM 
SECTION 1: The fallacy of the t.elescope 
In the discussion of the case of "My Division", examples 
were mentioned of what appears to be a different kind of 
thought-experiment from those examined up to this point. The 
examples were the one which occurs in Salmon's "Four Worlds" 
paradox, and the one which was used to show that the existence 
of a particular brain, body and set of interrelated events 
does not imply the existence of a particular person. What 
initially marks these experiments as being of a different kind 
is that they are centrally concerned with the identity of 
persons across worlds, whereas the examples we have examined 
had the identity of persons over time, but within a single 
world, as their explicit concern. 
This kind of thought-experiment is also of special 
interest to us because its use brings to the fore a 
methodological objection different from any raised up to this 
point. Whether or not the obj:ection is relevant to 
thought-experiments concerned with trans-temporal identity as 
well is a matter that can be set aside, at least until the 
implications of the objection for trans-world 
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thought-experiments have been investigated. It is worth 
noting here, however, that even if. the objection is not 
directly relevant to thought-experiments dealing with identity 
over time, it could still have relevance to our topic. This 
is because, as the discussion of the previous chapter shows, 
transworld thought-experiments can and do inform the debate on 
personal identity over time. 
The objection under discussion is one put forward by 
Wiggins, who in turn acknowledges a debt to Kripke (Wiggins 
1980: 213). Wiggins does not suggest that all 
thought-experiments are mistaken, but argues that "the method 
of possible worlds" is inappropriate in ~ertain contexts. It 
would be a "mistake" to use it, he contends, in reaching 
conclusions regarding the necessity of identity or, what is of 
more direct importance to the discussion of the identity of 
persons, the necessity of o~igin. 
The method may be useful in investigating identity over 
time - indeed, Wiggins himself makes such use of imaginary 
cases in his Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Wiggins 
1967, part 4.3) -but here it reaches a limit. The reason for 
the method's being inappropriate with regard to the necessity 
of origin debate, according to Wiggins, stems from the nature 
of possible worlds. The misgivings emerging in his mind will 
be set out below. It is important to note first that, while 
the discussion to follow is aimed only at the necessity of 
origin, similar considerations could be produced which would 
affect other transworld relations between individuals or 
transworld identity principles, and thus that the objection 
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has wider significance than it may seem to have at first 
glance. 
The thesis which bears the label of "the necessity of 
origin" is this: the identity of an individual depends in a 
crucial way on that individual's origin; a different origin 
would entail a different individual. This plant could not 
have grown from a seed other than its actual parent seed, nor 
could this child have had different parents1 • Wiggins's 
contention, then, is that the truth of these claims cannot be 
supported by argument from possible worlds. 
Wiggins sees the believer in the necessity of origin 
postulating worlds different from the actual one in that some 
individual has an alternative origin, and then asking whether 
the resultant plant, person, or whatever is identical to the 
corresponding individual in the actual world. The supporter 
of the necessity of origin concludes, from due consideration 
of the alternative world, that there is no relation of 
identity between the individuals concerned. conversely, the 
opponent of the necessity of origin may postulate a similar 
counterfactual situation and conclude that the individuals are 
identical. 
Wiggins suggests that this method of reasoning is faulty 
as a result of the conception of possible worlds which 
underlies it. For possible worlds, following Kripke, are 
suppositions, scenarios wh_ich we construct: "a possible world 
is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it" 
(Kripke 1980: 44) 2 • For such a scenario to be complete, its 
suppose! is required to stipulate the identities of the 
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individuals which appear in it; if we are to be able to 
identify the relevant possible world, then we must already 
know the identities of its component individuals. 
In this way, questions of identity must be decided in the 
postulation of possible worlds. Precisely what one cannot do 
is to examine a world one has constructed and "read off" the 
identities of the individuals appearing there. Kripke warns 
against a "distant countries" conception of possible worlds -
they are not like faraway countries or planets to be 
discovered and investigated with the use of powerful 
telescopes (Kripke 1980: 44). Wiggins accuses those who use 
possible worlds to argue for (or against) the necessity of 
origin of being guilty of treating them in just this 
unacceptable manner - of committing what I will call the 
fallacy of the telescope. It seems then that one of the 
limits on the use of possible worlds is that they cannot 
decide the question of the necessity of origin. 
This limit deriving from Kripke and Wiggins is a false 
limit, however. Or rather, Wiggins does not succeed in 
establishing that the use of possible worlds is limited in the 
way he contends it is, even if he is right about the nature of 
possible worlds. By way of demonstrating this, I propose to 
take a look at an important argument in favour of the 
necessity of origin which depends crucially on an appeal to 
other possible worlds, and argue that it is innocent of the 
telescope fallacy. 
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SECTION 2: A counter-example to Wiggins on the telescope 
The possible-worlds argument for the necessity of origin 
alluded to above is that of Forbes (Forbes 1985: Ch 6 sec 3). 
As he presents it, it concerns oak trees and acorns, but it is 
intended to apply to other kinds of individuals as well, 
persons included. I will recast the argument in terms more 
directly relevant to my topic. 
The argument in favour of the necessity of origin works 
as a reductio ad absurdum of its denial. The crux of the case 
is that if one rejects the necessity of origin thesis, one 
commits oneself to certain unacceptable ungrounded identity 
claims. As a result, scepticism about the thesis should be 
rejected. Suppose that in the actual world w*, x is the child 
of Xe and Xs. If the thesis were false, then in another 
world, w, the same child could have been born to Ye and Ys. 
Fiqure 3 
W* w 
Xe Xs Ye Ys 
-
y y 
I~ ~ ; Ye Ys y 
- y y 
~------11 ---------+-------------
Xe Xs y 
I 
v u 
C:-' symbolises identity,'-' indistinguishability ) 
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But then consider a world, u, which is just like w - there 
is a child born to Ye and Ys in u which is indistinguishable 
from that in w - except in that there is also a child born to 
the X's. Which child in u is identical to the actual one? It 
can't be the x-child, because then the y-child in u would not 
be identical to the y-child in w, since the latter is the 
actual child. The trouble is that there is no relevant 
difference between the y-child in u and the y-child in w in 
virtue of which this non-identity could obtain3 • Since the 
two are indistinguishable in all relevant respects - that 
another child also happens to exist in one of the worlds does 
not seem to count as a relevant respect - the sceptic would be 
left with an ungrounded non-identity claim. The sceptic must 
then (given the formal properties of identity) say either that 
the y-child in u is the actual child, or that neither child in 
u is the actual one. 
Whichever he chooses, it follows that the x-child in u is 
not the actual child. But then consider a fourth world, v, in 
which a child just like the x-child in u exists. Since it is 
quite plausible that the actual child could have been just 
like the x-child in u, we can claim that this is the actual 
child. It follows, then, that the x-child in v is not 
identical to the x-child in u, since according to the sceptic 
the latter is not the actual child, whereas the former is. 
The two are indistinguishable in all relevant respects, 
however, and so the sceptic is once again faced with an 
ungrounded claim. Since all the sceptic's options have been 
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used up, the conclusion must be that scepticism about the 
necessity of origin is mistaken. 
That rather complex case is Forbes's argument for the 
necessity of origin. It is a valid argument even if it 
contains some contentious assumptions, to which I will return 
below. But, and this is where it is relevant to our present 
concerns, nowhere does Forbes attempt to, or need to, "read 
off" the identities of individuals from a given possible 
world. He does not claim to discover any identities or 
non-identities in the way envisaged by Wiggins. His argument 
may hit problems somewhere along the line - indeed, we have 
seen strong reasons for rejecting his assumption that 
identities must be grounded - but there is nothing wrong with 
its use of possible worlds. In the rest of this section, I 
will elucidate this defence. 
Forbes's argument turns on the similarity in all relevant 
respects between individuals in various possible worlds. He 
argues that if one denies the necessity of origin, then one is 
inevitably left with identity claims which are arbitrary or 
ungrounded; specifically with assertions denying identity 
between individuals in the absence of any relevant difference 
between those individuals. This may still sound a bit dubious 
given Wiggins's misgivings: Wiggins's view suggests that if 
the identity of any individual is not made plain in the 
postulation of a world, then the world is incompletely 
specified, and thus unacceptable in an argument. But this is 
not true of Forbes's worlds. Forbes is not guilty of making 
unacceptable use of incompletely specified worlds. He 
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circumvents this charge by arguing in effect that no matter 
what identity you assign the individuals in his set of worlds, 
if you don't accept the necessity of origin, certain of the 
identities you assign will be ungrounded. Thus Forbes neither 
deals with incompletely specified worlds, nor does he commit 
the telescope fallacy - and yet he presents a case for the 
necessity of origin which is well worth consideration. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that it has not been 
established that arguments from possible worlds to the 
necessity of origin involve a defective conception of what 
possible worlds are. There is some importance to this 
conclusion. Wiggins ends up agnostic about the necessity of 
origin (Wiggins 1980: 213) because he sees possible worlds 
arguments as being inappropriate, and yet the only kind of 
argument which could decide the issue. The case just 
presented shows that there can at least be sensible debate on 
the topic. And since Wiggins's argument fails against its 
direct target, namely, the necessity of origin, we also have 
no reason to believe that arguments concerning other 
transworld identity principles will inevitably commit the 
telescope fallacy. 
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SECTION 3: Trans-temporal identity, the telescope and the 
Combined Spectrum 
So far I have argued that possible worlds are not by their 
very nature prevented from contributing to conclusions 
regarding the necessity of origin or other principles of 
transworld identity, but the question remains open as to 
whether arguments committing the telescope fallacy occur in 
discussions of the conditions of personal identity over time. 
In this section I wish to examine a centrally important 
argument in the debate between reductionist and 
nonreductionist views on personal identity. This argument 
relies heavily upon the use of possible worlds (although it is · 
not phrased in possible-world terms) . I will argue that it is 
unsuitable as support for the conclusions drawn, and that this 
infelicity is a result of, amongst other things, the abuse of 
possible worlds. At least on one plausible interpretation of 
the argument, a mistake closely akin to the telescope fallacy 
is made. I will set out the argument more or less as it is 
presented in the literature, and then in the following 
sections show how it is problematic. 
The argument concerned is one of Parfit's, which he calls 
the "Combined Spectrum" (Parfit 1984: 236-244). The spectrum 
consists of a range of possible cases in which a person 
undergoes increasing psychological and physical changes along 
the range. Taking the person concerned to be Parfit himself, 
each case is a possible world in which Parfit is operated upon 
and physically altered to an increasingly greater degree. In 
the first case nothing at all is changed. In the second case 
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a few of his body and brain cells are changed, replaced by new 
ones. Since our psychological_features are dependent on our 
brain states, the result of this change will be certain slight 
psychological changes. The new cells which replace Parfit's 
old cells will be replicas of the cells of another person -
Parfit selects Greta Garbo as his model. Along the spectru~, 
increasing numbers of cells are replaced accompanied by 
increasing psychological changes - Parfit will gradually 
acquire some of Garbo's beliefs, etc - until in the final case 
the result of the operation is an exact replica of Greta Garbo 
- exact both physically and psychologically. 
Each of these worlds is indeed possible, according to 
Parfit; at the moment they are merely technically impossible. 
He holds that the only crucial assumption is that our 
psychological states depend on our brain states, and nobody is 
about to deny that. From consideration of this range of 
possible cases Parfit draws the conclusion that "these cases 
provide, I believe, a strong argument for the reductionist 
view" (Parfit 1984: 237). 
Reductionists like Parfit believe that the relation of 
personal identity can be analysed into more familiar 
relations, such as those of psychological or physical 
continuity. They believe further that these relations can be 
described in 'purely impersonal terms; it is this which really 
makes them reductionists. Nonreductionists deny that any such 
analysis is adequate, or deny that the reduction to impersonal 
terms goes through. Another important difference, according 
to Parfit4 , is that nonreductionists believe that our identity 
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is an all-or-nothing matter: one either is or is not identical 
to a given person; there are no indeterminate cases~ 
This is where the Combined Spectrum comes in. Parfit 
contends that the identity of the person after the operation, 
while clear in the cases at either end of the spectrum, is 
indeterminate near the centre of the spectrum. The questio~, 
"Do I continue to exist?" is in these cases an empty question. 
If an all-or-nothing view of identity were true, there would 
have to be a sudden change of identity between two of these 
central cases; the resulting person in one being Parfit, and 
in the next one Garbo. As it is there is no sudden 
psychological change marking this change of identity to be 
observed. All that occurs is the change of a. few brain cells 
accompanied by a slight psychological change, and one could 
hardly base a claim about something so momentous as change of 
identity on a change so insignificant. 
The nonreductionist, however, is bound to the 
unacceptable claim that there is a sudden change of identity 
somewhere along the spectrum, although we could never know 
where on the spectrum it occurred. Since this is an untenable 
position, the Combined Spectrum shows nonreductionism to be 
false and supports the reductionist view. 
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SECTION 4: Why the Combined Spectrum does not support 
reductionism 
I wish to argue that the case which the Combined Spectrum 
provides for reductionism is not nearly as strong as Parfit 
suggests. As a first point I will argue in this section that 
Parfit's thought-experiment only raises problems for some 
nonreductionists, and not for nonreductionism as such. If 
this contention is correct it is an important one, since 
Parfit's case works as a revisionary thought-experiment in the 
way outlined in Chapter 7. That is, he intends it to support 
reductionism by showing nonreductionism to be false. If, 
however, only a specific type of nonreductionism is shown to 
be false then the case would provide no more support for 
reductionism than for other types of nonreductionism. 
The argument of the Combined Spectrum turns on the issue 
of the determinacy of identity. What emerges from it is that 
if one insists that personal identity must be determinate, 
then one is forced to face the unpalatable consequences Parfit 
outlines, that somewhere on the spectrum there is a sudden 
change of identity even though we can never know where that 
change occurs. Parfit sees this as providing support for 
reductionism because (as outlined in Chapter 7) he takes the 
nonreductionist to be tied to the principle that identity must 
be determinate. I will argue that the Combined Spectrum 
misses its mark because a ~onreductionist can consistently 
reject that principle. 
Nonreductionists have tended to accept that identity must 
be determinate: prominent examples are Butler, Reid and 
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Swinburne. It is not hard to see why a nonreductionist might 
see this principle as part of their nonreductionism. The 
reason lies in the Cartesian view of a person which many 
nonreductionists share. That is, they see a person as an 
immaterial entity - a Cartesian ego - that exists 
independently of any particular physical or psychological 
features that person may happen to have. Physical and 
psychological facts thus appear to be irrelevant to personal 
identity; identity becomes a matter of being the same 
immaterial entity, not of having the same body or the same 
memories and beliefs. As long as this is the case, there 
seems to be no room for indeterminacy with regard to questions 
of identity. It would only be once one acknowledged the 
importance of facts like psychological or physical connections 
which are matters of degree that there would be room for 
indeterminacy regarding questions of identity. As a result, 
Parfit takes it that reductionists can accept the possibility 
of indeterminate identity while nonreductionists cannot. 
However, it is just not the case that the sort of 
nonreductionism which is Parfit's explicit target is 
incompatible with indeterminacy. To recall, the 
nonreductionist whom Parfit is attacking is anyone who 
believes that personal identity does not just consist in the 
holding of physical andjor psychological facts or who holds 
that these facts cannot be impersonally described (Parfit 
1984: 210-212). The latter part of this description is 
telling, for it acknowledges that a nonreductionist may see 
physical and psychological facts - the very things which 
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introduce indeterminacy to questions of identity - as an 
important part of the story. This nonreductionist will insist 
that these facts ultimately presuppose personal identity in 
some way, and thus cannot be "impersonally described", but 
that is not in any way to mark them as irrelevant to the 
concept of personal identity. 
A nonreductionist who takes this line, while being true 
to the spirit of the position which Parfit is opposing, will 
not share the Cartesian view of persons outlined above. such 
a nonreductionist would deny that persons are separately 
existing immaterial entities. It may help to make the 
distinction between the two kinds of nonreductionism clearer 
to appeal to the distinction Wiggins draws between the "is" of 
identity and the "is" of constitution (Wiggins 1980: 30). The 
"is" of constitution is the sense used in saying that a 
souffle is simply eggs and milk, and it does not have the same 
sense as the "is" in "a souffle is a souffle". The Cartesian 
nonreductionist holds that a person is not just a brain, body 
or set of interrelated physical and psychological events in 
either sense. The non-Cartesian nonreductionist holds that 
while a person is not just a brain, body or set of 
interrelated psychological and physical events in the sense of 
identity, a person is no more than that in the sense of 
constitution. 
My suggestion here is that one may well deny that 
personal identity can be successfully reduced to (say) 
psychological continuity, while still holding that the concept 
of psychological continuity is central to the analysis of our 
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concept of personal identity. The Combined Spectrum would 
then only affect a nonreductionist who - on top of his 
nonreductionism - also sees particular psychological and 
physical facts as irrelevant or who for some independent 
reason accepts that identity must be determinate, but it would 
not affect nonreductionism as such. It would be a threat ~o 
the Cartesian nonreductionist, but not to a nonreductionist 
who rejects the view of persons as separately existing 
entities. To put the point in slightly different terms, what 
the Combined Spectrum stands to show is that the concept of 
personal identity is analysable, but not that it is reducible. 
Since the terms "analysable" and "reducible" have often 
been treated as synonymous in the literature, the distinction 
drawn here between the two needs some discussion. The 
question is bound to arise as to whether there is any point in 
asserting the analysability while denying the reducibility of 
personal identity, even if one grants that it is coherent to 
do so. If personal identity is not reducible to psychological 
continuity, then what status does an analysis of the relation 
in terms of psychological continuity have? Why should 
psychological matters be of any concern to the 
nonreductionist? The answer to these questions begins with 
the point that not all good analysis takes the form of 
reduction. 
An example will help. Locke's analysis of personal 
identity, outlined in Chapter 1, has famously been criticized 
by Butler as being circular. Locke suggests an analysis in 
terms of memory: 
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as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea 
of any past action with the same consciousness it 
had of it at first, and with the same consciousness 
it has of any present action; so far is it the same 
personal self. (Locke 1694: II,xvii,10) 
Butler's response is that memory presupposes personal 
identity, just as knowledge presupposes truth, and thus the 
analysans only works by having the analysandum contained in it 
(Butler 1736:. 124). 
Butler seems to be right. You can only remember your own 
experiences - were they not yours, what was going on would 
fall under imagination or telepathy, but not memory. Since 
the analysis is circular, Locke cannot be said to have offered 
a reduction of personal identity. But while this is true, 
Locke's analysis is not circular in a way which renders it 
trivial and devoid of insight. 
For although the ability to remember may presuppose 
identity, memory is a concept distinct from personal identity. 
What Locke's analysis reveals and investigates is an extremely 
important connection between the two concepts, even if that 
relationship is not reductive. The analysis serves to make 
clearer the position these two concepts have relative to each 
other in our folk-psychological conceptual scheme. This sort 
of analysis will be especially important if it reveals links 
between the concept under discussion and another concept with 
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a well-established place in that scheme - a concept with which 
we are more familiar and understand more clearly5 • 
The arguments of Chapter 7 in support of a 
nonreductionist view suggest that any analysis of personal 
identity is bound to be somehow circular, in that at some 
stage the notion of personal identity itself will be used in 
the analysis. This suggestion gets some support when one 
looks at the detail of a reductionist account. Parfit's 
reduction of personal identity is to the effect that "Personal 
identity consists in (psychological connectedness and/or 
continuity, with the right kind of cause) holding uniquely -
holding between one present person and only one future person" 
(Parfit 1984: 263). Quite clearly, the relation into which 
personal identity is apparently being reduced contains 
reference to persons, and thus indirectly to personal identity 
itself6 • But this by no means implies that non-reductive 
analysis is unimportant or that we should give up the attempt 
at establishing connections between personal identity and 
other concepts. Since there is an important difference 
between analysability and reducibility, and since one can 
sensibly accept the analysibility of personal identity while 
denying its reducibility, Parfit's case against that 
relation's being unanalysable does not imply it is reducible. 
Having made these points about the difference between 
analysability and reducibility and shown that the Combined 
Spectrum does not affect a sensible variety of 
nonreductionism, I will for the sake of argument ignore the 
differences within the nonreductionist camp, and treat 
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nonreductionism as a single doctrine - the Cartesian variety 
which includes adherence to the determinacy of identity - as 
Parfit does in his exposition of the Combined Spectrum. 
SECTION 5: One interpretation of the Combined Spectrum 
It has just been argued that Parfit's Combined Spectrum 
argument misses its target of nonreductionism, and thus does 
not provide the strong argument for reductionism which Parfit 
wanted. The charge laid against it earlier, however, was a 
much more damaging one, namely that it committed a version of 
the telescope fallacy. As was mentioned, this charge is not a 
straightforward one, and needs further explanation. There are 
two plausible interpretations of Parfit's argument, and only 
one of these involves the fallacy. As I will point out, 
Parfit makes use of elements of both interpretations in his 
discussion without making a clear distinction between the two, 
and this creates tensions. Much of what Parfit stresses in 
his discussion points towards the primacy of the 
interpretation which does involve the fallacy, which runs as 
follows. 
The Combined Spectrum is claimed to support reductionism 
by showing that our identity can be indeterminate. It shows 
such indeterminacy by establishing certain facts about us. 
The indeterminacy follows once it is established that we (i.e. 
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persons) are complex en~ities in a special sense. That is, 
that we are entities made up of psychological and physical 
components, components such as beliefs and desires (amongst 
many other things) which can be atomistically separated out, 
removed, replaced and re-assembled without the functioning of 
the whole system being affected in any radical way. If 
persons are in fact such entities, then we must acknowledge 
that their identity can be indeterminate, as in the central 
cases of the spectrum. I have no wish to argue with the view 
that personal identity can be indeterminate; the arguments of 
sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 7 were in defence of the 
possibility of ungrounded identity, and not against 
indeterminate identity. Indeed, in section 7 below I will 
argue that there are familiar and not at all fantastic 
examples of a very similar sort of indeterminacy to be found. 
But this agreement does not preclude a question of 
principle being raised against Parfit's particular argument. 
For Parfit's spectrum needs to show that we are in fact 
complex in the sense outlined, and I wish to deny that a 
series of possible worlds - a set of suppositions - can 
establish such facts about the actual world. 
The proposed interpretation of the argument of the 
Combined Spectrum is that the thought-experiment establishes 
that our identity can be indeterminate by showing that we are 
complex entities. This interpretation is a plausible one 
given Parfit's stress on the importance of evidence to his 
case. The conclusion of his discussion of the Spectrum is 
that what he has done is to marshal overwhelming evidence 
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against nonreductionism. He ends off: "There is no evidence 
in favour of this view (viz. nonreductionism], and 
overwhelming evidence against it" (1984: 243). 
I will argue that the Combined Spectrum can only provide 
evidence (in Parfit's own sense) against nonreductionism by 
committing the telescope fallacy. To get an idea of what he 
has in mind when he talks of evidence and what evidence he 
actually produces against nonreductionism we can consider the 
following passage from his discussion of the Spectrum. 
Except for the cases close to the near end, the 
cases in the Combined Spectrum are, and are likely 
to remain, technically impossible. We cannot 
therefore directly discover whether the results 
would be as I assume ... But what the results would be 
depends on what the relation is b~tween the states 
of someone's brain and this person's mental life. 
Have we evidence to believe that psychological 
continuity depends chiefly, not on the continuity of 
the brain, but on the continuity of some other 
entity, which either exists unimpaired, or does not 
exist at all? We do not in fact have the kind of 
evidence that I described above. And we do have 
much evidence both to believe that the carrier of 
psychological continuity is the brain, and to 
believe that psychological connectedness can hold to 
any reduced degree. (Parfit 1984: 238) 
·Parfit's crucial evidence against nonreductionism is that 
mentioned in this passage - evidence that our psychological 
states are dependant on our brain states. But this evidence 
provides no direct support for the view that personal identity 
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can be indeterminate7 • A Cartesian can accept that dependency 
at no risk of being inconsistent. Perhaps Parfit's claim that 
the evidence supports reductionism is misleading and what he 
means is that the facts about psychological dependency are 
evidence for the plausibility of his thought-experiment which 
is in turn a kind of evidence (in the much weaker sense of 
showing it to be a coherent thesis) for reductionism. The 
fact that our psychological states are dependant on our brain 
states would then· contribute by providing evidence that we are 
in fact complex entities. 
But that fact provides no such evidence: the dependence 
of our psychological states on our brain states implies 
nothing about our complexity. It would be absurd to deny that 
we are complex psychophysical entities in one ordinary sense 
of "complex" - it has obviously been established that we are 
far more intricate systems than amoeba or fish. But 
complexity in the required sense of having the capacity to be 
taken apart belief by belief and then reconstructed and 
altered does not follow from the premise for which Parfit has 
support, that our mental states are a function of ~ur physical 
ones. 
So the evidence Parfit marshals prior to his description 
of the Spectrum is neither direct evidence for reductionism, 
nor evidence for our complexity. But then perhaps complexity 
is something he wishes to assume in the argument for 
indeterminacy. However, this option is not plausible. Not 
only would it make his stressing of the dependence of 
psychological states on physical ones totally irrelevant, but 
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complexity is not something Parfit can simply assume. He 
cannot do so because there are strong reasons for denying that 
persons can be taken apart and reconstructed piece by piece. 
On the contrary, the holistic character of our mental states 
like beliefs and desires seems undeniable. 
As part of the system of folk-psychology outlined in 
Chapter 2, particular beliefs and desires function to explain 
behaviour only against the background of a vast network of 
other beliefs, desires, and so on. Even though one wants some 
rhubarb tart and believes that the tart on offer is a rhubarb 
tart, one will not eat tart if one believes that it is 
poisoned. And even if one does not believe it poisoned, the 
tart will remain uneaten if one has formed the intention never 
to accept anything from the person offering it, and so it goes 
on. What follows is that we have no reason whatsoever to 
believe that a single mental state, or even a set of mental 
states, could be removed from an individual's psychology 
leaving the remainder intact. 
To put it in less abstract terms, we have no reason to 
suppose that, for instance, Parfit's belief that personal 
identity is indeterminate could be transplanted in isolation 
into the brain of a blonde actress and remain that belief, 
suddenly appearing among whatever else she may happen to 
believe. Given this holistic picture, it appears that the 
outcomes which Parfit envisages in his scenarios may well be 
impossible in a far stronger sense than that of technical 
impossibility. Any assumption about our atomistic complexity 
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is totally at odds with the holistic scheme of folk-psychology 
in which beliefs and desires find their place. 
Nor should it be thought that these difficulties depend 
upon the truth of Davidson's anomalous monism {Davidson 1970), 
which made these claims about mental holism prominent. For 
Parfit's picture is unlikely to be acceptable even to thos~ 
who accept the possibility of psycho-physical reduction. Even 
philosophers who accept a form of type physicalism see that it 
is vain to hope for the establishment of psycho-physical 
identities other than relative to a particular individual at a 
particular time {cf Loar 1981). In the light of this, there 
is no reason to believe that the transplanting of a small 
amount of brain matter from one individual to another will 
bring with it a particular mental state. 
But if Parfit does not, and indeed may not, make the 
assumption that we are complex entities, and the facts which 
Parfit produces provide no support for that claim, then it 
must be that the Combined Spectrum itself somehow establishes 
our complexity and in that way provides evidence for 
reductionism, or the argument fails. That brings the problem 
to a head. The Combined Spectrum is obliged to establish that 
we are in fact complex. If we are indeed complex then that is 
a contingent fact about us, and to reach such a fact on the 
grounds of the series of suppositions which we are offered, 
the telescope fallacy must be committed. If Parfit wants his 
Spectrum to provide evidence for reductionism, as he claims it 
does, then this outcome is inevitable. 
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SECTION 6: An alternative interpretation 
There is another interpretation of the argument which is 
also plausible, and which allows it to avoid the fallacy. 
While this may suggest that this interpretation is thus to .be 
preferred, it is nevertheless the case that this alternative 
reading is itself problematic. On top of this, it makes no 
sense of Parfit's insistence on the important role of evidence 
in his argument. 
The alternative interpretation, put briefly, is this. 
Nonreductionism holds that personal identity is always 
determinate. The Combined Spectrum sets up a scenario in 
which identity is not determinate. So nonreductionism is 
false. All that is required of the Spectrum is that it 
demonstrate the possibility of the operations having the 
relevant outcomes; if they could occur, then identity could be 
indeterminate. Thus, as long as there could be persons who 
were complex in the required sense, the argument would go 
through. In this way, it makes no difference as to what is 
actually the case about us persons in this world, and so there 
is no threat of the fallacy being committed. One might also 
note that it is irrelevant to this argument that our 
psychological states are actually dependant on our brain 
states; the mere possibility is enough for the argument's 
purposes, thus leaving much of Parfit's exposition rather 
puzzling. 
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Apart from the uneasy fit of this interpretation with 
parts of Parfit's exposition, there is also room for .the 
nonreductionist to respond, even a nonreductionist of the 
Cartesian variety. 8 
The most effective response a nonreductionist can make is 
to bring up the holism of the mental once again. In the 
previous section, appeal was made to mental holism in order to 
show that Parfit could not simply assume that persons are 
complex in the sense that they could be taken apart piece by 
piece and reconstructed or changed. But the same 
considerations have the further implication that Parfit's 
Spectrum argument, even interpreted in ·the current way, 
collapses. 
Parfit's setting-up of the argument requires that we 
answer his question after each operation in the spectrum, 
"Would the resulting person be me?" His charge is that in 
relation to the cases around the middle of the spectrum the 
question would be an empty one, in the sense that either a 
"yes" or a "no" answer would be as good as the other. But it 
is quite clear that while Parfit believes the answer to ,his 
question may be indeterminate, he believes that his question 
makes sense; that is, he takes it that what will emerge from 
the operation in these cases will be a person. 
It is here that mental holism becomes important -
because, given the extraordinarily complicated interdependency 
of a person's mental states, we have good reason to believe 
that whatever emerged, it would not be recognisable as a 
person at all. To add, for example, one belief to a person's 
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psychological system can have repercussions throughout the 
system in terms of changed beliefs, desires, fears, 
behavioural tendencies, and so on. To add, remove and change 
vast numbers of mental states as Parfit proposes would 
inevitably have repercussions of an enormously greater 
magnitude. And we still need to add to this picture that the 
states to be added come from another equally complicated 
independent system. 
Now, to suggest that out of the clash of one half of each 
of these systems with one half of the other one coherent mind 
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will emerge is almost absurdly hopeful, and is something we 
have no reason at all to expect. Yet that is precisely what 
we have just seen that Parfit does require for his argument to 
have any intuitive force. Because the Combined Spectrum, even 
interpreted in the second way, has this unacceptable 
requirement, the nonreductionist is entitled to take his view 
to remain intact after Parfit's challenge. 
SECTION 7: An independent argument for indeterminacy 
one final point remains to be made before we leave the 
discussion relating to the determinacy of identity. I have 
argued in Section 4 that nonreductionism of a non-Cartesian 
variety, which accepts the importance of psychological 
continuity and denies that persons are separately existing 
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entities is compatible with indeterminacy. I have 
nevertheless also argued, in Chapter 7 and,the previous two 
sections, that Parfit's influential arguments fail to 
establish that personal identity can be indeterminate. This 
makes it seem that a stronger form of nonreductionism than the 
kind favoured by the argument of Section 4 remains a viable 
option, and that the compatibility of the non-Cartesian 
variety with indeterminacy· is not necessarily a reason for 
adopting that variety of nonreductionism. The final point I 
wish to make is that this compatibility is a definite plus, 
because the possibility of indeterminacy can be established by 
arguments other than Parfit's. 
It is not necessary to go to the fantastic lengths which 
Parfit does to achieve his conclusions with regard to 
determinacy and the identity of persons; indeed, the arguments 
of this chapter show that it is also unwise to go to such 
lengths. The fact that personal identity can be indeterminate 
emerges from contexts which are more familiar and less far-
fetched. 
Consider, for instance, the case of an individual who 
suffers from Huntington's chorea. The results of this disease 
are physical deterioration and gradual psychological 
deterioration. Eventually a point is reached when the 
individual is no longer recognisably a person at all. Since 
the deterioration is a gradual one, there will be some point 
during the disease's development when it will be indeterminate 
whether we are still confronted by a person or not. The same 
will be true in the cases of certain sufferers from 
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Alzheimer's disease. Now while the indeterminacy in these 
sorts of case is not strictly the indeterminacy of identity 
which Parfit is attempting to illustrate, it is nevertheless 
an indeterminacy which must be extremely embarrassing to the 
nonreductionist who believes that identity must be 
determinate. And we can link it to the kind of indeterminacy 
which concerns Parfit. The Cartesian, adhering to the 
determinacy of identity, is obliged to say that at some 
particular stage the sufferer ceases to be a person or ceases 
to be who he was, even though we can never know which stage 
this is; and that it is precisely the kind of unacceptable 
position into which Parfit wants to push the nonreductionist. 
Since the possibility of indeterminacy is one which we must 
take seriously, then, the weaker form of nonreductionism 
advocated above is definitely the form to be preferred. 
SECTION 8: Conclusion 
The upshot of this discussion of the two interpretations 
of the Combined Spectrum is that the telescope fallacy is 
indeed a factor in one of the most important and influential 
thought-experiments in the literature. For points which 
Parfit stresses suggest that the Spectrum is to be interpreted 
as an argument which involves the fallacy; and that 
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interpretation is only avoided by invoking another which also 
does not refute the nonreductionist. 
What this means as far as methodology is concerned is 
important. It suggests that in using thought-experiments we 
must bear in mind that we are dealing with possible worlds, 
and that subject matter demands special care. Specifically, 
even though an experiment is not expressed in possible-world 
terms, we must be careful not to try and read off too much 
from it. Thought-experiments can reveal things about our 
beliefs and their relative strength and importance, and they 
can also inform us that certain beliefs or principles are 
incoherent or in conflict with some fundamental belief; but 
they cannot get past this to reveal actual contingent facts. 
As far as personal identity itself is concerned, the 
discussion of this chapter shows that Parfit's Combined 
Spectrum does not make the strong case for reductionism which 
he wishes it to make. It does not present a convincing case 
against a non-Cartesian version of nonreductionism, nor does 
it even succeed in refuting the much stronger Cartesian 
version. 
Nevertheless, one central point which Parfit wishes to 
establish, namely that personal identity can be indeterminate, 
is one which can be established by considerations other than 
the Combined Spectrum. What this means is that 
nonreductionism incompatible with such indeterminacy is to be 
rejected. But this is no victory for reductionism, since in 
Section 4 I pointed out how a nonreductionist can hold a 
position which is compatible with indeterminacy by allowing 
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that personal identity is to be analysed in terms of 
psychological continuity while denying that it can be reduced 
to such terms. As a result, the arguments of this chapter 
both defend nonreductionism against Parfit's attack, and give 
us further reason to be sympathetic to a version of 
nonreductionism. 
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NOTES 
1. Strictly speaking, the doctrine concerns particular egg 
and sperm cells, and not parents in the usual sense. 
2. There are other views as to what possible worlds are, and 
these may well have different consequences from Kripke's 
view. Kripke's view is nevertheless widely enough 
accepted for us to concentrate on it here. I investigate 
some consequences of other views in my paper, "The Method, 
of Possible Worlds" (Beck 1992b). 
3. Importantly, Forbes excludes the properties of other 
individuals from counting as "relevant differences". 
Identities must, he feels, be intrinsically and not 
extrinsically grounded (1985: Ch 6 §4). 
4. Again I stress that this is according to Parfit because I 
will deny the truth of this claim in what follows. 
5. These points are endorsed by Wiggins: "No reduction of 
(sameness or identity] has ever succeeded ... Nor is it 
called for, once we realize how much can be achieved in 
philosophy by means of elucidations which use a concept 
without attempting to reduce it, and, in using the 
concept, exhibit the connexions of the concept with other 
concepts that are established, genuine collateral and 
independently intelligible" (Wiggins 1980: 4). 
6. Garrett makes this point in more general terms. 
In each version (of reductionism) there is reference 
to persons in the analysans (e.g., in the RHS 
(right-hand side) of the Psychological Criterion 
there is reference to persons A and B) , and the 
concept person, in virtue of being a sortal concept, 
'contains' the criteria of personal identity over 
time, precisely the criteria we are attempting to 
elucidate. 
(Garrett 1991: 362) 
7. As Madell has pointed out in "Derek Parfit and Greta 
Garbo" (Madell 1985) . 
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8. In "Finding Ourselves: Personal Identity and the Limits 
of Possible-World Arguments" (Beck 1991), I argued that 
nonreductionists can defend their position against the 
~pectrum with two arguments. Firstly that a Cartesian 
nonreductionist can claim that while we are separately 
existing entities, we might not have been, and secondly 
that the indeterminacy which the Spectrum reveals is only 
an epistemological one; that is, that there is a fact of 
the matter who emerges in the central cases, it is just 
that we don't know who it is. While there may be. 
something to both of these arguments, I feel now that 
this response is just too heroic to be really plausible -
no real nonreductionists put forward either argument. 
The argument below serves far better to show why the 
Spectrum poses no threat to nonreductionism. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
SECTION 1: What the thesis has achieved 
The arguments of Part One led to the conclusion that the 
current unpopularity of thought-experiments is undeserved, 
since the considerations on which it is based are misguided. 
Flew's attack on thought-experiment rested on a misconceived 
picture of how terms like "person" and "same person" get their 
meaning. Fodor appears to run together the question of what 
we would say if things were different given our conceptual 
scheme with the question of what our conceptual scheme would 
be if things were different, and this casts doubt on his 
conclusions about the acceptability of thought-experiments. 
Wiggins's attack on fission thought-experiments involved 
treating person as a natural kind, but good reasons for not 
doing so emerged. Revising Wiggins's position in the way 
proposed by Kitcher and treating person as a law~governed kind 
rather than a natural kind offered a preferable alternative, 
but failed to rule out the sort of thought-experiment in 
question. I also argued that Wilkes's attempt to show fission 
and other thought-experiments to be suspect were inconclusive. 
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Having cleared the method of thought-experiment of its 
bad name, the discussion of P~rt Two revealed something of 
what the method is capable of showing fn the context of 
personal identity. One important function thought-experiments 
can perform is to reveal the relative importance of the 
principles of classification which are implicit in our use.of 
the concept of being the same person, by drawing out our 
intuitions as to when the concept does or does not apply. 
Thought-experiments can reveal which implicit principles we 
are least prepared to give up or deny. Used in this way, they 
can serve as a way of supporting a theory of personal 
. identity, and as a way of attacking theories as well. They 
can support a theory by showing its principles to be in accord 
with our intuitions as to when the relevant concept applies. 
They can provide ammunition against a theory by showing its 
principles to be at odds with such intuitions. In line with 
this, I argued that it emerges from thought-experiments that 
considerations of psychological continuity are more 
fundamental to making judgements about the identity of persons 
than those of physical continuity. 
Thought-experiments can also be used against views in the 
personal identity debate by showing that the view in question 
suffers from internal inconsistencies, or showing that it has 
consequences the costs of which are not worth paying. Such 
costs are incurred, for instance, when a thought-experiment 
reveals that the view conflicts with some fundamental 
metaphysical principle like the transitivity of identity. 
This aspect of the method of thought-experiment can also be 
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used to support a view in the debate by showing its opposition 
to suffer from one or other of these disorder~. Parfit's case 
of "My Division" provided a clear example of an attempt at 
using a thought-experiment in a supporting role in this way. 
Although it provided a clear example, closer investigation 
suggested that it did not provide an example of a revisionqry 
thought-experiment which actually achieves its aim. What 
emerged from the thought-experiment and ensuing discussion was 
not the revisionary reductionist view Parfit favours, but that 
when used in conjunction with other thought-experiments "My 
Division" gives support to a nonreductionist view opposed to 
Parfit's own. 
Using thought-experiments in these various ways, we saw 
that support emerged for a particular view of personal 
identity which is nonreductionist but also non-Cartesian. It 
is non-Cartesian in that it denies that persons are immaterial 
entities existing apart from any physical or psychological. 
facts. Persons are not their bodies, or their experiences; 
but nor are they immaterial entities. In this way the view is 
neither incompatible with materialism nor with the possibility 
of identity being indeterminate. The theory is 
nonreductionist in that it denies that personal identity can 
be reduced to impersonal terms. It allows that personal 
identity can be analysed in terms of psychological continuity, 
but denies the success of any further attempt to reduce our 
identity to psychological continuity or to describe the 
analysans without mention of persons and their identity. 
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A view along these lines begins to emerge when the method 
of thought-experiment is taken seriou~ly. In the course of 
this discovery, a number of important methodological points 
regarding thought-experiments came to the fore. We cannot 
expect thought-experiments to provide a direct route to 
metaphysical truth. We can neither expect them to reveal 
ungainsayable intuitions - absolute truths - nor to provide 
evidence for a view in the strong sense of empirical evidence. 
Especially since our context is one of abstract metaphysics, 
when offering a thought-experiment as a refutation of some 
principle we should make sure that our case serves better as a 
reductio of that principle, rather than of one of our own 
assumptions. We have seen important examples drawn from the 
literature of all of these, as well as other, mistakes. 
SECTION 2: Looking further 
While many issues regarding personal identity and 
thought-experiments have been covered in the foregoing 
chapters, there remain some important points which have gone 
unmentioned, or which have received only scant attention. I 
wish to look briefly at some of those now, even if only to 
explain why I have not dealt with them or to indicate where I 
think further research might prove fruitful. 
195 
Perhaps the most notable gap is the lack of discussion 
regarding whose responses to thought-experiments are the ones 
which matter. The question which introduces a thought-
experiment, as we have seen, is most commonly something of the 
form, "What would we say if ... " But who is the "we" here? 
Much of my discussion has concerned our reactions to 
counterfactual situations, and the relative weighting of 
principles in .rug: conceptual scheme. Again, .to whom does 
"our" make reference? Is it everybody, people of a certain 
culture, academic philosophers, or who? The point is of some 
importance since different responses may well be forthcoming 
from different groups of "we's". If one wants a complete 
account of the philosophical knowledge which is to be gained 
from thought-experiments, this problem of whose responses 
count must be solved. I touched on this point in Chapter 6, 
but did little more than indicate one aspect of the problem. 
I have left the question as to who "we" are an open one 
in the thesis. Doing this is in line with tradition in the 
debate on personal identity, but there are also further 
reasons for doing so. Because of the interconnectedness and 
open-endedness of philosophical problems, one has to draw some 
line at where to stop, or one can easily lead oneself from one 
problem into another, without end. To attempt an answer to 
the problem of who "we" are would either have required another 
thesis or would have been obviously inadequate. 
A whole thesis would be required for the purpose, because 
the ramifications of the problem are so large. It would need 
a detailed discussion of the universality of concepts, the 
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possibility of conceptual objectivity and the relationship 
between circumstances and conceptual system. Closely related 
to these points is the hotly debated topic of the nature of 
rationality, which would also need discussion in order to 
achieve a satisfactory response to our problem. On the other 
hand, any quick attempt at a solution would come across as 
inadequate. Consider, for example, Unger's attempt to deal 
with the problem briefly: 
Finally a few words about whom to trust as 
respondents: To begin, each of us Should, of course, 
take stock of our own intuitions, both on particular 
cases and on proposed generalities. In relation to 
a given subject area, however, some of us have 
intellectual investments that can strongly influence 
our responses. Indeed, just by having read a lot on 
the topic, one may become attached to a certain 
approach. Instead of responding in a way revelatory 
of one's untutored attitudes, one may then respond 
so as to favor an approach that, even if perhaps 
only temporarily, is conspicuously endorsed. 
Respondents who are so inclined are not to be much 
trusted. At the same time, a most useful respondent 
will rather fully understand even the more intricate 
offerings she encounters. Putting these two 
considerations together, our preferred respondents 
are those colleagues, and those students, who are as 
detached as they are astute. (Unger 1990: 13) 
This leaves too many questions unanswered. Do we trust 
untutored intuitions, or those of students and teachers of the 
subject? Unger suggests both, although he also shows 
awareness of a tension here. Again, Unger's students at New 
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York University are worlds apart from, for example, my 
students at the Univer~ity of Natal. Their backgrounds and 
the issues which concern them are very different. Should 
their responses to given situations clash, who do we take 
seriously? A quick-fix solution like Unger's just makes the 
problem more apparent. As a consequence, leaving the ques~ion 
open and as a subject for future research is a preferable 
alternative. 
A second important problem which I have not faced 
squarely is the question of which thought-experiments we 
should take seriously and which we should ignore. or rather, 
the problem not discussed is: what are permissable 
counterfactual scenarios? I have suggested no general way of 
distinguishing the permissable from the impermissible, 
although I have argued that specific situations are not to be 
taken seriously, and defended others against analogous attacks 
in the literature. 
The aim of my thesis was to defend the method of thought-
experiment, and to investigate via central examples in the 
literature what sort of things thought-experiments can 
establish. This does not strictly require an answer to the 
problem of which counterfactual scenarios are permissable, but 
there are reasons besides this for not attempting such an 
answer here. Once again, the central reason is that another 
thesis would be needed to do justice to the problem. We saw 
in Part one that attempts like Flew's and Wilkes's to provide 
the required distinguishing principles are inadequate. They 
suggest that only actual examples or cases which fit strictly 
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with the details of our scientific picture of the world are 
acceptable, but we saw good reasons for not drawing the line 
at such points. Perhaps there is indeed no clear line to be 
drawn between permissable and impermissible counterfactual 
situations. 
The beginnings of a more sensible approach to the issue 
are to be found in Harre's outline of counterfactual 
epistemology (Harre 1983: 16-21) 1 • Harre suggests (as an 
extension to Lewis's [1973] theory on the semantics of 
counterfactuals) that our knowledge of the truth of a 
counterfactual conditional depends upon a set of categorical 
assertions related to the counterfactual. The more securely a 
counterfactual is grounded in reliable categorical assertions, 
the more secure we can be in its truth. But these are no more 
than the beginnings of the required account of counterfactual 
epistemology, and a fuller account must await further 
research. 
One final area which is worth mention is clearly beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but is an area where the work here 
might well have useful applications. I have concerned myself 
with thought-experiments in the context of the pe~sonal 
identity debate, but they do not occur in that debate alone, 
nor are they (as is sometimes suggested) the preserve of 
philosophers. Work has been done on thought-experiments in 
science and elsewhere (Brown 1991, Sorensen 1992), but it 
would be extremely interesting to see how the points on 
thought-experiment methodology which have emerged here relate 
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to thought-experiments as they occur, for instance, in moral 
philosophy. 
My discussion may be even more relevant to certain areas 
of law. For not only is the law greatly concerned with 
persons and matters which (like responsibility) depend on 
their identity, but thinly-disguised thought-experiments are 
frequently to be found in its domain. The law of delict is 
perhaps the most obviously related area. In delict, courts 
consider (amongst other things) what a reasonable person would 
have done in the circumstances, whether something would still 
have happened if X had not acted as he did, and what a 
person's life would have been like had they not been injured. 
In all of these cases, thought-experiments concerning persons 
and their identity are involved. It should also be noted that 
these are areas of the law in which courts often find it 
extremely difficult to reach decisions (Strassfield 1992). As 
a result, it would be interesting and important to see how 
philosophy might be of help here to the law2 • 
For all these reasons, I believe that I have identified 
some things that thought-experiments can do, as well as some 
things which they cannot hope to achieve. At the same time I 
have pointed towards the large and complex terrain that still 
needs to be surveyed and mapped. 
200 
NOTES 
1. A similar account is to be found in Rescher (1964). 
2. I have begun a tentative investigation into these issues 
in "Counterfactuals and the Law" (Beck 1993b) . 
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